Their framework is a form of liberalism that pacifies violence and legitimizes military action creating zones of being and nonbeing
Van Milders and Toros 20(Lucas, Assistant Professor in Critical Security Studies at the University of Groningen, Harmonie, Deputy Director of Institute of Cyber Security for Society (iCSS) at University of Kent, “Violent International Relations”, CS)
Indeed, the ‘international’ nature of IR and of its scholars make the discipline a ‘frontline’ discipline that often resides in practices along the abyssal lines between the zones of being and nonbeing. This is caused by the object of enquiry of the discipline – formally the power relations between states but, as is increasingly recognised, the power relations between people. It is also caused by the practices of the discipline – the need to perform the role and lifestyle of the international expert for research, dissemination and increasingly impact. There are many ways in which this is distributed across the discipline, yet what the iterations of disciplinary violence in IR tend to have in common is a further proliferation of the limits of IR as essentially an abyssal line. This concerns, for instance, the decadent or disciplinary nature of mainstream IR, widely critiqued elsewhere (such as in Ashley and Walker, 1990 and Weber, 2014 to name but two separated by decades). However, critical strands of IR theory might have, despite their efficacy at exposing the violence performed by mainstream IR, implicitly (and presumably undeliberately) contributed to the image of the critical theorist as an expert or intellectual, characterised by the privilege to withdraw politically and theorise both systemically as well as globally (Linklater, 1996). This image subsequently solicits and naturalises a range of theoretical inquiries that not only stem from the zone of being but also, as mentioned above, continue to demarcate an abyssal line around the discipline. This has, in recent years, allowed for the continued support for Western military violence in post-colonial states, even when such instances have had disastrous effects (see debate between Dunne and Gelber, 2014, Hehir, 2015, and again Dunne and Gelber, 2015 as well as the critique of feminist support for war in Afghanistan in Wibben, 2011). The violent nature of IR is also evident from its inclusion of non-Western forms of theory (typically presented as reactionary and anti-Western) on the premise that they do not challenge the discipline’s inherently Western epistemology (Buzan, 2018). The violence of IR theory is then characterised by its capacity and often willingness to maintain relations of both material as well as epistemic coloniality. This article is not about pointing accusatory fingers at specific instances of disciplinary and epistemic violence, which would indeed aid to exceptionalise said violence. Yet the question remains: what marks the violence of IR that cannot be solely attributed to the fact that it is a discipline like any other, and can we study IR without reproducing said violence? To clarify, the type of violence we are talking about is not merely the direct violence of physical and material force or the indirect violence of the aggregate actions of social groups or institutions, such as a refugee crisis or the concentration of wealth. Rather, it is the violence of pacification: a form of domination that (re)structures the political order and ensures that violent resistance against it is infrequent (Baron et al., 2019: 203). The violence of pacification is often inconspicuous, yet it operates through means of coercion that are rendered visible whenever they are resisted. As such, it is similar to Slavoj Žižek’s discussion of the maintaining function of objective violence in capitalist ideology that incites the eruption of subjective violence of anti-capitalist struggles and riots (2009). In IR, this pacification is distributed through the so-called liberal world order, often celebrated for bestowing the world with liberal peace and a decline of violence (Ikenberry, 2009; Pinker, 2012). Yet liberal pacification is still violent, as ‘it coerces a specific type of liberal docility, while also preventing types of resistance that might be understood as violent, including riots, insurrections, civil wars, and inter-state wars. Pacification reveals the ongoing violence at the heart of a political project that imagines itself to be against violence’ (Baron et al., 2019: 207). As it concerns the shaping and maintaining of a political order that seeks to hide its apparatus of violent coercion, the violence of pacification also intersects with the epistemic violence that is distributed through a colonial epistemology. It is indeed the epistemic violence that seeks to silence marginalised groups such as the subaltern nonspecialists, the illiterate peasantry, and the urban subproletariat (Spivak, 1994). Through IR’s violence, the international is reconfigured into a discipline that silences these voices in a seemingly non-violent way by subjugating their experiences as in need of translation or assimilation into expert knowledge that can be evaluated against disciplining/disciplinary criteria, that is, impact. So as opposed to trivilialising IR’s violence by exceptionalising it, we rather seek to highlight the deeply embedded nature of this violence across the discipline, although of course distributed to varying degrees.