--Extend - OSCE Solves Best
The OSCE solves best due to its inclusive membership – that is best for building trust and cooperation with Russia.
Nadibaidze, 2021 - Ph.D. Student at the University of Southern Denmark [Anna Entry submitted for the Second OSCE-IFSH Essay Competition “Commitment to Control over Weaponised Artificial Intelligence: A Step Forward for the OSCE and European Security” https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/3/507341.pdf Acc. 4/21/22 TA]
Strengthening Human Control: The Role of the OSCE Arriving to a common position on weaponised AI regulation will be challenging. The current global and European political atmosphere is one of distrust. There is distrust between two major European security players: Russia and the US. In June 2021, both President Joe Biden and President Vladimir Putin said that the bilateral relationship “has deteriorated to its lowest point in recent years” (Walters 2021). There is also distrust among state leaders towards technologies such as the Internet, AI, 5G and robotics, not least because they can be weaponised and used for threatening activities such as cyberattacks. This environment makes it difficult to find a common understanding and commit to principles on the use of weaponised AI. Nevertheless, in this section I argue that the OSCE possesses some key advantages to become the platform for making a step forward in the global debate. In 2019, the GGE on LAWS adopted a set of principles to guide the work of the group in the next years, which were endorsed by the CCW High Contracting Parties. These Guiding Principles are broad and have no legally binding force. As pointed out by the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, the “CCW principles were simply intended to guide the deliberations. They were never supposed to be an end in themselves or intended to provide the structure for or outcome to CCW work on lethal autonomous weapons systems” (2020, 1). Moreover, they do not provide further clarifications on the concept of human control, only stating that “human responsibility for decisions on the use of weapons systems must be retained since accountability cannot be transferred to machines” (Principle b). Thus, while member states accept in principle the importance of human control, they have until now not been able to agree on a common definition of this concept, which is stalling the progress of the CCW debate (Bolton et al. 2021). Just like the CCW, the OSCE operates via consensus, which requires seeking a compromise between participating States and can often hamper the decision-making process. However, this institution has been historically known for its ambition to form an inclusive security community and to build practices that “suggest a new model of international security”, described as “comprehensive”, “indivisible”, and “cooperative” (Adler 1998, 119). The former Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was a symbol of détente between the US and the Soviet Union, and a place for two rivals to find compromise on security issues, demonstrating the possibility of coexistence on the European continent (Rittberger et al. 2012, 42). The Helsinki Final Act negotiations were a cooperative process, with the goal of promoting communication, as well as increasing confidence between States (Sandole 2007, 65). The negotiations resulted in a declaration of common norms and values of the participating States. Following the Cold War, the OSCE was not only able to survive, but also to change its goals and adapt to the rising security challenges of the new world order. Its broad membership and comprehensive approach towards security make it a key, if not the most, legitimate institution for European security (Mosser 2015, 584). At a time when some experts debate whether Russia-US relations have entered a ‘new Cold War’ (Polyakova 2019), the OSCE’s inclusive approach towards security is the one that is needed to show that tensions can be dealt with in a forum, rather than in the battlefield.
The OSCE solves best because it bridges East West tensions and builds consensus historically.
Nadibaidze, 2021 - Ph.D. Student at the University of Southern Denmark [Anna Entry submitted for the Second OSCE-IFSH Essay Competition “Commitment to Control over Weaponised Artificial Intelligence: A Step Forward for the OSCE and European Security” https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/3/507341.pdf Acc. 4/21/22 TA]
This essay examines the impacts of weaponised Artificial Intelligence (AI) for European security and proposes solutions to mitigate the risks caused by the lack of regulation of autonomy in weapons systems. Studying how OSCE participating States use and talk about weaponised AI, it demonstrates that the diminishing human control over the use of force and the differences in States’ discourses pose a considerable risk for regional stability. At the same time, it suggests that the trajectory of the impact of AI is not inevitable, and that States should address this issue via political means, specifically a political declaration with a commitment to human control over the use of force. Finally, it argues that due to its inclusive membership, the OSCE can become the platform which can build trust and consensus, two necessary elements to make a step forward in the global debate on weaponised AI. Introduction Recent technological and political developments in participating States of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) suggest a strong interest to pursue, test and use weaponised Artificial Intelligence (AI), specifically weapons systems with increasingly autonomous features operating on the base of algorithms. In May 2021, Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu announced that the Russian Federation has begun producing “combat robots capable of fighting on their own” (TASS 2021). According to media reports, the French Land Army is planning to introduce robots by 2040 (Barotte 2021). The UK Government stated its objective of achieving “a leading role in critical and emerging technologies” (HM Government 2021, 38) and has established a Defence Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy Unit to better understand them (Ministry of Defence 2020, 15). In the United States, the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI) has urged the government to “not be a witness to the AI revolution in military affairs” and “deliver it with leadership from the top, new operating concepts, relentless experimentation, and a system that rewards agility and risk” (2021, 77). Nadibaidze 2 While the global discussion about autonomy in weapons systems is often framed in a futuristic way and focuses on fully lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) – colloquially called ‘killer robots’ – or the ‘AI arms race’, weaponised AI is already a reality of European security. Due to its current wide-ranging impacts, this issue deserves the attention of the OSCE and especially the military-political component of its multidimensional approach to regional security. Nevertheless, so far participating States have been reluctant to benefit from the OSCE platform to address the risks caused by increasing autonomy in weapons systems. Building upon this puzzle, this essay intends to address the following questions: How does the lack of regulation of weaponised AI affect security and stability in Europe? What role can the OSCE play in mitigating the risks related to weaponised AI? In the first section, I argue that the international debate on weaponised AI should take existing weapons systems as a starting point and highlight the impacts of practices related to weaponised AI for European security and stability. By analysing how weaponised AI is used and is talked about, I point to the issues of diminishing human control over the use of force as well as the uncertainty caused by the lack of a common definition of LAWS among OSCE participating States, while examining the case studies of France, Russia and the UK. Further, I argue that the trajectory of the impact of weaponised AI for European security and stability is not set in stone and that the current framing of the debate overestimates the agency of AI and its military uses. Therefore, there is a possibility of changing the trajectory of this impact by, as a first step, agreeing on basic principles about responsible use of weaponised AI. In the second section, I argue that, given its large membership which includes the Russian perspective, as well as its historical role as a consensus-builder and a forum for bridging East-West tensions, the OSCE has a key role to play in terms of re-structuring the global debate on weaponised AI. The global political tensions between Russia and the United States make an agreement on emerging technologies such as AI more challenging, but not impossible. At a moment when the debates on LAWS at the United Nations are stalling, the OSCE can and should take a step forward by building consensus on guiding principles, issuing a political declaration with a commitment to human control over weapons systems, and demonstrating that the impact of AI depends on how states decide to use it.