1NC - OSCE CP
CP Text - The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe should adopt ethical principles to ensure human control in military artificial intelligence systems.
Solvency – The OSCE can establish norms on AI ethics. A declaration would promote international norms due to its history of working across the East West gap and its reputation for building trust.
Nadibaidze, 2021 - Ph.D. Student at the University of Southern Denmark [Anna Entry submitted for the Second OSCE-IFSH Essay Competition “Commitment to Control over Weaponised Artificial Intelligence: A Step Forward for the OSCE and European Security” https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/3/507341.pdf Acc. 4/21/22 TA]
In sum, a political declaration should contain a commitment to keeping human control over existant AI-driven weapons systems. Agreeing to enshrine such a commitment in a document with a soft law nature would be a step forward not only towards addressing regional security threats, but also towards an international framework on weaponised AI. As highlighted in this section, the history and membership of the OSCE make it the organisation to built trust and take a step forward on weaponised AI, at a moment when global discussion at the UN is stalling and when operational trends continue to increase autonomy. Conclusion This essay has argued that current practices related to the use of weaponised AI already impact European stability and security. Operational trends are diminishing the level of human control over weapons with increasingly autonomous features in their critical functions, which poses significant legal, ethical and security risks. Moreover, the lack of definition of LAWS and a common conception of an appropriate level of human control among participating States creates uncertainty and potential for misinterpretation. At the same time, the trajectory of AI is not set to be an ‘arms race’, as “arms races are not inevitable, but can be managed, channeled or even stopped” (Maas 2019, 303). States can intervene in a variety of political ways to address the impacts of existing weaponised AI. Finding a common agreement is a challenging, but not impossible task. In this essay, I have argued that the OSCE is a promising platform to build upon the stalled discussions at the CCW. This institution has a history of acting as a bridge between Eastern and Western perspectives of European security. It is an inclusive organisation which brings together not only the Euro-Atlantic Community, but also the Russian Federation, one of the key developers of weaponised AI and players in European security. By debating the issue of weaponised AI at the OSCE and agreeing on a political declaration with commitment to human control, participating States will address the risks of autonomy in weapons systems, as well demonstrate as the relevance of the OSCE in tackling the impact of new technologies and their use in conventional weapons.
The OSCE solves crisis miscalculation by sharing information and increasing confidence
Egel, 2021 - Nuclear Security Visiting Fellow at the Truman Center for National Policy [Naomi, PhD candidate at Cornell, January, Geneva Centre for Security Policy Strategic Security Analysis” Issue 16, “Reducing Military Risks through OSCE Instruments: The Untapped Potential in the European Arms Control Framework” https://www.gcsp.ch/publications/reducing-military-risks-through-osce-instruments-the-untapped-potential-in-the-European-arms-control-framework Acc 2/27/22 TA]
Information about the types of AWS that states employ, the aspects of autonomy and human control in AWS, the intended uses of AWS, and demonstrations of AWS use would together provide greater information regarding the scope of AWS deployment and use in military operations. They would also strengthen confidence that AWS are being designed and deployed in ways that aim to avoid inadvertent conflict escalation. Although these CBMs would not fully eliminate the military risks posed by AWS (including the risks posed by AWS malfunctions), they could help to reduce misunderstandings and thereby moderate the responses by other states. Additionally, such CBMs could be applied to future AWS. Much of the concern over the risks posed by AWS is centred on cutting-edge and future systems of this kind. Although the exact nature of future AWS cannot be predicted, CBMs that are designed to reduce the risks posed by various elements of autonomy would be useful for reducing the risks posed by both existing and future AWS. Given the ever-increasing integration of autonomy into weapons systems, these AWS CBMs could take the form of an addendum to the Vienna Document, which covers all conventional weapons systems. The CBMs proposed here build on precedents in the Vienna Document, and thus amending the Vienna Document to address risks arising from AWS would be a logical progression that would be acceptable to states. Alternatively, AWS CBMs could be agreed as a stand-alone set of CBMs, in the style of the OSCE’s CBMs for Information and Communication Technologies. Regarding the institutional format used to discuss, negotiate and develop AWS CBMs, the OSCE Structured Dialogue (established in 2016) could provide a dedicated venue for negotiating such CBMs. An alternate approach would be for the OSCE to set up a new venue for such negotiations.
The OSCE solves better than NATO because of its inclusive membership. Russia will only participate if NATO is not involved, due to their adversarial relationship.
Nadibaidze, 2021 - Ph.D. Student at the University of Southern Denmark [Anna Entry submitted for the Second OSCE-IFSH Essay Competition “Commitment to Control over Weaponised Artificial Intelligence: A Step Forward for the OSCE and European Security” https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/3/507341.pdf Acc. 4/21/22 TA]
Other international institutions have shown their ambitions in AI regulation. In April 2021, the European Commission presented its legal framework proposal, which, while not touching upon security and defence, could set a path forward towards a regional approach to governing weaponised AI (European Commission 2021).1 NATO is also due to present an AI strategy and set forward its “principles of responsible use of AI in defence” (NATO Newsroom 2021). The key difference is that these institutions have favored exclusive membership, where prospective countries need to fulfill specific conditions to join. Meanwhile, the OSCE has relatively easy accession rules, as it was initially based on the concept of geopolitical diversity (Pourchot 2011, 183). Crucially, the OSCE includes not only the Euro-Atlantic community, but also other major security actors, notably the Russian Federation. Settling the differences and misunderstandings between Russia and the US is a key step in achieving a security agreement such as a commitment to human control over weaponised AI. In recent years, the Russian discourse has shown a disappointment towards Western countries and their making NATO as the main European security organisation (Kropatcheva 2012, 386). By engaging with Russia upon the issue of weaponised AI within the OSCE framework, the US and the EU would contribute to easing the tensions, while also diminishing the chances of misunderstanding and misinterpretation which could lead to severe security risks, as outlined in the first section. The OSCE’s inclusive membership is thus a valuable advantage when it comes to building trust and mitigating the security implications of emerging technologies (Dunay 2006, 25).