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Even if cap was, at some point, a root cause for war, the two have become so intertwined that the difference has become indistinguishable—making the root cause irrelevant and the perm the only solution

Grove 19 (Jairus Victor Grove, Department of Political Science UH Manoa, Savage Ecology: war and geopolitics at the end of the world, 2019)//KB

The shift to guns and infantry further increased the need for supplies and the production of more weapons. The effect, according to Mumford and Fuller, was an increasing demand on industry to standardize arms.28 Mass production and an emphasis on numbers and repetition, rather than singularity and skill, takes place on the battlefield as much as or more than the early factories of commercial industrialization. According to Fuller, “The quality idea, upon which eighteenth-century fighting power was based, was, in the last lap of that century, steadily giving way to the quantity idea.”29 Again, here there was a martial logic for which mercantilism and proto-capitalism and industrialization were means rather than independent drivers. However, there was also a positive feedback between the demand for mass production, the resulting economic and resource demands on the state, the expansion of overseas conquest, and, therefore, war. Even if there was a martial inception, once global networks and states locked into place, the difference between war for economic advantage and gaining economic advantage for war quickly became indistinguishable. Two kinds of war emerge from the vicious circle of mercantilist states. European states fought other European states that were in competition for colonial exploitation, and they fought colonial wars of occupation and expropriation to pursue primitive accumulation and, later, settlement. Critical machines of capitalism played a vital role in the becoming global of this phenomena. The drive to institutionalize the mass death set off by first conquest in places like the Americas required new levels of speed and profit only made possible by finance and credit. According to Mumford: One abstraction reenforced the other. Time was money: money was power: power required the furtherance of trade and production: production was diverted from the channels of direct use into those of remote trade, toward the acquisition of larger profits, with a larger margin for new capital expenditures for wars, foreign conquest, mines . . . more money and more power. . . . Money grew in part out of the increasing mobility of late medieval society. Landed wealth etc. was difficult to transport, whereas money could be transported by a simple algebraic operation on one side or another of the ledger.30 Mumford’s “ledger” took the form of the Bank of England in 1694, and was further accelerated by Thomas Savery’s steam pump in 1698. As a result, “war was endemic, because its main object was to extract wealth from other nations.”31 The machinic and amplifying relations between ever more portable forms of warfare, primitive accumulation, finance, credit to enable investments (before the return on those investments had created new capital), and the demand for security in newly formed settlements created terraforms and institutionalized a new kind of planet—that of the Eurocene.

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