Extend - Modelling Solvency
The UN establishes a global model because it brings together the experience and information from many states.
International Panel on the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons, 2021 [(iPRAW) coordinated by: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, July “Building Blocks for a Regulation on LAWS and Human Control Updated Recommendations to the GGE on LAWS” https://www.readkong.com/page/building-blocks-for-a-regulation-on-laws-and-human-control-8617434 Acc 2/27/22 TA]
SOFT LAW Best Practices: States Parties to a CCW Protocol (or any other regulatory instrument) could meet regularly with the specific purpose of sharing experiences that were already made at the domestic level regarding the design, development, acquisition, deployment, and use of weapon systems with autonomous functions (under the assumption that the use of such weapons is lawful, meaning that human control is maintained). Especially States with significant experience in this area could provide knowledge and information about regulating LAWS and could show how human control is maintained in practice. Such experiences could serve as exemplary model for other States. Best practices are also a helpful instrument to establish additional standards on the design, development, acquisition, deployment, and use of LAWS based on cooperation, transparency, trust, and confidentiality. The sharing of best practices could promote the adoption of domestic laws on LAWS, ensuring that human control is maintained as required by military, legal, and ethical considerations.
The UN can build consensus over time for a global norm.
Sauer, 2021 - Senior Research Fellow at Bundeswehr University [Frank serves on the International Panel on the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons IRRC No. 913 March “Stepping back from the brink: Why multilateral regulation of autonomy in weapons systems is difficult, yet imperative and feasible” https://international-review.icrc.org/articles/stepping-back-from-brink-regulation-of-autonomous-weapons-systems-913 Acc 4/5/22 TA]
Conclusion A multilateral regulation of autonomy in weapons systems – that is, codifying a legally binding obligation to retain meaningful human control over the use of force – is difficult yet imperative to achieve. Severe strategic as well as ethical mid- and long-term risks, such as unintended conflict escalation at machine speed and the violation of human dignity, outweigh any short-term military benefits. This analysis has illustrated how regulating weapon autonomy is feasible, presenting a three-step process to facilitate stepping back from the brink: step one, foster the emerging consensus on the notion that a positive obligation to retain human control over weapons systems is prudent and urgently required; step two, further develop the insight that there is no one-size-fits-all standard of meaningful human control; and step three, devise differentiated, context-dependent human control schemes for weapons systems. Given the current geopolitical landscape and the lack of political will to engage in arms control efforts, the taking of these steps will resemble a marathon, not a sprint. After all, the perceived military value of weapon autonomy is exceptionally high, and the issue itself is elusive, requiring an innovative, qualitative approach to arms control. But history clearly suggests that great powers are not devoid of sensitivity to the accumulation of collective risks – otherwise arms control on nuclear, chemical and biological weapons would never have seen the light of day. The emerging technologies of the twenty-first century present humankind with the opportunity to demonstrate that it has learned from history before the risks have manifested themselves to their full extent. Humans do terrible things to each other in war, and there is no technological fix for that. But the international community can at least set rules to curb against uncontrolled escalation and the crossing of fundamental moral lines. If we fail to do so, we will not only lose the breathing room to ponder and deliberate responses,112 an essential requirement of political conflict management, as the Cuban Missile Crisis strongly suggests;113 we will also allow “the ultimate indignity” of war turning into “death by algorithm”.114