Security K Links
State discourse on AI shapes the norms for conflict – the Aff portrays AI technology as “inevitable” and a “competition.” This shapes our perceptions of other states.
Bode, 2021 - Professor of International Relations at the University of Southern Denmark [Ingvild June 25, AutoNorms “Reflecting on the Future Norms of Warfare” https://www.autonorms.eu/reflecting-on-the-future-norms-of-warfare-2/ Acc. 5/27/22 TA]
Further, in terms of other factors that may continue to shape/disrupt current norms of conflict and warfare, we should also consider the arguments that states offer. State discourse often points to the inevitability of integrating more and more AI into weapon systems. The reason for this is often two-fold: first, states map out weaponised AI as part of a steady, irresistible process that they cannot resist. Second, we have also seen an emphasis on great power competition resurfacing. From a US (and a UK) perspective, it is necessary to include ever more AI into weapon systems because China (or to a lesser extent Russia) are doing it. China and Russia, in turn, speak of the same necessity as a reaction to US (and allied states) moves. What gets lost in these dynamics is that both options represent particular, not exclusive courses of action that policymakers can or cannot engage in. In sum, tracking how norms of conflict and warfare change, especially considering emerging technologies, requires going beyond a narrow and toward a critical understanding of international law. I argue that we can expect to see norms, when defined broadly as understandings of appropriateness, emerging in practices of designing, training for, and operating (novel) weapon systems. How these norms relate to standards enshrined in international law is an active research question.
“Inevitability” arguments are deterministic – they rely on the assumption that technology shapes society.
Trabucco and Stanley-Lockman, 2022 – prof of Political Science, University of Copenhagen and prof of Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University [Lena and Zoe, The Oxford Handbook of AI Governance, March, “NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs” https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780197579329-e-69 Acc 4/16/22 TA]
However, this is complicated by the reality that military organizations that see technological superiority as a core element of deterrence and defense, including NATO, engage in forms of technological determinism that STS scholars squarely reject. Respective views on technological determinism—which considers that technology shapes society as a largely autonomous process with limited human agency—thus creates a tension for governance prospects.15 To spotlight the aspects of military innovation related to governance, this section briefly expands on the overlaps and tensions between STS and military innovation literature.
Our rhetoric of an “Arms Race” is threat construction – current AI development is not a race.
Scharre, 2021 - Director of Studies at Center for New American Security [Paul, Texas National Security Review Vol 4, Iss 3 Summer “Debunking the AI Arms Race Theory” https://tnsr.org/2021/06/debunking-the-ai-arms-race-theory/Artificial Intelligence Acc 5/27/22 TA]
Current Military AI Competition Is Not an “Arms Race” As Heather Roff has written, the arms race framing “misrepresents the competition going on among countries.”5 To begin with, AI is not a weapon. AI is a general-purpose enabling technology with myriad applications. It is not like a missile or a tank. It is more like electricity, the internal combustion engine, or computer networks.6 General-purpose technologies like AI have applications across a range of industries. Wired magazine co-founder Kevin Kelly has argued that it “will enliven inert objects, much as electricity did more than a century ago. Everything that we formerly electrified we will now cognitize.”7 Nations may very well be in a technology race to adopt AI across a range of industries. AI will help to improve economic productivity and, by extension, economic and military power. During the industrial revolution, early adopters of industrial technology significantly increased their national power. From 1830 to 1890, Britain and Germany, which were both early industrializers, more than doubled their per capita gross national product while Russia, which lagged in industrialization, increased its per capita gross national product by a mere 7 percent over that 60-year period.8 These technological advantages led to increased economic and military power, most notably for Europe relative to the rest of the world. In 1790, Europe (collectively), China, and India (including what is now Pakistan and Bangladesh) held roughly the same shares of global manufacturing output, with Europe and India each holding about one-quarter of global manufacturing output and China holding roughly one-third. They all had approximately equivalent levels of per capita industrialization at that time. But the industrial revolution skyrocketed European economic productivity. By 1900, Europe collectively controlled 62 percent of global manufacturing output, while China held only six percent and India less than two percent. These economic advantages translated into military power. By 1914, Europeans occupied or controlled over 80 percent of the world’s land surface.9 Being ahead of the curve in adopting AI is likely to lead to significant national advantages. Although AI can increase military capabilities, the more consequential advantages over the long term may come from non-military AI applications across society. Long-term benefits from AI could include increased productivity, improved healthcare outcomes, economic growth, and other indicators of national well-being. Increasing productivity is especially significant because it has a compounding effect on economic growth. Over the long term, technological progress is the main driver of economic growth.10 The scale of military AI spending, at least at present, is nowhere near large enough to warrant the title of “arms race.” Of course, AI can also be used for weapons. Militaries around the world are actively working to adopt AI to improve their military capabilities. Yet the militarization of AI does not, at present, meet the traditional definition of an arms race, despite the rhetorical urgency of many national leaders. Michael D. Wallace, in his 1979 article “Arms Races and Escalation,” defined an arms race as “involving simultaneous abnormal rates of growth in the military outlays of two or more nations” resulting from “the competitive pressure of the military itself, and not from domestic forces exogenous to this rivalry.” Wallace further stated that the concept of an arms race only applied “between nations whose foreign and defense policies are heavily interdependent” and who have “roughly comparable” capabilities.11 AI is being adopted by many countries around the globe.12
Threat Construction creates a security dilemma – if we believe we are insecure because we are losing “the arms race” we will create a self-fulfilling prophecy where we race to catch up.
Horowitz and Scharre, 2021 - Senior Fellows at the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security [Michael and Paul, Jan 12, “AI and International Stability: Risks and Confidence-Building Measures” TA]
An additional challenge stems from security dilemma dynamics. Competitive pressures could lead nations to shortcut test and evaluation (T&E) in a desire to field new AI capabilities ahead of adversaries. Similar competitive pressures to beat others to market appear to have played an exacerbating role in accident risk relating to AI systems in self-driving cars and commercial airplane autopilots.23 Militaries evaluating an AI system of uncertain reliability could, not unjustifiably, feel pressure to hasten deployment if they believe others are taking similar measures. Historically, these pressures are highest immediately before and during wars, where the risk/reward equation surrounding new technologies can shift due to the very real lives on the line. For example, competitive pressures may have spurred the faster introduction of poison gas in World War I.24 Similarly, in World War II, Germany diverted funds from proven technologies into jet engines, ballistic missiles, and helicopters, even though none of the technologies proved mature until after the war.25 This dynamic risk might spark a self-fulfilling prophecy in which countries accelerate deployment of insufficiently tested AI systems out of the fear that others will deploy first.26 The net effect is not an arms race but a “race to the bottom” on safety, leading to the deployment of unsafe AI systems and heightening the risk of accidents and instability.
“Arms Race” rhetoric increases the risk of international instability because it pressures states to deploy untested and unsafe AI weapons systems.
Scharre, 2021 - Director of Studies at Center for New American Security [Paul, Texas National Security Review Vol 4, Iss 3 Summer “Debunking the AI Arms Race Theory” https://tnsr.org/2021/06/debunking-the-ai-arms-race-theory/Artificial Intelligence Acc 5/27/22 TA]
A related risk of a “racing” dynamic among competitors could come from an acceleration, not of the pace of operations on the battlefield, but of the process of fielding new AI systems. AI systems today have a host of safety and security problems that can make them brittle, unreliable, and insecure.29 Because machine learning in particular can create new ways in which systems can fail, militaries face novel challenges in adopting AI systems.30 Militaries will have to adopt new methods to test, evaluate, verify, and validate AI systems (also known as TEVV).31 Such concerns related to autonomy are well known in the U.S. defense community,32 although at present they have not been solved to a satisfactory degree. Machine learning introduces additional challenges with regard to testing, evaluation, verification, and validation. A rush to field AI systems before they are fully tested could result in a “race to the bottom” on safety, with militaries fielding accident-prone AI systems. There are strong bureaucratic and institutional imperatives for militaries to field systems that are robust and secure. Indeed, designing systems to military specification standards often means making them more robust for a wider range of environmental conditions and shocks than comparable commercial systems, even at the expense of other aspects of performance, such as size, weight, or usability. AI presents novel challenges, however, in achieving the robustness needed for operating in the complex, hazardous, and adversarial environments that often characterize military operations. Certain AI methods today, such as deep learning, remain relatively immature with significant reliability challenges. A 2017 Department of Defense report by the JASON scientific advisory group explained that deep neural networks are immature as regards the “illities”, including reliability, maintainability, accountability, validation and verification, debug-ability, evolvability, fragility, attackability, and so forth. … Further, it is not clear that the existing AI paradigm is immediately amenable to any sort of software engineering validation and verification. This is a serious issue, and is a potential roadblock to DoD’s [Department of Defense’s] use of these modern AI systems, especially when considering the liability and accountability of using AI in lethal systems.33 The Defense Department’s 2018 AI strategy calls for building AI systems that are “resilient, robust, reliable, and secure.”34 Yet, the current state of technology makes achieving this goal particularly difficult for AI systems that incorporate deep learning, a subfield of AI that has seen significant growth and attention in recent years. While there is active research underway to improve AI safety and security, militaries will have to adapt to the technology as it currently is, at least for the time being. An ideal process would be for militaries to engage in experimentation, prototyping, and concept development, but also to subject AI systems to rigorous TEVV under realistic operational conditions before deployment. Taking shortcuts on testing and evaluation and fielding a system before it is fully tested could lead to accidents, which, in some settings, could undermine international stability.