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Benevolent hegemonic offensive rhetoric is key – otherwise, worse, anti-democratic rhetoric fills in

Green and Brands 22 – *senior vice president for Asia and Japan Chair at CSIS and chair in modern and contemporary Japanese politics and foreign policy at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University,**Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at Johns Hopkins SAIS, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, and columnist for Bloomberg (Mike* interviewing Hal**, February 25, 2022, “Twilight Struggle: Lessons from the Cold War for China Strategy Today,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, https://www.csis.org/analysis/twilight-struggle-lessons-cold-war-china-strategy-today)//KH

Mike Green: So the way you write the book is looking at different themes in Cold War strategic competition and then, at the end of the book, tying together some lessons or implications for us. You don't come out and say, "We need to recreate exactly NSC-68, or we need"... It's not redo what we did but what are the implications for how we prepare for this ourselves? There is a bit of a contradiction in there, which may be something you can resolve for us. But, on the one hand, you want an open educational exchange with China, for all the reasons you just said, but you also quote... And I agree with this, too, by the way. You quote Kennan on the need for offensive, not just defensive, but offensive political warfare, information warfare, so poking at the seams, the inconsistencies, the contradictions in the adversary's way of life.

Mike Green: The contradiction is this. This is the excuse Xi Jinping and other authoritarians used to shut down civil society and free academic learning and discourse, because it's all just part of an American campaign of offensive political warfare. This is a kind of tactical question, really. I don't think we ever figured it out in the Cold War, really. How do you take advantage of our open society, the attraction of our values, even within an authoritarian state, and therefore wanting to preserve an open exchange in academic and intellectual, rich interaction with China while at the same time engaging in political warfare, which we need to do? Do you have any sort of lessons from the Cold War or thoughts on the way forward?

Hal Brands: Well, the framing point here is that when Kennan and others thought about political warfare early in the Cold War, I think they were motivated chiefly by the idea that the Soviet Union certainly isn't going to hold back from trying to divide and weaken our society and pry us apart from our friends and allies, and so if we limit ourselves to purely defensive measures, that's a form of unilateral disarmament in this struggle. Since the struggle is really, hopefully, going to be waged using primarily means short of war, that's a part of the toolkit you just can't leave to the side in a competition like this. I think that's basically right today as well. I think it's fairly well established the Chinese have a pretty well-developed program of political warfare that they pursue vis-a-vis not just the United States but other democratic societies that's meant to make it harder for us to be an effective competitor. So I think we're going to have to do things in the same area.

Hal Brands: The point I would make, though, is that you don't always have to think of political warfare as the really sexy covert action, dangerous type stuff that it sometimes gets described as. So we did a lot of political warfare during the Cold War that frankly wasn't that effective, right? We would parachute Albanian exiles back into Albania to try to link up with the anti-Communist resistance there, and they all got killed because Kim Philby had infiltrated British and American intelligence service. We trained Tibetan guerillas to go fight against the Chinese communists and they pretty much all got killed as well. So those types of things weren't always the most effective forms of political warfare. Some of the most effective forms of political warfare could be things like finding ways of introducing unbiased information into an otherwise closed information ecosystem. We used Radio Free Europe, for instance, to do this during the Cold War. There are parallels today that would come with finding ways of circumventing the Great Firewall and things like that. Political warfare can also be, you know, sort of a synonym for standing up for your own best values abroad.

Hal Brands: I mean, when the United States gets together with other democratic allies to sanction Chinese officials who are involved in doing terrible things to the Uighur population, that's a form of political warfare. It strikes at the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party, particularly under Xi Jinping. But it's something that we ought to be doing simply to validate our own values as well, and so I think we need kind of a broad version or a broad vision of political warfare, one that is not entirely constituted by, sort of, sneaky and subversive acts. I think we just have to accept the tension as well. I don't think there's anything the United States can do, by the way, that would convince Xi Jinping that we are not trying to overthrow the Chinese Communist Party. It's not just Xi, by the way. Deng Xiaoping thought that the United States was trying to overthrow the Chinese Communist Party as well back in the 1980s when that was basically the last thing that we had in mind. So there is a degree of ingrained suspicion here that we're not going to be able to overcome.

Mike Green: So the political warfare, the offensive... It's unfortunate the word warfare goes with it, but the offensive tool that works best for us is our openness and just, as you said, getting rid of the firewalls, opening up information. I went to college during the Cold War, so I remember it. I ran our radio station, and we used to get the weekly world news from Radio Moscow, and they'd encourage us to play it. We'd play it with a laugh track. It was so ridiculous. It was propaganda, and we knew, and it was funny. It was like a drinking game.

Mike Green: After college, I took the Trans-Siberian Railroad from China through the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, which made for interesting security clearance interviews a few years later. The most effective piece of American political warfare I saw behind the Iron Curtain was outside the US Embassy in Warsaw, where they had a huge placard with Herblock cartoons making fun of Ronald Reagan and dozens and dozens of Poles just staring at it in amazement. "You mean you're allowed to make fun of your leader?" So I think that's what political warfare meant, probably what Kennan had in mind, too. Don't emulate the other side. Play to your own strengths, which is openness, information, challenging conventional wisdom, and all of that.

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