Alt fails
Grove 19 (Jairus Victor Grove, Department of Political Science UH Manoa, Savage Ecology: war and geopolitics at the end of the world, 2019)//KB
I want to take up both premises as they make more explicit what is also central to Moore. First, I want to consider the question of capitalism as a failed social system planner, and whether the natural limits of the ecosystem represent an accelerant for capitalism’s contradictions. The claim that capitalism is at odds with social planning is simply unsustainable. After all, geopolitics is a form of global social planning, and maybe the largest ever, as it is a system of planetary management. The problem is that we have a progressive functionalist bias in what constitutes successful social planning. The global networks of surveillance, multicountry military operations, mutual security alliances, and transnational border, seaport, and airport cooperation suggest that capitalism can innovate and implement global-scale social systems with high degrees of efficiency and effectiveness. What is left out by Balakrishnan is that one can have vast and unprecedented social and economic planning without benefiting the majority of the planet. Balakrishnan, to his benefit, makes note of the vast socialization of capital in the form of health care and education for the benefit of industry. However, more importantly, I would add to the cost of educating workers and maintaining the health of workers the huge price tag of the American-led geopolitical order. The cost of the wars in Iraq to maintain access to oil runs in the trillions of dollars alone. Yet even in regard to climate change, clean water, species loss, and migration crises, it is true that vast capitalist social planning is in the works: for instance, ecomodernist proposals for geoengineering that consolidate the hegemony of a few great powers. They do this via climate control and cooling northern countries while devastating subtropical and tropical countries by slowing the rain cycles necessary for agriculture; through capital-intensive desalinization, which ensures water security for those who can afford it; and through synthetic meat and food production, which represents real alternatives to land-based food production but extraordinary capital input. All these strategies for “adapting” to the climate and ecological catastrophe—while currently being pursued—are rejected by academics as seemingly unrealistic because they do not scale for 10 billion people. However, it should be considered that the visions of an ecomodern vanguard are less concerned with the speed and feasibility of scale as long as there is enough for them. In fact, the most common critique by Marxists like Andreas Malm and neo-Keynesian ecologists like Naomi Klein is that such design schemes for cooler weather, clean water, and food security will leave potentially billions without the means to survive. From the ecomodernist perspective of elite blocks, that is, contemporary capitalism, so be it. Unlike Balakrishnan, Klein, and to a lesser degree Malm, the crisis of “failure” is just the next stage of what Klein calls elsewhere “disaster capitalism.”35 The fact that these solutions do not provide for everyone, or might create periods of tumultuous transition, are not critiqued within the standards of the narrow few pursuing them. Instead, the limited applications of industrial adaptation models are a virtuous form of managed scarcity and opportunity for the reconfiguration of governance. This transformation, while incipient, is for me a significant transformation between labor, contradiction, and political crisis. It envisions a world, and then engineers a world that can live, and even thrive, without the majority of people currently alive on the planet. The limited survival and making of a new fully manageable planet is precisely a “system-wide economic renewal.”36 The reconfiguration of the planet such that labor and resources play a significantly different role than previously experienced may not exactly be capitalism as we have understood it, but neither is it Balakrishnan’s vision of a future created by Marx’s understanding of contradictions. Even the presumption of Foucault’s schema of biopolitical capitalism is that somehow capital cannot live without labor, and therefore contradictions, that is, immiseration, will create turbulence for revolt, even if not revolutionary change.37 In the biopolitical logic of labor, the threat of extermination is limited by the necessity of a population or mass to protect and to make live.38 However, in the schema developing among the futurists of Silicon Valley, this presumption is simply false. Mass death at scales comparable and even exceeding the bubonic plague are no longer a problem for capital functioning. In fact, it is quite the opposite: losing one-half or more of the global population if sufficiently contained by drones, space weapons, and other long-range autonomous weapons systems provides a great benefit to a certain class of an increasingly cosmopolitan elite who look forward to automated forms of labor that make human exploitation instrumentally even if not morally obsolete. The limit of Balakrishnan’s and for that matter Marx’s vision is and was the presumption that there are limits to what humans can bear materially and morally. Like Moore, Balakrishnan is simultaneously too optimistic and too pessimistic. These thinkers are too pessimistic about the creativity of the Eurocene, which historically has departed from classical capitalist logic and structure in important ways, while maintaining the consistency necessary to continue. Furthermore, they are too optimistic about the ways that consciousness and political action change under increasingly sadistic material conditions. A project of homogenization also hides behind the problematic logic of the contradiction of capital creating its alternative. There is something quite dangerous in how this logic interiorizes resistant ontologies or uprisings against capital as “new.” Of the many examples given by Moore and hinted at more obliquely by Balakrishnan, the insurgent ontologies, whether rural or indigenous, are exceedingly old. I do not mean in the sense that indigenous peoples are outside of time but in the sense that Eduardo Viveiros de Castro has used when he talks about “extra-moderns,”39 that is, forms of life that have creatively survived, so far, the onslaught of homogenization under the Eurocene. To classify these extramodern forms of life “new” or contingent upon the “contradictions” of cheap nature is to resign their cause and constitution to the logic of capitalism itself. And as such, this logic drags along with it a project of homogenization as a way of thinking, whereby the resistance or even indifference to the Eurocene is created by the Eurocene. Not unlike Marx’s insistence on proletarization as a necessary precondition of revolution, interiorizing struggles like “Idle No More” or the farmer revolts in India to the logic of contradiction is to rob them of what autonomy they have carved out against the dictates of development and modernization in both capitalist and Marxist iterations. These insurgent ontologies against extractivism are continuous across centuries of rebellion against the appropriation of land and resources. They are not a recent phenomenon created by the end of cheap nature. What is new, potentially, is that those of us consonant with a modern form of life have begun to care. Modern concern for extramodern struggles may well be because of the glaring crisis caused by lives built on and from cheap nature. However, to conflate that concern with the cause of those who provoked our concern is politically and ethically dangerous. Like the logic of the Anthropocene whereby the power to break the world somehow suggests the power to engineer the world, the interiorization of indigenous and rural struggles against the Eurocene enables many of the same assumptions about the grounds and legitimacy of global-scale governance, even if such forms of governance would be more indebted to cosmopolitan solidarity rather than elite geopolitical control. In the former, the difference is more sentimental than material, as the cosmopolitan solidarity of a new, more just ecological order would itself also be a project of incorporation and homogenization, except this time done in the name of the marginalized irrespective of their input or shared governance. Thus, while it is all well and good to declare allyship for struggles like Idle No More against the destruction of the planet, we should be careful that the grounds for agreement are not a prelude to a new enclosure.