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Critical legal advocacy by Asian-American communities has engendered progress—only public pressure and legal advocacy can protect those gains and enable future challenges to succeed

Yamamoto, et al, 17—Fred Korematsu Professor of Law and Social Justice, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawai’i (Erik, with Maria Amparo Vanaclocha Berti and Jaime Tokioka, ““Loaded Weapon” Revisited: The Trump Era Import of Justice Jackson’s Warning in Korematsu,” 24 Asian Am. L.J. 5 (2017), dml)

The Justice Department declined to further appeal the coram nobis decisions. So the Supreme Court did not confront an opportunity to belatedly reverse its World War II rulings. Nor in other subsequent security and liberty disputes has the Court overruled Korematsu. 149 While the case has been sorely discredited by judges150 and scholars,151 as well as by the coram nobis decisions, the Court’s original ruling formally still stands—if not for its now widely recognized wrongful validation of the forced removal and incarceration, then for its embrace of unconditional judicial deference to government claims of national security as justification for broad civil liberties restrictions. 152

Indeed, the late-Chief Justice William Rehnquist153 and influential Seventh Court of Appeals Judge Richard Posner, in important respects, treat Korematsu as “correctly decided.” 154 Underscoring Korematsu’s principle of judicial passivity, Judge Posner indicates that during times of hostility when faced with government national security claims of urgent need, as in Korematsu, the courts can say, “[W]e’re going to defer.” 155 As Justice Jackson predicted, “every repetition” of judicial deference to unsubstantiated government claims of exigency “embeds the principle more deeply in our law and thinking and expands it to new purposes.” 156

Thus the pivotal question for today and tomorrow can be reframed in the following way: If “it”—something akin to the World War II mass exclusion and incarceration—happens again, 157 would the Court’s deferential approach in 1944 be expanded to “new purposes” in the Trump era to validate transgressions of essential democratic liberties?

We submit that the significance of this question is tied to a key sociolegal insight about the forces of lasting social injustice drawn from the Japanese American incarceration experience: national security fears coupled with racism, nativism, or religious animosity and backed by the force of law generate deep and lasting damage.158 It is the “law’s stamp of approval on wartime exigencies plus racism [or religious intolerance] that transforms mistakes of the moment into enduring social injustice.” 159

III. LAW AND POLITICS—INTO THE FUTURE

In light of policymakers’ vociferous after-Paris and post-Trump election calls for sweeping harsh Muslim restricting security measures— along with accelerating harassment of and discrimination against Muslims and other communities of color in the United States160—Justice Jackson’s warning and Judge Patel’s call for vigilance remain hotly relevant. Justice Scalia envisioned the “same thing” happening again. He further foresaw a compliant judiciary, as in Korematsu, falling deferentially in line with the “hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible,” even if exaggerated or falsely grounded, “claim of an urgent need.” 161

The time is ripe for revisiting and then proactively responding to the challenges posed by the loaded weapon.

The political and legal atmosphere after 9/11 (with some calling for reasoned temperance and judicial checks and balances, citing the WWII internment as a cautionary tale) 162 differs from the environment of the original World War II internment (with few calling for independent judicial scrutiny as a check on government power).163 Recent litigation now challenges wide-ranging government civil liberties violations, placing security and liberty tensions squarely in the public eye.164 Court challenges, public education, and organizational advocacy165 collectively signal what Justice Sonia Sotomayor describes as a “modicum of progress.” 166 But politicians’ regressive prescriptions in the Trump era, with its deeply conservative national security leadership, forefend steep political backsliding.167

An accommodation of security measures and civil liberties protections is essential in a constitutional democracy. But in light of the former’s penchant for overwhelming the latter, we submit, it is combined critical legal advocacy and public pressure that erect the real bulwark against government civil liberties excesses.

We suggest that next steps should not focus entirely on political organizing or primarily on legal action. Rather, strategic steps forward need to embrace an integrated combination of critical legal advocacy and public pressure at two crucial stages. The first, at the front-end, is through organizing, educating, and litigating to prevent politically driven abuses of vulnerable communities before they occur. 168 The second, at the back-end, is through blocking or removing “the law’s stamp of approval” of those abuses once they occur.169 Combining critical legal advocacy and political organizing with public pressure is essential, in Justice Murphy’s words, for closing “the door on discriminatory actions against other minority groups in the passion of tomorrow.” 170

A. Front-end Prevention

In today’s climate of fear, “our first task in protecting both people and key democratic values is to be proactive at the front-end”—to afford government ample berth for security actions while preventing palpable government abuses.171 As the original Loaded Weapon essay prescribed, to facilitate prevention through vigilance and action:

We need to organize and speak out to assure that the expansive new national security regime does not overwhelm the civil liberties of vulnerable groups and move the country toward a police state. We need to mobilize and raise challenges to prevent . . . [exclusion and] incarcerations, particularly en masse.172

More specifically, “[t]hrough political analysis, education, and activism, our job [before abuses occur] is to compel powerful institutions, particularly the courts, to be vigilant, to ‘protect all.’” 173

To illustrate, at the front-end, the Korematsu coram nobis legal team wrote an open letter to President George W. Bush sharply criticizing Commissioner Kirsanow’s prediction of a mass internment of Arab Americans and his resort to the original Korematsu decision as precedent. The legal team stressed that by citing the 1944 Korematsu case and ignoring the coram nobis courts’ later findings, Kirsanow sought to employ Korematsu wrongly as legal and moral justification for present-day imprisonment of another ethnic group in the United States.174 Similarly, Fred Korematsu publically responded to conservative commentator Michelle Malkin.175 In 2004 Malkin argued that the World War II Japanese American internment had been justified and that using the mass incarceration after 9/11 to criticize the government’s expansive war on terror jeopardized homeland security.176 Korematsu responded in words worth quoting at length: It is painful to see reopened for serious debate the question of whether the government was justified in imprisoning Japanese Americans during World War II. It was my hope that my case and the cases of other Japanese American internees would be remembered for the dangers of racial and ethnic scapegoating. Fears and prejudices directed against minority communities are too easy to evoke and exaggerate, often to serve the political agendas of those who promote those fears. I know what it is like to be at the other end of such scapegoating and how difficult it is to clear one’s name after unjustified suspicious are endorsed as fact by the government. If someone is a spy or terrorist they should be prosecuted for their actions. But no one should ever be locked away simply because they share the same race, ethnicity, or religion as a spy or terrorist. If that principle was not learned from the internment of Japanese Americans, then these are very dangerous times for our democracy. 177 Other front-end actions after 9/11 contributed to heightened scrutiny by domestic and international human rights organizations.178 They also fueled Congressional investigations into regressive Bush Administration policies.179

One potent front-end effort emerged from the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence chaired by Senator Dianne Feinstein. That Committee concluded that the CIA’s coercive interrogations—torture— following 9/11 did not produce “intelligence, result[ed] in false answers, and had historically proven to be ineffective.” 180 Looking forward, Feinstein highlighted the importance of preventive action. She pressed the executive branch’s security apparatus in the future to abide by articulated ethical dictates because “[w]e cannot again allow history to be forgotten and grievous past mistakes to be repeated.” 181 To implement the kind of preventive measures envisioned by the Senate Committee, Feinstein and other senators crafted the “Due Process Guarantee Act” in 2012. 182 The proposed legislation, supported by testimony of Korematsu coram nobis attorney, Lorraine Bannai,183 aimed to afford due process protections to citizens and permanent residents who were apprehended for ostensible security reasons on U.S. soil.184

Community advocates, too, figured significantly in halting or at least impeding proposals for potentially abusive actions before they mushroomed into widespread damage. Immediate national and international criticism followed Mayor Bowers’s 2015 call for a mass Muslim “sequester.” 185 Japanese American organizations immediately denounced Bowers’s resort to the World War II internment as precedent. 186 The Japanese American Citizen League, for instance, rejected Bowers’s “outrageous comments,” criticizing the “fear-mongering proposals” and the “scapegoating of innocent people.” 187 Mainstream media also weighed in.188 These sharp responses, along with strong criticism by U.S. Representatives Doris Matsui189 and Mike Honda,190 coalesced into potent and timely front-end preventive action. In the face of mounting criticism, Bowers apologized to “those offended” and effectively retracted his call.191

Extending Bowers’s earlier citation to the internment to bolster antiMuslim proposals, presidential transition insider Carl Higbie provoked outrage when he relied on Korematsu as precedent for a sweeping Muslim registry and tracking system. California Representative Mark Takano denounced Higbie’s remarks: “People connected to the incoming Administration are using my family’s [racial incarceration] experience as a precedent for what President-elect Trump could do.” 192 Takano added that “[t]hese comments confirm many Americans’ worst fears about the Trump Administration, and they reflect an alarming resurgence of racism and xenophobia in our political discourse.” 193 The Council on American-Islamic Relations characterized Higbie’s reliance upon the internment as precedent as “absolutely deplorable” 194 and warned that it would “return America to one of the darkest chapters of its history.” 195 The director of Anti-Defamation League announced that “if one day Muslims will be forced to register, that is the day that this proud Jew will register as a Muslim.” 196 When President Trump issued the January 2017 Muslim exclusion and removal orders, public protests erupted.197 Those protests built on earlier organized resistance. Combined with critical legal advocacy, those efforts temporarily blocked enforcement of the most prominent executive order.198 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in denying the government’s request to stay the lower court’s nationwide restraining order, cited “irreparable harm” to wide swaths of Muslims and to the states. 199 It also deemed factually unsubstantiated (thus far) the government’s national security claim of “urgent need.” 200 And it rejected the government’s contention that national security restrictions of noncitizens liberties should be “unreviewable” by the courts.201

The long-term impacts of this type of front-end advocacy are uncertain. What is certain is that this advocacy has piqued public awareness, spurred watch groups, and built a platform for immediate public criticism of and preventive action against newly unfolding repressive policies and practices. And it has placed the courts and their “cultural performance” 202—and the very idea of judicial independence—on center stage.

B. Back-end Accountability

Combined critical legal advocacy203 and political pressure are essential to a second task. That task is for legal and community advocates, policymakers, businesses and journalists to be “assertive at the back-end – to call out injustice after it occurs, to spell out the damage it does to real people [and communities] in our midst and to our constitutional democracy, and to demand accountability to principles of equality and due process.” 204 The aim is to rectify injustice.205 And the demand for accountability is expressed through advocacy and pressure for heightened judicial scrutiny of proffered government justifications for curtailing essential democratic liberties.206

FOOTNOTE 203 Critical legal advocacy encompasses, critical legal argument by lawyers and civil and human rights organizations aimed at shaping judges’ threshold selections of the level of judicial scrutiny, and ultimately the judges’ response to the specific legal challenges to executive actions. . . . [And by supplementing] traditional legal arguments . . . critical legal advocacy aims to reveal what is really at stake, who benefits and who is harmed . . . who wields the behind-the-scenes power, which social values are supported and which are subverted, how political concerns frame the legal questions, and how societal institutions and differing segments of the populace will be affected by the court’s decision.

Yamamoto, supra note 179, at 285, 291–92.

The task is crucial because uncertainty persists at the back-end. Some courts embrace an exceedingly deferential judicial posture, particularly where the president acts with congressional authorization,207 relying upon, if not citing, the 1944 Korematsu majority. 208 In this fashion, the Supreme Court in its 1993 Reno decision implicitly recognized Korematsu as precedent. 209 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, employed a highly deferential approach to reject juvenile detainees’ due process claims challenging their indefinite detentions en masse. 210 In dissent, Justice Stevens pinpointed Scalia’s reliance on, but without citation to, the “one notable exception” to the rule of individualized due process—Korematsu. 211 The “Court’s holding in Korematsu obviously supports the majority’s analysis.” 212 The Supreme Court exhibited similar Korematsu-like deference in its 2010 Holder decision in upholding chilling restrictions on free speech and association activities of a nonprofit humanitarian organization on thinly substantiated national security grounds. 213

Other courts chafe at the jurisprudential notion that the judiciary should largely defer to the government whenever the government claims national security to justify curtailing civil liberties. They cite the Korematsu dissents and the coram nobis rulings as a cautionary tale and reject turning a blind eye to abuses by the elective branches. 214 These latter courts would undertake independent scrutiny as an integral separation-ofpowers component of government accountability in a constitutional democracy. 215

Justice Sotomayor overall perceives a “modicum of progress.” 216 She sees judges, mindful of the need to accommodate both security and liberties, embracing heightened judicial solicitude. For instance, District Judge Robert G. Doumar in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld217 carefully scrutinized the executive branch’s designation of American citizen Hamdi as an “enemy combatant.” 218 While recognizing deference due to the executive branch in matters of military personnel and tactics,219 Judge Doumar, a Reagan appointee, announced the court’s commitment to “meaningful judicial review” 220 of the government’s proffered evidence justifying Hamdi’s continued detention. Judge Doumar’s demand for bona fide government proof of necessity underscored a well-recognized if unevenly employed “watchful care” approach to judicial scrutiny—notably articulated in Ex parte Milligan. 221 U.S. District Judge Katherine B. Forrest similarly scrutinized the government’s necessity claim in Hedges v. Obama. 222 American citizens, writers, journalists and civil liberties advocates sued the President, challenging their potential indefinite incarceration under the National Defense Authorization Act.223 Plaintiffs feared their free speech and associations would subject them to prolonged military detention as vaguely defined supporters of terrorist groups. 224 The government urged the district court essentially to “stay out of it.” 225 It asserted that the court should defer to the executive and legislative branches’ contention that national security justified the restrictions and, on that basis, uphold the government’s expansive security reach. 226 Judge Forrest acknowledged the importance of the government’s need for latitude in safeguarding the country.227 She maintained, however, that this partial deference “does not eliminate the judicial obligation to rule on properly presented constitutional questions,” 228 especially because “[c]ourts must safeguard core constitutional rights.” 229 Judge Forrest therefore subjected the restrictions to “exacting scrutiny” 230 and concluded that the executive and legislative branches failed to show that the restrictions—particularly indefinite detention without procedural safeguards—were necessary. 231 In Hassan v. City of New York,232 American Muslim communities claimed to be targets of excessive post-9/11 surveillance and harassment by New York City police. They sued “to affirm the principle that individuals may not [be subject to] pervasive surveillance that cause[s] them continuing harm simply because they profess a certain faith.” 233 The district court granted the City’s motion to dismiss.234 On appeal, the Third Circuit concluded that plaintiffs had pleaded enough factual content to state a claim.235 The City argued that, nevertheless, the program was justified by national security.236 The court disagreed. It acknowledged that elective branches possess broad power over most security matters. 237 To justify impinging upon protected liberties, however, “[t]he gravity of the threat alone cannot be dispositive.” 238 The government’s necessity contention needs to “be substantiated by objective evidence.” 239 To legitimize careful scrutiny, Judge Thomas L. Ambro, writing for the Third Circuit, recounted lessons from the World War II internment and the McCarthy-era witch hunts about government persecution of innocent people driven by “unfounded fears.” 240 Judge Ambro first highlighted how those fears led to harsh discrimination against one hundred thousand innocent Japanese Americans on an unfounded claim of necessity and how a deferential judiciary passively accepted the government’s misrepresentations: Yet when these citizens pleaded with the courts to uphold their constitutional rights, we passively accepted the Government’s representations that the use of such classifications was necessary to the national interest. In doing so, we failed to recognize that the discriminatory treatment of approximately 120,000 persons of Japanese ancestry was fueled not by military necessity but unfounded fears. 241 Judge Ambro then highlighted how that passive judicial stamp of approval sacrificed fundamental freedoms and led later to national regret: The World War II relocation-camp cases and the Red scare and McCarthy-era internal subversion cases are only the most extreme reminders that when we allow fundamental freedoms to be sacrificed in the name of real or perceived exigency, we invariably come to regret it. 242 Judge Ambro’s summary account of the World War II internment focused the appellate court’s specific inquiry into alleged police harassment and disruption of Muslim religious and community life in the name of national security. Turning a blind eye in Korematsu, he observed, enabled a Supreme Court majority to constitutionally validate the continuing incarceration of innocent citizens and noncitizens on a badly flawed factual claim of necessity—something the Third Circuit would not countenance in the case before it. 243 Echoing Judge Patel’s call for vigilance, Judge Ambro described what “[w]e have learned from experience”—that courts “must be most vigilant in protecting constitutional rights.” 244 On behalf of the Third Circuit, Judge Ambro therefore cautioned all federal judges to avoid similar future injustices and to apply “the same rigorous standards [of judicial scrutiny] even where national security is at stake.” 245 Unconditional [court] deference to the government’s . . . invocation of emergency . . . has a lamentable place in our history, . . . bending our constitutional principles merely because an interest in national security is invoked. . . . We have learned from experience that it is often where the asserted interest appears most compelling that we must be most vigilant in protecting constitutional rights.246 In 2017, the Ninth Circuit similarly embraced judicial vigilance in language that mirrored Judge Ambro’s. The court denied the Trump Administration’s motion to stay the lower court’s nationwide temporary order restraining enforcement of the President’s Muslim exclusion and removal order.247 In doing so, it soundly rejected the Justice Department’s broad contention that “national security” renders an executive order’s immigrant restrictions judicially “unreviewable” even if the order transgresses constitutional freedoms. Total judicial deference, the court observed, “runs contrary to the fundamental structure of our constitutional democracy.” 248 The judicial role “will sometimes require the resolution of litigation challenging the constitutional authority of one of the three branches.” 249 The Ninth Circuit therefore chided the Justice Department for failing to submit evidence of “urgent need” to justify the executive order’s immediate enforcement. As in Korematsu, “[r]ather than present evidence to explain the need for the Executive Order, the Government has taken the position” that the courts simply must acquiesce. 250 While counseling deference to executive and legislative national security measures generally, the Ninth Circuit declared that the “Government’s ‘authority and expertise in [national security] matters do not automatically trump the Court’s own obligation to secure the protection that the Constitution grants to individuals,’ even in times of war.” 251 The judges in these cases evinced—in Justice Sotomayor’s words—a “modicum of progress” toward shaping the judicial role and affirmatively blocking or removing the law’s stamp of approval on government sponsored injustice. CONCLUSION—LOOKING BACK TO FORGE AHEAD

Despite incremental progress, the Supreme Court has never formally overruled its sorely discredited 1944 Korematsu decision. Most significant, it has not definitively rejected the case’s contested principle—advanced by the Trump Justice Department—that when the government asserts national security, the courts should “stay out of it,” even when the government transgresses civilians’ fundamental liberties.

Harassment of and violence against Muslim individuals and communities has intensified. Republican presidential candidates called loudly for broad Muslim surveillance, exclusion, and “sequestration.” Then-candidate Trump bolstered his call for a complete and total shutdown of Muslim entry with a call for torturing Muslim terror suspects. And after Trump’s election, transition insiders signaled coming repressive religion-targeting measures and cited the Japanese American internment as precedent. The President followed with his thinly vetted January 2017 Muslim exclusion and removal executive orders.

The questions posed earlier thus remain intensely relevant today: “What will happen when those profiled, detained, harassed or discriminated against [or tortured] turn to the courts for legal protection? How will the courts respond to the need to provide for society’s security and to protect fundamental democratic values?”

One response is that former Justice Scalia is correct: a serious violation of peoples’ liberties en masse could happen again, and, following former Chief Justice Rehnquist’s and the Trump Justice Department’s lead, conservative judges may well defer to the government’s loosely or even falsely grounded assertion of national security necessity. Another and contrasting response is that many judges now will carefully scrutinize the government’s national security justifications for curtailing liberties essential to a functioning democracy—endeavoring to accommodate both security and liberty. Those courts, in an exercise of judicial independence, will require a bona fide government showing of “urgent need” and strike down unsubstantiated sweeping restrictive measures. Lower court rulings in Hassan, Hedges, and Washington offer a glimpse. Legal commentators, at this juncture, tend to end their national security-civil liberties analyses of Supreme Court cases by noting divergent judicial approaches and expressing worry yet cautious hope for the future. The Loaded Weapon Revisited steers further analysis in a different direction—it does so in broad fashion, leaving explication for longer works. It outlines the realpolitik dynamics of how: How we as a society are to continue overall progress in the face of politicians’ regressive policy prescriptions and public fear-mongering; and how, “in times of international hostility and antagonism,” as Judge Patel cautioned, “our institutions, legislative, executive and judicial, [are to] exercise their authority to protect all citizens from the . . . fears and prejudices . . . so easily aroused.”

Peering into the future, for those committed to both security and liberty, this Article charts realpolitik dynamics along dual paths of critical legal advocacy (for heightened judicial scrutiny and against mass ethnic or religious restrictions) and public pressure (to compel policymakers’ and judges’ accountability). The first path, at the front-end, is through organizing, educating, and litigating to prevent politically popular abuses of vulnerable communities before they occur. The second, at the back-end, is through blocking or removing “the law’s stamp of approval” upon those abuses once they occur. For it is the failure at both the front and back ends—where national security fears “coupled with racism or nativism [are] backed by the force of law”—that generates deep and lasting social injustice.

Combined critical legal advocacy and public pressure—through assertive communities supported by justice groups, lawyer and scholar advocates, attuned media, and an informed public—heighten prospects for shutting the “door to discriminatory actions against other minority groups in the passions of tomorrow.” More broadly, collective action for both prevention up-front and accountability at the back-end empowers communities to break the cycle Justice Jackson envisioned of “repetition that embeds that principle” of judicial passivity and harsh government discrimination “more deeply in our law and expands it to new purposes.”

It may be this kind of collective strategic action that compels the Supreme Court to formally, and finally, overrule Korematsu—both its approval of the internment and its principle of unconditional court deference—while reclaiming the Korematsu coram nobis call for judicial vigilance.

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