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Their example of the Japanese-American Citizen’s League [in the Chambers-Letson card] goes neg—their advocacy of specific policy proposals enacted postmemory by refusing to let the government and public forget the injustices of internment—state engagement does not obscure that history!

Fukarai and Yang, 18—Professor of Sociology and Legal Studies AND Associate Professor of History, UC-Santa Cruz (Hiroshi and Alice, “The History of Japanese Racism, Japanese American Redress, and the Dangers Associated with Government Regulation of Hate Speech,” 45 Hastings Const. L.Q. 533 (2018), dml)

Activists in the 1960s and 1970s also dismantled claims that the camps were necessary for national security by publicizing studies that documented the racism behind mass exclusion and incarceration. To gain credibility outside the community, it was important that a growing list of books by non-Japanese-American researchers could be cited as evidence for the injustice of the incarceration. 128 Accounts by historian Roger Daniels and journalist Allan R. Bosworth denounced government euphemisms that called mass ",129 removal an "evacuation" and labeled the camps as "relocation centers. Instead, these authors argued that the camps should be called "concentration camps" because they had caused widespread suffering. Documenting the racist views of DeWitt and other architects of the incarceration, this scholarship helped Japanese Americans recognize the camps were not just a wartime "mistake," but reflected a long history of anti-Asian racism. 130 Researchers also began presenting evidence of suffering within the camps, including the fact that several prisoners were shot and killed by trigger happy guards, which helped activists persuade former prisoners that there was no shame in sharing their personal accounts of trauma they experienced during and after the war. Activists frequently quoted this scholarship to convince Americans who had no familiarity with the Japanese-American community that the damage mass incarceration inflicted on individuals, families and the community was significant and pervasive.131

To counter claims that Japanese Americans should "move on" and avoid dwelling on the past, activists Edison Uno and Raymond Okamura organized a grassroots campaign in 1967 to repeal Title II of the 1950 Internal Security Act to prevent other groups from being incarcerated without due process. 132 This act provided funding for detention sites, including the former Japanese-Amenican camp at Tule Lake, to imprison individuals labeled as subversives without hearings. While the act specifically targeted communist agitators, black power and antiwar protesters feared that they also might be placed in "concentration camps." After the campaign gained momentum within the ethnic community and increasing media coverage, more conservative JACL lobbyists, Senator Daniel Inouye, and Congressman Spark Matsunaga shepherded the legislation through Congress in 197 1.133

This history of militant community activists putting pressure on more conservative leaders who then used their political contacts to achieve legislative changes became a model for redress' passage. In 1970, Edison Uno persuaded the JACL to pass a resolution calling on the government to "compensate on an individual basis a daily per diem requital for each day spent in confinement and/or legal exclusion."l34 Uno passed away in 1976 without seeing any significant progress. Two years later, however, the JACL elected an outsider, Clifford Uyeda, as president and he, in turn, recruited John Tateishi, the son of a famous critic of the wartime JACL, to serve as JACL's redress chair.1 3 5

Under this new leadership, the JACL developed a multifaceted campaign to build support for redress. To overcome redress opponents and skeptics within the JACL, Uyeda wrote thirty-five articles for the JACL's newsletter defending the concept of redress and explaining that the campaign's goal was not to "put a price tag on freedom or justice" but "to acknowledge the mistake by providing proper redress for the victims of the injustice, and thereby make such injustices less likely to recur. "136 To help marshal support for one plan, the redress committee reviewed various proposals that defined redress eligibility, form, and scope in different ways. Seattle activists maintained that redress compensation should be determined by the amount of time spent behind barbed wire. Critics of this plan argued that it would penalize Japanese Americans who left camp early to serve in the military, to attend college, and to find jobs to support their families.13 7 JACL old guard leaders, offended by the concept of individual compensation, called for the creation of a community trust fund that could support educational programs and charity projects. Critics of this plan questioned who would administer the program and worried that public relations programs would take priority over housing and health services for low-income Japanese Americans.138

To achieve consensus, Uyeda and Tateishi incorporated components from multiple proposals. Their 1978 proposal called for both a community trust fund and payments of $25,000 to each individual, or their heirs, who had experienced removal and incarceration regardless of age, national origin, or camp experience. Ironically, the $25,000 figure was based on a fabricated claim made by a JACL leader during hearings for the 1948 Evacuation Claims Act that the Federal Reserve had calculated Japanese Americans lost $400 million in property during the war. 139 Realizing that Japanese Amencans needed to project an image of unity before the government, JACL leaders designed a survey that disguised conflicting views of redress eligibility and compensation. They simply asked if "the injustice of internment affected your life" and if people favored the concept of redress without wading into more specific definitions. 140 As a result, the campaign could claim a mandate based on support by ninety-four percent of the organization for redress and eighty-three percent for compensation.' 4

JACL activists then developed a media campaign to educate other Japanese Amenicans and the mainstream public about the injustice Japanese Americans experienced during the war. They were unintentionally assisted by redress opponents who made inflammatory comments that attempted to minimize or deny Japanese American suffering. The most prominent critic, S. I. Hayakawa, a Canadian-born semanticist and Republican senator from California who spent the war in Chicago, actually claimed the camps were "the best thing that could have happened" to Japanese Americans because they "forced them out of their segregated existence" and allowed them to take "advantage of new opportunities." 42 News outlets spread Hayakawa's claims along with redress criticism by others who continued to blame Japanese Americans for Pearl Harbor, the Bataan Death March, and more recent trade wars with Japan. Instead of diminishing support for redress, this publicity boosted the campaign by enraging former prisoners who felt compelled to counter Hayakawa's depiction of the benefits of mass removal and incarceration and to debunk the racist conflation of Japan and Japanese Americans.1 4 3 Such accounts made it difficult to argue that racism was an irrelevant vestige of history and convinced more Japanese Americans to become activists. 44

The creation of a federal commission to investigate the causes and consequences of the wartime removal and incarceration became a vital component in the passage of redress. Japanese-American members of Congress advised JACL redress leaders that such a commission was necessary to educate the public about what happened during the war. JACL leaders knew that this proposal would be controversial and would be criticized as a stalling tactic or a replacement for meaningful redress. JACL reformers, especially within the Seattle chapter, denounced this strategy and argued there was no need for an investigation given the large body of scholarship that documented the racism behind Executive Order 9066.145

Declaring that redress delayed was redress denied, JACL redress leaders noted that increasing numbers of former prisoners were passing away each month. Political leaders, however, recognized that having a government commission provide an official determination of the injustice was critical to win congressional support. Senator Daniel Inouye and Congressmen Spark Matsunaga, Norman Mineta, and Robert Matsui cosponsored the legislation that created the Commission on the Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians in 1980.146 This Commission held hearings in twenty cities around the country and included testimony from more than 750 witnesses.1 47 As the National Coalition for Redress and Reparations ("NCRR") activist Lillian Nakano explained, "the burden of guilt has finally shifted onto the government, where it rightly belongs." "Bitter tears," she proclaimed, "intermingled with pride and determination as we reaffirmed our resolve to continue our quest for justice." "At every city hearing," she noted, "the united demand for monetary reparations was virtually unanimous, and irresistible."4 s

Media portrayals of the incredibly moving testimony completely obliterated "model minority" images of Japanese Americans and increased public understanding of the trauma experienced by former prisoners and their children. For example, Time's 1981 article, "Burden of Shame," noted the "terrible ironies" of Fourth of July celebrations held "behind barbed wire, in the shadow of sentry towers" and "parents wasting away in tar-paper camp shacks" that "proudly displayed starred banners indicating that their sons were American soldiers." 49 While some Japanese Americans worried that this focus on loyalty and patriotism obscured a history of protest and resistance within the camps, it clearly helped in winning support for redress outside of the Japanese American community.150

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