PC is finite and declines over time
Lee et al 2019
Barton, Phd Political Economics @ UNSW Sydney, New South Wales and Junior Research Fellow at University of Oxford (Magdalen College). Gabriele Gratton, UNSW Australia Business School, School of Economics, Richard Holden, University of New South Wales (UNSW), “Political Capital” UNSW Economics Working Paper 2019-04 March 30, 2019 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3363382
We study how the leader chooses to spend her capital depending on her initial stock of capital, the precision of her information, and whether the issue at stake is more or less important for her. For example, the President of the United States may choose to spend her political capital only on issues that were central to her campaign. Similarly, senior faculty may choose to spend their political capital only on job candidates in their own fields. We show that the leader optimally chooses one of four leadership styles and that the chosen style affects the dynamics of power within the organization. Irrelevant leaders have too little capital to influence decisions and therefore never voice their dissent. Leaders with sufficient political capital but poor information choose to be patient: they save their capital and spend it only on issues that are important to them. Although patient leaders spend their capital sparingly, when they spend it they are unlikely to regain it and therefore their power declines over time. Leaders with intermediate precision of information choose to be loud: they spend their capital on all issues and their power declines over time. Finally, the most informed leaders choose to be strong: they spend their capital on all issues and their power grows over time. For a given stock of political capital, leaders with the least precise information are more likely to be patient. Therefore, conditional on disagreeing with the majority of the organization, leaders are more likely to spend political capital when their information is more precise. But the unconditional probability of spending political capital on any given issue is non-monotonic on the precision of the leader’s information—while loud leaders have less precise information than strong leaders, they are more likely to voice their dissent on any given issue. More political capital does not necessarily induce the leader to voice dissent more often. How more capital affects the leaders’ decision hinges on the marginal power of political capital and therefore on the shape of the mapping of political capital into power. Intuitively, when the marginal power of capital is greater after the leader’s preferred alternative is revealed to be better (respectively, worse) than the default, then a larger initial stock of political capital translates into a greater return (respectively, smaller loss) to voicing dissent. We give a concrete example within a linear framework. In this example, leaders with little political capital have a greater chance of becoming irrelevant if they choose to push for a decision today. Therefore they compare a small chance of influencing today’s decision with the risk of losing their power in the future. For such leaders, a marginal increase in today’s capital (and therefore power) increases the potential power loss in the future more than it increases today’s gains. Therefore, for small stocks of capital, the probability of spending political capital may be decreasing in capital. To put it another way: some patient leaders have more political capital and power than some loud leaders have. This relation is reversed for larger stocks of political capital, for which a marginal increase in today’s capital increases the incentives for the leader to voice her dissent. However, as the leader’s power increases, the relation is reversed yet again, as very powerful leaders can only achieve a small increase in power by voicing dissent.