Thus our only choice in an era of war is to become war- to enter a state of becoming in which we constantly mobilize- a historical analysis of the world through radical empiricism teaches us to enter becoming, instead of being, and no longer are we devoured by war.
Bousquet et al 20 (Antoine Bousquet, Jairus Grove, Nisha Shah, “Becoming War: Towards a Martial Empiricism”,2020) GP
Martial empiricism apprehends war as a process of becoming that is suspended between potentiality and actuality, scrutinizing the enfolding of intensities, relations and attributes that give rise to war’s givenness. War’s ontogenetic powers see it persist across multiple histories and geographies while simultaneously always being recast.4 Although a processualist philosophy expects the sum of reality to be engaged in such becoming, war’s peculiar qualities undoubtedly express becoming’s wildest and most disruptive tendencies. In its various iterations, war’s irruptive possibility has unleashed the most intensive periods of invention and transformation, tearing through carefully erected human orders, shattering sacred idols and shredding cultural pretensions. War reminds us how little control we really have, how easy it is to be swallowed whole and forgotten in an instant. War forces a confrontation with how precarious, finite and insignificant each of us is as a solitary, fleeting line of becoming. Through martial empiricism, we choose fidelity to the world and our encounter with it over fidelity to a method or the comforting illusion that the world is reliably mechanical, discretely rational and providentially progressive. Martial empiricism is an empiricism built to embrace the generative, mutating and world-ending character of war. It belongs to what the anthropologist Eduardo Viveiros de Castro (2014: 105) calls ‘untamed thought’, in which ‘knowing is no longer a way of representing the unknown but of interacting with it’.5 A radical empiricism affirms the world as it is, not as we wish it were. This is the empiricism that war demands – an empiricism that is open-ended and robust enough to bear both the generative chaos of battle and the ever-extending tendrils of its other-than-combat activities. 104 Security Dialogue 51(2-3) Rather than attempting to narrowly circumscribe it in service of prior positivist or normative commitments, martial empiricism permits war to define itself. Contra attempts to compartmentalize reality with unyielding definitions of the object of study, we expect such definitions to become ever less useful as they become more specific. The more assured we are that we know what war is, that we know in advance what to measure, that those units of measurement are isomorphic with each other, the more it will slip between our fingers. The more confident we are in what to look for, the less we are capable of experiencing. There is no better example of this than the insistence by Steven Pinker (2011) or Joshua Goldstein (2012) that war is coming to an end as they brandish spreadsheets that purport to show the statistical decline of armed conflict. Yet what sense is there in conducting a large-n study when every war is its own n? To our mind, what is waning is less the occurrence of war than the capacity of ‘war accountants’ to encounter the world. The normative injunction to only study war through the frame of a problem that has as its unique solution peace is no less limiting. How can such a commitment not obscure what can be known of war? While we are interested in becomings other than war, we do not think we should conduct research in a padded room. The provocation of war’s creativity – its more-than-human persistence, its continuities and discontinuities – demands theorizing even if those lines of thought do not have happy endings. In our formulation of martial empiricism, we draw inspiration from the ‘radical empiricism’ of William James, as well successive inheritors such as Alfred North Whitehead (1978), Gilles Deleuze (1986, 1988, 1994), Isabelle Stengers (2010), Gilbert Simondon (2009), Erin Manning and Brian Massumi (2014), Jane Bennett (2010), William Connolly (2005), Karen Barad (2007) and Steven Shaviro (2014). Writing in the early 1900s, James (1976, 1996) outlined a philosophy decisively grounded in the fecund event of experience. It is essential to understand that James does not propose anything like a phenomenological reduction on the basis of a stable subject of experience but instead affirms experience itself as prior to both its subjects and its objects. According to Massumi’s (2016: 116) interpretation of James, ‘pure experience is worlding. It is the constitutive process of the world’s emergence.’ James took issue with the rationalist philosophy of his day, charging it with a fixation on universals and a privileging of wholes understood as prior to their parts. His, in contrast, was to be ‘a mosaic philosophy, a philosophy of plural facts’ that ‘starts with the parts and makes of the whole a being of the second order’ (James, 1976: 22). This approach is an inherently processual one, in which ‘what really exists is not things made, but things in the making’ (James, 1996: 117). Accordingly, radical empiricism does not produce an ontology in the sense of a hierarchy of being for the organization of reality. As Didier Debaise (2005: 104) puts it, ‘everything is taken on the same plane: ideas, propositions, impressions, things, individuals, societies. Experience is this diffuse, tangled ensemble of things, movements, becomings, relations, without primary distinction, without founding principle.’ From the theoretical ground demarcated thus far, three principles of a martial empiricism should be highlighted. First, martial empiricism is interested in a world that appears as ‘a fabric of interlaced, superimposed relations, of telescoped events’ (Lapoujade, 2000: 193). While a pragmatic bounding of experience may be necessary, nothing can be excluded a priori, no matter how morally repugnant or seemingly banal, if we are to account for war’s promiscuity. Second, like experience, war is replete with dualisms that have to be attended to as provocations but not accepted as natural divisions. One such instance concerns the articulation between the supposed constancy of the general concept of war and the perpetual mutations in its manifestations as warfare. In reality, war is both a thing and a process, a unity and an assembly, an event and an ecology of relations (Grove, 2014). War’s relations do not only bind parts into wholes at the service of structural functionalities; they also constitute multiplicities of difference that possess no less integrity for the contingent assembly of their constituent elements. Third, every investigation of war explores a different field of experience that requires a bespoke attention and theoretical development native to that field. No Bousquet, Grove and Shah 105 conceptualizations are ever exhaustive of reality; they are only ever partial and contextual. Martial empiricism is not a theory of war. It is a theory of the conditions of possibility for asking what war does and means in the first place. Positing becoming over being, we necessarily privilege novelty and difference over stability and recurrence, with the former having to explain the latter rather than the reverse. We also prioritize relations over dualisms, since the world of becoming is no more split between ideas and matter than it is between subjects and objects or structure and agency. Everything is a transaction between the organizational character of a particular arrangement of things and the ways in which those things make sense of the world through that organizational character. We are all singular blocks of becoming that are simultaneously imbricated in each other. Similarly, we value process over causality. The investigation of continuities in a world of becoming suggests that any causal explanation only appears as such through a decontextualization of the transactional processes that support it. Radical empiricism and processual ontology imply that there is no rational base camp from which to set off in the study of a process – all research is necessarily in media res. One always begins ‘in the middle, between things, interbeing, intermezzo’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 25). We are always in the middle of war, in a world already saturated with the history, present and anticipation of war. This is not to say that its manifestations, intensities and destructions are evenly distributed. Yet no war emerges without the conspiracy of the cosmos. The explicit and visible character of that complicity moves each day from the abstract metaphysical to the concrete actual as war draws into its gravitational pull polities, economies, technologies and ideologies. There is no end to war’s metabolic appetite, and what it does not devour and incorporate, it creates new from whole cloth. But where do you start investigating something with no outside, no beginning or end, no enduring substance? How do you know what to look for in the first place if the world is a non-repeating flux? One must necessarily hold a provisional idea of what war is in order to begin enquiring into it. But that idea must remain fuzzy enough to accommodate the novelty and mutability inherent in its becoming – an ‘anexact yet rigorous’ conception in Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987: 407) formulation. Likewise, the more specific processual sketches to be outlined within the empirical field of war can be thought of as renderings of what Whitehead (1978: 86) calls ‘lures’. In complexity science, these lures are the strange attractors that draw dynamic systems to certain recursive yet never identical patterns of behaviour, from atmospheric flows to crowd movements. Crucially, Whitehead’s lures are emphatically not Platonic ideals imperfectly instantiated in the world, but refer instead to ‘potentials for the process of becoming’ from which concrete things or events emerge (Whitehead, 1978: 29). The contributions to this special issue each stake their own claims and investigative terrains through their attentiveness to how war engenders martial life and demands new modes of empiricism equal to it. Rather than summarizing each of the pieces, we outline below the distinct yet overlapping domains of war’s becoming that coalesce through their collective resonance. With the ultimate aim of orienting future research, we identify the intensive processes of war encapsulated by mobilization, design and encounter. Mobilizing war A term that first entered military parlance in the 1830s, mobilization denotes the ways in which resources are conscripted, regimented and deployed into martial worlds. Through this becomingmobile, prior attachments are cast off, life-forms are refashioned and rearranged, wild energies are stoked, amassed and directed. The particular affinity of war with speed has of course been noted 106 Security Dialogue 51(2-3) (Virilio, 2006). But it would be a mistake to focus only on the obvious weapon systems or even the accompanying rhythms of production, communication and exchange. Different velocities are also involved in both the galvanizing of affects – glory, honour, animosity, all the passions without which Clausewitz admitted war would be impossible – and the new cadences of becoming that transport beings in war. While mobilization is inherent in every war, a broad historical intensification and deepening of its processes has been a salient feature of modern societies. The German veteran Ernst Jünger was probably the first to fully conceptualize mobilization when he wrote in the 1930s of the ‘growing conversion of life into energy, the increasingly fleeting content of all binding ties in deference to mobility’, anticipating a state of total mobilization in which ‘there is no longer any movement whatsoever – be it that of the homeworker at her sewing machine – without at least indirect use for the battlefield’ (Jünger, 1992: 126).6 As historical sociologists have amply demonstrated, the unfolding of world history in the past five hundred years is unintelligible without reference to the tremendous development of the means of destruction that came to nest within the nation-state and attained a new escape velocity in 1914 (Mann, 1986, 1993; Tilly, 1992). Through bouts of intense competition, states placed their entire populations in arms, invoking homeland, virtue or historical destiny and summoning figures of absolute enmity so as to corral the energies that might deliver a decisive blow to the adversary. Placing war in the 20th century under the sign of ‘work’, the instrumental rationalization of life, relentless optimization and the central role of technique, Jünger diverged above all from Karl Marx in that he did not see capital accumulation as the mainspring of modern societies but instead a more fundamental drive for power that found its purest expression in the warring activity.7 Although his elevation of war into a redemptive metaphysics outlines a black hole that a martial empiricism should always guard against, Jünger’s interventions do emphasize the difficulties that war has always presented to an orthodox Marxism that would resort to a crude economism to account for it. Other thinkers, such as Georges Bataille (1988), J. F. C. Fuller (1998), and Deleuze and Guattari (1987), have produced ‘general economies’ of war that attend to a wider field of investments, exchanges and expenditures and should accordingly retain our attention (see Meiches on Bataille, 2020). Just as war cannot be apprehended solely through its instrumental appropriations, a lucid understanding of human societies cannot treat war as merely a peripheral or derivative phenomenon.8 Moreover, it would be misguided to believe ourselves beyond the era of total mobilization. Entire nations may no longer face the likely prospect of being in arms strictly speaking, but the annihilatory powers amassed by them still indefinitely hang over us in the guise of a thermonuclear sword of Damocles. States of war and peace, civilian and military spheres, blur ever more in the unrelenting age of globalized targeting, counterinsurgency, criss-crossing circuits of innovation from MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) to Silicon Valley to DARPA (The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency), and the intensifying societal securitization to which we affixed the now almost quaint denomination of ‘war on terror’. As for the key mobilizing activity of logistics so central to the global capitalist economy, it not only originates in the conduct of warfare (Cowen, 2014) but is now so prominent within it that Paul Virilio affirms, somewhat hyperbolically, that it has ‘become the whole of war’ (Virilio and Lotringer, 2008: 103). We thus take one of the tasks of martial empiricism to be to investigate the historical escalation and proliferation of mobilization, to trace the ebbs and flows of its extensions and intensities in the various fields into which it has been invested. Attention must here be directed as much to its overarching frames of intelligibility as to the minutiae of its micropolitical practices (Öberg, 2020). The particular marshalling of the human body, in its somatic, cognitive and affective capacities, is here paramount. Be it via the psychomotricity of the musculoskeletal frame and its nervous system of reflexes, perceptual and neurocognitive faculties, or the affective states of anger, fear and Bousquet, Grove and Shah 107 communal bonding, the human organism has been comprehensively enlisted into the war machine (McSorley, 2020). The age-old conduct of military training for instilling discipline and esprit de corps in the new recruit is certainly paradigmatic, with drill exercises persisting today as a chief ritual through which individuals are integrated into the ranks of military organizations (Foucault, 1995; McNeill, 1995). Yet, if repetitive drill and docile obedience to hierarchical command remain valued, late modern military institutions with organizational cultures that increasingly resemble those of their civilian counterparts are also today less prone to rely on nakedly authoritarian means to ensure individual compliance and dependability (Howell, 2015; Moskos et al., 2000). The ‘anatomo-politics of the human body’ have deepened considerably since their incipience in the disciplinary techniques of the 17th century (Foucault, 1990: 139). The capillary microphysics of military power extend themselves ever further through the fields of biochemistry, neuropsychology, pharmacology and genetics (Coker, 2013; Krishnan, 2016). Military weaponry and equipment are no less important in soliciting, orienting and steering the human agent, their design guided by principles of ‘human systems integration’ into the war machine (Pew and Mavor, 2007). The methods employed for the purpose of mobilization vary, but their core objective remains constant: to augment the individual’s contribution to assembled combat power and ward off the thresholds beyond which the compound effects of stress, pain and fatigue induce its degradation and eventual collapse (Kinsella, 2020). Indeed, among all the spheres of human activity, it is plausibly within that of armed conflict that the previously established limits of the body are most persistently and spectacularly breached. Borrowing the Spinozist cry vocalized by Gilles Deleuze (1988: 17), we can exclaim: ‘we do not even know what a martial body can do!’ None of the above should imply an overly restrictive or monolithic conception of mobilization. For one thing, the purview of mobilization is evidently not restricted to the statist institutions that have otherwise advanced its techniques to their highest point. It encompasses, for instance, the combustive chain reaction of (self-)radicalization undergone by jihadis or white nationalists in their becoming-war, along with the specific roles played by ideological conversion, catalytic peer groups, paramilitary training, and the administration of steroids or amphetamines. Informal banking networks and internet crowdfunding platforms likewise support modes of martial patronage, incitement and entrepreneurialism that bypass the state form (Grove, 2019). No less important are the oppositions, subversions and surfeits that the solicitations of the war machine encounter everywhere. We find among these open resistances to the headlong rush to war as well as small, concealed and repeated acts of disobedience and denial. Conversely, there is the fierce indocility of the very energies stoked by mobilization, which are by their very nature uncompliant in their expressions. For war is a domain of transgression and excess that never fully reconciles with the governmental imperatives of utility, calculus and restraint (Meiches, 2020). Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 358) thus invoke the ‘fundamental indiscipline of the warrior’ waging a struggle against the forces that would pare them down to an instrumental function. The study of mobilization must therefore also include all that resists, disobeys and exceeds its injunctions (Lisle, 2020). Finally, as MacLeish (2020) so poignantly reminds us, processes of demobilization and the smouldering remainders and abominable residues left in the aftermath of war are no less worthy of our consideration.