Presidents have PC to solidify party unity
Lee 2021
Barton, Phd Political Economics @ UNSW Sydney, New South Wales and Junior Research Fellow at University of Oxford (Magdalen College), “Essays in Political Economics” August 2021
Most organizations—in politics, business, and academia—feature leaders who can sway collective decisions. In business, a CEO may persuade her firm’s board to approve a project the board is initially skeptical about. She may do so by appealing to personal friendships with members of the board, or even by threatening to resign. In politics, U.S. presidents may coax Congress into passing legislation that does not have the initial support of the majority of members. They may, for example, claim a popular mandate for policies on which they campaigned, or appeal to party unity. Similarly, in academia, a senior faculty member may push to hire a job candidate the recruiting committee is initially inclined to reject, perhaps by exerting influence over junior colleagues. That leaders have the power to influence decisions is not controversial. Yet, power to influence is not an easy concept to define, as it includes both formal and informal components. For example, in Hollander’s (1958; 1960; 1978; 2009) theory of “idiosyncrasy credit” leaders have an account of credit with group members they can spend to deviate from group norms and assert influence (see also Bass, 1990, Ch. 17).1 These credits are “given and received as rewards” from a leader’s social exchange with her followers (Hol- lander, 1978). Therefore, power to influence derives from the leader’s network of friends and allies within the organization, the organization’s informal system of favor exchanges, and even the organization’s culture (March, 1981, pp. 216–219).