The plan costs pc – Strategic Concept proves – member states intentionally avoided defining OCOs – no consensus means the plan triggers a fight
Jensen 2022
Mikkel, Mikkel Storm, Institute for Strategy and War Studies, Royal Danish Defence College, Copenhagen, Denmark, “Five good reasons for NATO’s pragmatic approach to offensive cyberspace operations,” May 30, 2022 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14702436.2022.2080661
Unclassified information on the internal negotiations in NATO on OCOCs and the CyOC is not available, but it has probably been difficult to find common ground between the 29 members NATO had at the time. The elaborate wording used by the alliance to discuss the topic could indicate that OCOs were a controversial topic. While Denmark in 2018 pledged willing to provide “cyber weapons” and “offensive cyber effects” to NATO (Danish Ministry of Defence 2018), NATO has avoided these terms. Instead NATO have compromised on the rather ungainly term “sovereign cyber effects, provided voluntarily by Allies,” or SCEPVA (Goździewicz 2019).
Adding to the diplomatic delicateness of the matter to the alliance, difficulties are exacerbated at the legal level: All NATO-members agree that international law and the rules of armed conflict apply to offensive cyber capabilities and their effects (NATO 2020, 21). However, there is no well-established NATO, let alone international, consensus on interpretation of this in practice (Taillat 2019, 33; Smeets 2021).