Voting for the status quo is anti-black, too – evaluate consequences before ethical alignments
Mathew R. Silliman 3, Professor of Philosophy at the Massachusetts College of Liberal Arts, 2003, Theory & Research in Education, Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 307-309
This brings me to my second proposal about the source of the problem: it will not I think be possible to validate, understand, and thereby combat the various levels upon which racism operates without finding a place in moral reasoning for outcomes as well as intentions. Blum is attracted, for what I take to be entirely sound reasons, to a non-consequentialist view of morality. On such a view, unintended consequences that are morally undesirable are unfortunate, but not wrong in a strictly moral sense of the term, unless closely connected in some way to actual bad intentions. I share with Blum a preference for this deontological approach to moral analysis, but as the persistence of structural racism shows, we need some way to admit the robust moral significance even of unintended consequences or seriously risk the irrelevance of our moral theory. This is not as difficult to do as it appears, for the idea that these two strains of modern moral thought, consequentialism and deontology, are wholly contradictory is more a product of 18th century intellectual politics than of anything inherent in their moral insights; admitting that consequences matter morally need not involve capitulation to the slippery slope of utilitarian calculation. One fairly inexpensive way to bridge the imaginary gap is just to parse the utilitarian demand as a deontological obligation (and it need not even be the highest of our prima facia duties): one of our moral duties is to live our lives, within the limits of our knowledge and ability, so as to make the world a better and more just place overall. Simple as this seems, and easy to reconcile with principles like the dignity of persons, it is subversive, for it removes a bias in favor of the (oppressive, unjust, racist) social status quo sometimes thought to characterize deontic moral theories. It also revises the relation between individuals and their enabling communities from accidental association to mutual obligation: social structures owe individuals support, (relative) independence, and the best available approximation of justice, whereas individuals in turn owe those same social institutions the impetus for continual moral revitalization.