1NC - UN CP
CP Text - The United Nations should adopt ethical principles to ensure human control in military artificial intelligence systems.
The UN is best to create a global norm for human control because it builds on its principles from the CCW. UN Leadership would restore the credibility of global governance
Bolton, 2021 - professor of political science at Pace University [Matthew with Matilda Byrne, Ryan Gariepy, Emilia Javorsky, Volker Lehmann, and Laura Nolan, January “Addressing The Threat Of Autonomous Weapons Maintaining Meaningful Human Control” http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/17215.pdf Acc 5/27/22 TA]
The 2019 Meeting of High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) adopted 11 »Guiding Principles affirmed by the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE ) on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems.« (see Box 1). Some 40 UN Member States belonging to the »Alliance for Multilateralism« are now championing these 11 Guiding Principles and calling on States to contribute actively to the clarification and development of a normative and operational framework.2 The civil society-led Campaign to Stop Killer Robots is working for a preemptive ban on the development, production, and use of fully autonomous weapons. Similarly, UN Secretary- General António Guterres as well as his High Representative for Disarmament, Izumi Nakamitsu, have called for LAWS to be banned by international law.3 A growing number of Member States have also called for a prohibition of LAWS. At a minimum, there seems to be broad agreement that it is necessary that States have an obligation to maintain meaningful human control over the lethal use of force. Member States, with the support and active participation of the United Nations and other international organizations, civil society and the private sector, quickly need to reach common understandings on how to ensure human beings retain control over the use of force. Improving communication between policymakers and scientific and technical experts is crucial given the dual-use nature of artificial intelligence. Indeed, a prohibition on weapons outside of human control would not be counterproductive to technological development. Rather, there is a need to fully harness technological progress while maintaining and advancing international law that safeguards humanitarian protections, human rights and international peace and security. Therefore, in September and October 2020, the Friedrich- Ebert-Stiftung New York Office (FESN Y) launched the »New Alliances for Meaningful Human Control« project aimed at building on the 11 Guiding Principles on LAWS and moving them to the next level, towards international legal instruments that regulate high-tech weapons and prohibit LAWS. Linked to the UN 75 Global Governance Forum,4 FESN Y convened three discussions with representatives of governments, the United Nations, academia, civil society and the private sector to discuss the moral, ethical, legal and humanitarian challenges posed by LAWS (see Annex I for list of participants). Participants, speaking under Chatham House Rule, offered many diverse viewpoints, representing different perspectives on LAWS and pathways to addressing the risk they pose. 5 This paper is rooted in the discussions facilitated by FESN Y. While it summarizes the agreements between the co-authors, who participated, it does not purport to represent the views of all members of the discussions. For instance, participants disagreed on the precise meaning, scope and value of the 11 Guiding Principles. However, a significant majority agreed that good faith interpretation of the 11 Guiding Principles – particularly paragraphs b), c) and d) (see Box 1) – required progress toward negotiation of a legally-binding multilateral instrument mandating a positive obligation to maintain meaningful human control over the use of force, at the level of individual attacks. Given the contested international political environment, progress toward negotiating a legally-binding instrument would also demonstrate the potential for effective global governance, as currently spearheaded by the Alliance for Multilateralism. Towards this end, the subsequent paper argues that a potential venue for negotiating such a mandate could be within the CC W, in the form of a new protocol on meaningful human control. While positive obligations would be the most suitable starting point, a new protocol should also entail principles about technologies not to be developed and deployed. In what follows, two main issues will be addressed to help States as they move toward negotiations on a treaty to ensure meaningful human control: First, meaningful positive obligations, and second, legally-binding control.
UN action solves for the case – it establishes global norms, provides flexibility, and serves as a clearinghouse for information even without a formal treaty.
Sauer, 2021 - Senior Research Fellow at Bundeswehr University [Frank serves on the International Panel on the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons IRRC No. 913 March “Stepping back from the brink: Why multilateral regulation of autonomy in weapons systems is difficult, yet imperative and feasible” https://international-review.icrc.org/articles/stepping-back-from-brink-regulation-of-autonomous-weapons-systems-913 Acc 4/5/22 TA]
Fostering norm development in the CCW LAWS keep steadily gathering media attention around the globe.104 With mounting public pressure and increased scrutiny, there will be a strong incentive for CCW States Parties to produce tangible results for the 2021 Review Conference. The “aspects of the normative and operational framework” that are to be further developed over the course of 2021 could take a more concrete shape in three steps. First, consensus seems achievable on shared language that adopts the by now widely accepted functionalist view of weapon autonomy as well as a common understanding that some form of positive obligation and affirmation of the principle of human control over weapons systems is required.105 The CCW's guiding principle (b) already points this way in stating that “[h]uman responsibility for decisions on the use of weapons systems must be retained since accountability cannot be transferred to machines”.106 The Forum for Supporting the 2020 GGE on LAWS conducted in April 2020 as a webcast by the German Federal Foreign Office, with 320 registered participants representing sixty-three CCW States Parties, underlined the importance of further conceptualizing the human element. Controllability of weapons is arguably a proto-norm already,107 and a shared terminology – be it “meaningful human control” or some other formulation – could be found to stipulate in a general sense when humans and when machines are to be performing which function in the targeting cycle. The ICRC and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) recently presented a conceptual framework that can support this effort of operationalizing human control – that is, of clarifying the “who, what, when and how” of controlling weapons and limiting their autonomy.108 Second, since there is no one-size-fits-all standard of meaningful human control, the sharing of best practices and, more importantly, of case studies of specific weapons systems and operational scenarios could allow CCW States Parties to develop a deeper, shared conceptual grasp of the intricacies involved with implementing human control in design and use. The GGE is uniquely suited to facilitate these sorts of deep dives with analyses from multiple stakeholders and a sharing of legal, ethical and operational views. Smaller expert groups such as the International Panel on the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons (iPRAW) and the commission on the responsible use of technologies in the Franco-German Future Combat Air System are already beginning to organize their research toward that end. Third, a differentiated implementation scheme could be developed that conceives of human control as being exercised in a context-dependent way – that is, contingent on the weapons system, its mission environment, “target profiles”109 and additional factors such as mission duration.110 This human control scheme could prescribe minimum standards for controllability by design, for example regarding the ergonomics of human–machine interfaces, and determine “levels of human supervisory control”111 in use – that is, the tactics, techniques and procedures required to keep human control and responsibility intact during the system's operation. It currently seems unlikely that the CCW process, even if it were to complete these three steps, will end up yielding more than “soft law”, such as a consensual political declaration or a catalogue of best practices. In fact, a complete breakdown of the CCW process in Geneva is also within the realm of possibility. But even if the CCW turns out not to be the venue from which a legally binding regulation for weapon autonomy emerges, it has already served as an information hub and norm incubator for the last six years – and will continue to do. Especially considering the effect of the COVID-19 crisis on meeting schedules around the globe, it is currently too early to tell if other fora – and if so, which ones – can and should pick up the ball on regulation where the CCW leaves it in 2021, in order to further develop and codify the human control norm as binding international law.