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The Affirmative plan and discourse rely on humanist assumptions. The focus on human control reinforces the human/machine binary, which justifies human and team violence by condemning violence by AI. The focus on human dignity centers Value on human life, which Devalues and Marginalizes machine or cyborg life as “artificial.”

Jones, 2018 - Lecturer in Law at the University of Essex [Emily “A Posthuman-Xenofeminist Analysis of the Discourse on Autonomous Weapons Systems and Other Killing Machines” Australian Feminist Law Journal 44(1) August 1 https://doi.org/10.1080/13200968.2018.1465333 Acc 2/2/21 TA]

4.1 Challenging the Humanist Discourse around Autonomous Weapons: A Posthuman Analysis Despite the challenges posed, calls for a ban remain strong. However, there are very large differences between the people who call for a ban. NGOs, for example, tend to take a humanitarian stance, noting the need to promote a humanist ethics and uphold the rules of IHL. Alternatively, however, there are those in this group who do not fundamentally come from a humanist background but come from the perspective of futurism.113 Whilst the position of NGOs comes from the humanist discourse of IHL and the need to protect human life over all others, aligning more with the human dignity standpoint of religious leaders, some tech experts like Elon Musk fully embrace the posthuman future while working to ensure that this future remains ethical, albeit working within the confines of capitalism.114 The will to construct the future from the now can be seen through the project OpenAI, which Musk co-founded.115 OpenAI is a project which seeks to disrupt the current corporate trend in AI research, where most of the research into AI is being done by large companies such as Google or in research centres such as MIT, with many of the findings of this research kept private in the hope of using them for profit. OpenAI is a non-profit organisation which seeks to disrupt corporate monopolies on AI research by committing to make all of its research and patents public, as well as through offering to work freely with any group or organisation.116 Noting the threat AI could pose to humanity, OpenAI aims to create a friendly General Artificial Intelligence (GAI) - a system which can do more than just one thing such as speak or play chess; one which has ‘human’ characteristics.117 OpenAI thus represents a clear, strategic effort to disrupt current trends in technology and AI development, including the will to make profit, aiming to bring a different ethical standpoint to the realm of AI research working, hopefully, to create a better future.118 All the groups who call for a preventative ban fundamentally agree that machines should not make life/death decisions. However, while NGOs seek to protect humans now within the confines of the present, with the risk of becoming out of date, futurist tech experts fundamentally believe that ‘the best way to predict the future is to invent it’.119 OpenAI represents a move towards shaping technological advancement now to prevent the existence of killer machines. Such aims are very similar to xenofeminist aims: the wish to appropriate technology for feminist aims. Whilst xenofeminism does not explicitly address the threat to life technology could pose, I argue that the wish to define and use technology for feminist aims inherently includes the wish to ensure that technology remains ‘friendly’.120 While OpenAI wishes to create a friendly AI, however, they do not explicitly define what ‘friendly’ means. Xenofeminism, on the other hand, is explicitly informed by a feminist ethos which seeks to ensure that ‘friendly’ means non-killer as a minimum. There is a need, as I will suggest, to bring these two bodies of thought together. Gender theory is required in this area due to its long history of theorising and applying a set of complex and nuanced tools which seek to promote equality and justice, these ethics forming what I argue should constitute ‘friendly’ technology. While there is a need to ensure that IHL is upheld and that robots do not kill, it is also clear that this ethical dilemma does not just apply to autonomous weapons. While the organisations mentioned above clearly have at least some form anti-militarism as a core aim,121 the temporal horizon of such NGOs remains limited. NGOs largely maintain a strict humanist stance, focusing on the realm of international law and the need to promote and protect existing legal frameworks such as IHL which situate the human at the centre of the paradigm. Whilst this has historically produced many great achievements, such a humanist stance cannot be applied given the rapid pace at which technology is now developing. AI may not only pose a threat to the lives of humans where designed, purposefully, to kill, but may also pose a threat to life in and of itself, as it exists. There is a need for all groups who are working to promote ethical technologies to consider not only what may seem attainable now, but what is feasibly attainable in the future, noting the ways in which the now can be used to construct the future. NGOs continue to situate the human as the centre of their paradigm, seeing the machine as the ‘other’ to the human. This can be seen in the way in which autonomy is discussed in relation to the human who is imagined as either in/on/out of the loop, which does not account for the ways in which humans and machines work in connection.122 Posthumanism, on the other hand, challenges the centrality of the human within Western thinking, working to re- think the human/machine binary. Feminist posthumanism notes that something else is needed; a new way of defining subjectivity which sees the complexities and interconnections between humans and others: nature, technology, animals, etc., rejecting the human as the central paradigm and noting how the human is located instead ‘in the flow of relations with multiple others’.123 The humanist discourse around autonomous weapons ignores the posthuman reality that humans and machines are already working in connection with one another. Life/death decisions are already being made by human-machine combinations, as the next section illustrates. Banning autonomous weapons is not enough: there is a need to consider the ways in which machines are already making these decisions and to create ethical frameworks for these and future technologies, rebutting the false exceptionalisation which surrounds the current discourse on autonomous weapons. 4.2 Machine-Human Life/Death Decision Making As Jasanoff notes, technology is based around a set of decisions.124 Jasanoff observes that we often do not question these decisions until there is an accident – at which point we find who made the mistake.125 However, she argues that people ‘have spent a great deal more energy thinking about how to make good laws than about how to design good technological objects’.126 Yet, she continues, ‘in democratic societies, uncontrolled delegation of power is seen as a basic threat to freedom’.127 We must ‘understand how power is delegated to technological systems’.128 The need to understand how power and decision-making are delegated to technology is ever more urgent in the realm of life/death decision-making. However, as noted, the humanist discourse on autonomous weapons fails to account for the ways in which humans and machines are already working together to make life/death decisions. The most obvious example is the use of programming and algorithms in drone warfare. While many drone strikes are conducted as ‘personality strikes’ – i.e. strikes on a particular, key, well-known person – these occur only a few times a year, with ‘signature strikes’ happening a few times a week.129 These attacks are conducted on the basis of a ‘pattern of life’ analysis. ‘Pattern of life’ analysis develops a profile of an individual or a network of individuals by drawing on all the intelligence available, which includes things like drone and other aerial surveillance intelligence, communications interceptions, as well as phone tapping information and GPS tracking information.130 What becomes clear in ‘drone warfare’, therefore, is that the drone itself is only one part of a broader system which includes big data, algorithms, intelligence collection, chains of command, and bureaucratic formations, among other technologies and practices.131 This data is then often combined with individual tracking through the use of mobile phone and GPS tracking systems in order to both watch movements as well as to target individuals.132 The gathering of this information builds up to create a file of information collected by machines which, as Chamayou has noted ‘once it becomes thick enough, will constitute a death warrant’.133 This is an example of part-machine life/death decision-making. Part of the decision-making process here is already done by machines which gather this data and predict the likelihood of an individual’s involvement with terrorist organisations. While the human is clearly involved, in that they then must note the results of the data collected, deem it enough to act upon and then operate the drone to kill the subject in question, the machine and the human are making life/death decisions together. It is also worth nothing, as Wilcox has shown, the ways in which this data is often interpreted in racialised and gendered ways.134 Such processes of human-machine life/death decision-making would not be covered under a ban of autonomous weapons. It thus seems that part of the problem with the debate around autonomous weapons is the debate around autonomy itself. By trying to define autonomy instead of working to understand automation and autonomy as in continuum, international debates on autonomous weapons other the machine from the human, creating a false paradigm. Such a limited account of autonomy works to set the standard so high for machine decision-making that, in the end, almost nothing may be covered under a ban. In the meantime, machines are already making of life/death decisions alongside humans. Machine involvement in such decision-making processes is only set to increase, as the next section will illustrate.

Military Doctrine determines the Status and Value of artificial intelligence – it can define AI as a tool, or as an autonomous agent.

Vestner, 2021 - Head of Security and Law Programme at Geneva Centre for Security Policy [Tobias, July 8 “Warfare and Artificial Intelligence” in Robin Geiß and Henning Lahmann (eds), Research Handbook on Warfare and Artificial Intelligence -forthcoming https://www.gcsp.ch/publications/military-operations-and-artificial-intelligenceGCSP Acc 5/27/22 TA]

In response to AI’s particular characteristics, military doctrine is the appropriate means to define how armed forces perceive, understand, and value AI. Due to AI’s high levels of autonomy, armed forces may need to specify whether AI is considered as a technical tool or rather as an agent. In this sense, doctrine can define if the armed forces perceive AI as simply a mathematical, technical system, or rather a tool with cognitive abilities which can act as an autonomous influencer.51 As a corollary and based on doctrine’s function to shape armed forces’ culture, principles, and identity, doctrine can define the value, place, and role of humans in the organization and its processes. Since military operations and warfare remain endeavours for human purposes in a human world, doctrine can specify what this means. In this context, doctrines can also define values and principles on human interaction with AI systems, including that AI needs to serve humans and not the opposite.

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