Martial politics supersedes cap
Grove 19, (Jairus Grove, Savage Ecology, 2019, Jairus Victor Grove is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Hawai'i Research Center for Future Studies at the University of Hawai'i at Mānoa)GP
By turning Clausewitz’s words inside out, what we are left with is little more than war as an instrument; it is just that now war is waged on more fronts, both internal and external. This does nothing to complicate the concept of war. J. F. C. Fuller’s materialist account of the slugfest between what he calls the constant tactical factor and the quantity theory of war comes to a similar conclusion as Foucault, but the inversion of Clausewitz and the targeting of whole populations provokes an image quite different from that of biopolitics. Instead, quoting Fuller from 1942: “War ceasing to be a struggle between life values becomes a blind destructive force, like an earthquake, a volcanic eruption or a typhoon. Whole populations are now attacked, wiped out, enslaved or herded from one country into another like cattle. . . . the entire life of the enemy state comes to be the object of attack.” Fuller continues quoting Ely Culbertson, “From time immemorial, men fought against men, and weapons were but accessories; in this and in future wars, machines fight From Exhaustion to Annihilation—105 against machines and men are all but auxiliaries . . . engines of destruction which devour their substance.95 This process occurs because war is an assembly of things set in motion and held together by the racial refrain of settler colonization, the imperial and postimperial transforms territory into operational space, and, as an assemblage, war is also transformed by those mutations and expansions. Following the ecological account developed in the last chapter, war is not a tool of the state or a failure of order. War is a phylum of organizing principles, refrains, and protocols unto itself. War drags along with it the whole of the population—its vitality, industry, inventiveness, movement, rhythm, and affect—and attests to the human and nonhuman character of the population and violently metabolizes other forms of life in its path. If we want to call war biopolitical, then bios must extend beyond the human and certainly the thin European conception of humanism, and even the nonhuman animal, into the creative anime of all things, and into the formative and energetic forces of war from its beginnings. Mass war was set loose by the French Revolution’s levée en masse as much as it was made possible by gunpowder, supply lines, radio, interchangeable parts, mass production, and the increasing speed and efficiency of transportation and communication of information, whether linguistic or otherwise, as well as new terrains of racialized enmity. All these feedbacks point to a milieu or ecology of war that, while overlapping with the market or the epistemophilia of nineteenth-century humanizing sciences, lured these assemblages into connection at least as much as Foucault’s account of late capitalism or humanist governmentality. Therefore, the constant tactical factor—war as mutative creativity—is not just an axiomatic or abstract machine of war. It is a global abstract machine traversing the war/nonwar divide; war individuates specific forms of life. Hence, we can talk about warlike relations and governance as a martial logic without having to find combat present in either of these conceptual expansions. This statement would seem consistent with those inspired by Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, who seek to supplement Foucault by rebranding the global system an empire. However, while Negri describes the veritable deterritorialization of war, politics, economy, and life, he too quickly subsumes these deterritorializations under the logic of capitalism. For him, war is little more than a supplement or effect of capital: “War seems the only possible solution. . . . With the disappearance of the internal criteria that allow that self-regulation and self-valorization of development, it is the violence of the strongest that creates the norm. . . . it guarantees the smooth running 106—Chapter 3 of society and widens the terms of the market.”96 This is too simplistic, and perhaps this formulation should also be flipped on its head. War ought to be seen from the other side too as a martial machine with capitalist biopolitical effects, not just a capitalist axiomatic with martial effects. This would shift the emphasis from an anthropocentric preoccupation with human “states of emergency” or sovereign states of exception, or market failure, to the emergence of material assemblages that amplify human events such that they reverberate throughout the assembly of things. Within the analytic frame of capitalism, the microbial devastation of the Americas as well as the subsequent annihilation of forms of life would be incidental to the project of expansion rather than at their core. As a matter of historical development, the industrialization of war preceded the industrialization of civilian factories. The two most important components of industrialization—interchangeable parts and the assembly line—were developed because of the demands of larger and larger armies, not larger and larger civilian markets. Furthermore, the demand for American industrialization was not the result of an “invisible hand” but a directive of the War Department to create operations for arms production using interchangeable parts. Congressional funding for the directive resulted in a number of inventors competing for government contracts to mass-produce weapons that could be repaired more easily in the field. The winner, Thomas Blanchard, developed the technology for mass production that reverberated across the Atlantic, inspiring the images of cams featured in Jean le Rond d’Alembert and Denis Diderot’s Encyclopédie. The invention was Blanchard’s conceptual change that allowed cams to turn irregular forms. These early lathes developed by Blanchard inspired a wave of production mechanization in the United States and Europe. But Blanchard’s contract for the new lathes was exclusively with the Springfield Armory and only later was made available on the market for private factories. According to David Hounshell, the two main currents of American industrialization flowed from the Springfield armory system, and “the idea of uniformity or interchangeable parts was combined with the notion that machines could make things as good and as fast as man’s hands, or even better.”97 The aleatory milieu of war has its own efficacy independent of the logic of markets and modes of production and should be given its due. Despite the temptation to use capitalism as an explanatory logic for violence, the ecology of warfare as a martial logic exceeds the instrumentality of the market and profit drive of the market. Furthermore, the overem- From Exhaustion to Annihilation—107 phasis on capitalism and the provincial image of the European battlefield also complicate the more recent development of the global civil war theses found in Carlo Galli’s Political Spaces and Global War and Tiqqun’s Introduction to Civil War that, similar to Hardt and Negri, derive from Foucault’s account of biopolitics.98 The civil-martial divide prescripted in the move to say all war is now civil war requires that the civil peace that foregrounds classical war assumed by Foucault has ever existed in the first place. The accounts of McNeill, Fuller, Braudel, and Mumford as well as the historical record of martial development in the Americas suggest that the divide between the civil and the martial is a convenient fiction not unlike the state of nature. And insofar as the claim to an internal civic space (the zone of policing rather than war) can be made, it is in a very limited capacity and one entirely idiosyncratic of a very narrow temporal and geographic slice of Western Europe basically between the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) and the Napoleonic Wars (1803–15)—but again only if we ignore the globalization of warfare happening outside this narrow territorial limit from 1492 forward. From the larger historical and geographical vantage point, there is no classical period before the global civil war once the Europeanization of the globe began. From the beginning of European expansion, war was neither interior nor exterior, as the territory was in some sense a smooth space in that it had not been nationalized, much less internationalized. War took place, but it lacked the political quality that makes Foucault’s inversion possible. As such, the laws of war found in Hugo Grotius and early discussions of Christian traditions of just war were flagrantly disregarded, just as they had been in the European Crusades. And furthermore, decolonization does not return us to the romantic image of international politics either. In the aftermath of formal-legal colonization, everything is nationalized but virtually none of the new national spaces resembles what could be called a sovereign territory except for those spaces that cannot be fully decolonized because they are settler colonies.