Multilateral agreements over space are politically deadlocked – 50 years of empirics prove secrecy and sovereignty concerns mean the plan drains pc
Goguichvili et al. 21 [Sophie Goguichvill is a Program Associate at the Wilson Center https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/global-legal-landscape-space-who-writes-rules-final-frontier]//LP
In an age where space is evolving and developing more rapidly than intergovernmental organizations can keep up, it is abundantly clear that the current global space governance framework—a product of the Cold War—is no longer adequate. In its current state, the global space governance framework excludes many space activities and allows actors to operate under wide-ranging and often conflicting interpretations of existing agreements. While there have been many attempts to improve the governance framework, progress in this area has stagnated, in large part due to diplomatic impasses between international actors and has negatively impacted the sustainable development of space. Of the five international agreements previously mentioned, the Outer Space Treaty (1967), Rescue Agreement (1968), the Liability Convention (1972), and the Registration Conventions (1974) require substantial clarification in order to apply many of their principles to new space activities and issues, such as satellite servicing, space traffic management, tourism, or space debris mitigation. The Moon Treaty (1979) has too few signatories to be effective altogether. Although countries have attempted to improve or complement these agreements over the years, no new multilateral agreements have been produced since the 1970s. In their place, non-binding norms have emerged in large part due to the ease by which they can be created and set into effect, however effective or ineffective they may be. Often slow to action, limited in authority, and bogged down by political deadlock, international bodies like COPUOS—and more indirectly, UNOOSA—which were established to advance global space governance, are failing to further their mission. While this has not dissuaded spacefaring nations from proposing new multilateral policies addressing evolving uses of space through international fora, important technological advancements—such as the rapid advancement of the commercial space sector—are often overlooked. This raises concerns, namely because private entities are not bound by the Outer Space Treaty or any of the other agreements. Another obstacle of note is that different States have different priorities when it comes to transparency and confidence building measures (TCBMs) and often, competing economic and military interests tend to stall those efforts. Satellite over California/Earth in spacePlay Video Seeking Strategic Advantage: How Geopolitical Competition and Cooperation are Playing Out in Space As our dependency on space grows, what are the implications for the world’s critical infrastructure? Do risks to space capabilities threaten global economic development and international security? Former NASA Administrator Jim Bridenstine and experts from Aerospace Corporation discuss the future of governance in space in this event hosted at the Wilson Center. WATCH While easier to agree upon in the short-term, passive support from various states and private actors on nonbinding agreements—such as the UNGA principles as well as the Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities—will not hold in the long-run. One thing is clear: multilateral efforts have not proven completely effective, and more is needed to provide order as new space interests are pursued. In response to recent failures to advance international agreements, the development of national space policies is on the rise. Take the U.S., for example, whose concerted government-wide efforts to refocus its attention on space led to the creation of a new National Space Policy, as well as a series of Space Policy Directives, which outline and provide rules of the road for American space activities in the wake of pressing international challenges. These documents cover our human space exploration program (SPD-1); commercial space regulations (SPD-2); national space traffic management (SPD-3); the creation of the Space Force (SPD-4); cybersecurity in space (SPD-5); and space nuclear power and propulsion (SPD-6). With the addition of the U.S.-led Artemis Accords, these documents taken together are a means to establishing modern customary international law and norms of behavior beyond the Cold War-era provisions of the foundational U.N. space treaties. The growth of the commercial space sector has proven to be the single development related to space since the groundwork of international space governance was laid in the 1960s and 1970s. This has by and large contributed to commercial interests receiving greater prioritization as new national policies are developed. Although prioritized less than national security (i.e., military) or civil (i.e., science and exploration) space policy, commercial space has begun to emerge as a third component in national space policy strategies. The preference to develop domestic policies over international agreements reflects both the emerging value of commercial space and the stagnation of international space governance. The U.S. and Russia stand apart from other nations, as they have the most robust set of national laws and regulatory organizations designed with international space commitments in mind. But among the 28 nations with domestic space policies, there is little policy convergence. States’ decisions to develop unilateral space policies with little concern for international cooperation is creating more limitations than benefits. Failing to cooperate only aggravates existing policy confusion, stalling the development of commercial space activities. Prominent examples include satellite servicing operations and space traffic management, both of which hold significant economic value but cannot be fully developed without improved cooperation due to their need for shared norms and best practices, much in the same way civil aviation could not function effectively if states did not agree on norms and best practices for air traffic control or flight safety. As a global commons, if the goal is to take advantage fully of the economic value of near-Earth space, then unilateral national policies cannot replace international agreements. Current trends suggest that the number of space actors and their interests will increase over the coming years. Consequently, competition over the utilization of space will likely expand and intensify with more actors pursuing their interests and disagreements becoming more common. Current international space governance will not be able to handle the changing nature of space development. New governance, structured differently, is needed. Next Steps for Responsible Space Governance Space has unquestionably undergone some significant changes since the turn of the century and therefore, so has its threat landscape. Although space was once seen as a peaceful sanctuary for scientific purposes, it has become the new playing arena for great power competition between the U.S., Russia, and China. Besides the superpowers, there are now a greater number of nations and non-state actors partaking in space activities and the role of commercial actors in space is becoming more considerable by the day. Although the privatization of space has so-far proven to be primarily a Western phenomenon, nations around the world are beginning to adopt the public-private partnership model and will continue to follow suit. As such, since an increasingly democratized and more accessible space will inevitably bring with it more man-made threats and challenges to space sustainability, the current system of space governance will need to be strengthened to effectively deal with near-future challenges. The process of developing new rules of the road in space has been complicated by the rapid proliferation of space technology among novel actors. Throughout the Cold War era, when technology was in the hands of few states, reaching consensus on treaties was much easier due to a shared interest by the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council to control the spread of technology. Today, the same technologies that were in the hands of a select few are in the hands of dozens of countries. As such, there is less incentive to collaborate on amending or updating Cold War era provisions, which has led to gridlock in the international bodies originally established to advance global space governance. In the absence of multilateral consensus on managing space activities through intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), namely the U.N., and specialized international fora stemming from the U.N. (i.e. UNOOSA, UNCOPUOS, and the CD), non-state actors have played an increasingly influential role in the development of space law. Currently, the international space law regime gives legal authority to regulate and manage space activities to nation states, not international bodies, through Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty. International bodies—such as UNCOPUOS—play a critical role in establishing standards and facilitating coordination, but the licensing and enforcement of those standards is at the national level. Non-state actors' successful contributions to global space governance are directly correlated to the broader trend of a strained multilateral order where international norms, standards, and voluntary (or non-binding) agreements are preferred over legally binding treaties. The declining ability of IGOs to create widely accepted treaties and agreements that effectively manage space activities consequently means that non-space faring nations are losing what little access they already had to shaping space governance. Hence, it is no surprise that successful governance through the paragon of space law—legally binding and verifiable measures—has become impossible to achieve in the current international political climate. States today have shifted their attention to creating norms through voluntary, non-legal measures with the goal of achieving mutual understanding and reducing suspicion, competition, rivalry between states bypassing international legal bodies altogether. For space governance to continue being successful, states must think through modern challenges creatively and collaboratively—in the long-run, strictly bilateral agreements, national policies, and passive support on non-binding agreements will not be sufficient. It is important to note that ineffective and outdated multilateral treaties and agreements are not obstacles unique to global space governance alone, but rather, global governance and multilateralism more broadly.