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Beckman 10 Matthew N. Beckman, Professor of Political Science @ UC-Irvine, 2010, “Pushing the Agenda: Presidential Leadership in U.S. Lawmaking, 1953-2004,” pg. 50

That said, in cases where the president and his leading allies do disagree---if not on policy preferences, on matters like priorities or strategy---the White House must lobby their congressional leaders to ensure that they carry the president’s water (rather than their own). Hence, presidents want supportive leaders to use their prerogatives to keep the president’s proposed policies among those from which legislators choose.17 Getting their leaders “onboard” with the president’s preferences is the administration’s first order of business, and the bargaining tactics they use for this purpose runs the spectrum, from personal appeals to public pressure to political deals.¶ But even upon securing their support, the White House’s work with these supportive leaders is far from done. If anything, it has barely begun. Now the White House and their leading legislative allies must work together to best promote their overlapping interests.18 To this end, they should share policy information and political intelligence, not to mention the burden of putting them to good use. In short, after first bargaining over what policy they will advocate, the president and his leading allies should coordinate efforts to best execute that advocacy.¶ 2.2.2.1.2 Deterring leading opponents. When the president and his leading allies advocate a particular policy alternative, ultimately deciding its destiny is the members’ distribution of preferences in light of rival alternatives. The key variables at this point, therefore, are the preference distribution and the rival alternatives. The first of these---that is, the White House’s endgame strategy of shifting members’ preference distribution via vote-centered lobbying---has already been discussed, but still unexamined is the administration’s strategy for affecting rival alternatives. Let me now consider this crucial component of the White House’s earlygame strategy. ¶ By way of introduction, it is worth emphasizing the president’s motivation for affecting rival alternatives: beating the status quo is almost always easier than beating a strategic opponent. Accordingly, rather than just pulling pivotal voters toward the president’s position (and away from opponents’), the White House may also want to cut a deal with leading opponents, getting them to “pull their punches” against the president’s proposal, or at least something close to it. The obvious theoretical question begging, then, is the same one White House officials actually ponder: Why would an opposing leader ever endorse key planks of the president’s legislative agenda? Well, one way to secure leading opponents’ submission is simply by fiat. If the president and his leading allies can prohibit, by rule, leading opponents from challenging their position, then the president’s policy options are constrained only by the range of potentially passable policies. But even if this brand of strategic censorship may occasionally occur via restrictive rules in the House of Representatives, it is not generally a viable strategy and certainly not a reliable one. First, the president’s party is often in the congressional minority, and second, even when in the majority, the Senate does not allow the president’s leading allies to impose restrictive rules on their leading opponents. Far from it.¶ Lacking the ability to censor leading opponents by decree, how can an administration keep leading opponents from challenging the president’s initiatives? To foreshadow, the basic answer is that White House officials can deter leading opponents inasmuch as the president can convince them that the intrapolicy benefits of fighting are low and the extrapolicy costs are high. Let me elaborate.¶ Figure 2.10 lays out the tenets underlying the White House’s options for deterring their leading opponents, adding to the now-familiar policy space a leading opponent, O, who joins the president, P, and pivotal voter, f (who can occupy any number of positions, f to f ). For the purposes of clarity, here I assume that the president and his supportive leader, S, agree on the policy and work together promoting it. Because an administration can rarely (if ever) get pivotal voters to support the president’s ideal outcome, deterring leading opponents from challenging the president’s bill (or some version of it) requires that the White House lobby more than pivotal voters; they must also target opposing leaders. The reason is that to be successful, presidential aides must convince their leading opponents that the policy loss they will suffer from “pulling their punches” is small and can be offset by gains on other fronts. In Figure 2.10, then, the nature of demobilizing the opposition lobbying should aim to minimize the opposing leader’s potential policy impact---that is, minimize the disparity between policies when he or she fights (say, f ) and policies when he or she does not (say, f )---and compensate the leader for the difference.¶ Developing this strategy further, it is worth reiterating that leading opponents’ decision is not a calculus about fighting to get one’s own preferences but rather fighting to get whatever the pivotal voter will ultimately support (f, or wherever f would end up after being targeted by the White House’s lobbying arsenal). Accordingly, the more pivotal voters’ preferences match the president’s proposal, the less incentive an opposing leader has to challenge that position (because he or she will get something close to it anyway). The first hypothesis for deterring the opposition, therefore, is somewhat surprising: the White House should lobby pivotal voters to make them more supportive of the president’s preferred position. Notice that although behaviorally equivalent to a pure vote-centered lobbying strategy, here the White House’s rationale for lobbying pivotal voters is not for their votes per se but rather to weaken leading opponents’ bargaining posture.¶ Beyond pulling pivotal voters’ preferences toward the president’s position, an additional way in which the administration can lessen opposing leaders’ incentive to fight the White House is to convince leading opponents to dislike the president’s position less (to move O toward f ). Importantly, this does not require that the White House induce leading opponents to support the president’s position, much less vote for it. Instead, the administration need only convince opposing leaders that the effects of their counteroffensive would be minimal or, at least, could be better served elsewhere. Accordingly, the second deterringthe- opposition hypothesis is that the White House should target leading opponents with the same lobbying tactics used in the legislative endgame; the president should engage his leading opponents with arm-twisting and browbeating, private appeals and public pressure. Of course, a third way to diminish leading opponents’ incentive to fight is to compromise the president’s position (offer f instead of f ). This is not to say that the administration should capitulate all or even concede much; rather, the White House should compromise only enough to mollify leading opponents. Hence, this aspect of the demobilizing-leading-opponents hypothesis suggests that the White House should be willing to compromise with leading opponents, negotiating a “deal” that is more moderate than the best of the potentially passable policies but still better than what the president could get with an endgame floor fight. This is a point worth reiterating: the White House should only divert lobbying resources to leading opponents if doing so yields greater influence than would be possible through vote-centered lobbying alone.¶ This key point about agenda-centered lobbying leads to the final insight: because the president seeks a “deal” that is worse for leading opponents than what they could get by challenging him, the administration must compensate these leading opponents to offset the difference. This “horse-trading” can be on exogenous issues---for example, a different bill, an executive or judicial nomination, or some other executive-controlled offering---but often occurs within the confines of the same bill. Typically, the president’s part of the logroll is included as the bill’s first title, leading opponents’ part as its second.

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