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Opening Word document…

States’ reaction to multiple spheres of influence proves a regional shift away from Chinese revisionism and towards the USA!

Green and Brands 22 – *senior vice president for Asia and Japan Chair at CSIS and chair in modern and contemporary Japanese politics and foreign policy at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University,**Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at Johns Hopkins SAIS, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, and columnist for Bloomberg (Mike* interviewing Hal**, February 25, 2022, “Twilight Struggle: Lessons from the Cold War for China Strategy Today,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, https://www.csis.org/analysis/twilight-struggle-lessons-cold-war-china-strategy-today)//KH

Mike Green: You have a whole chapter on the contest and the periphery, and there was a great... The Soviets and the Chinese had an advantage because, for example, the fight in the Korean Peninsula or Vietnam was a continental Asian fight. They had interior lines. We had to go across the vast maritime space, and we ended up getting sucked into continental wars. The peripheral problems this time, with a few exceptions, are maritime. That's different, isn't it? It's South China Sea, it's East China Sea. It's increasingly not only the first but the second island chain. It's closer to home, and it's sort of more vital in the sense of American sea lanes and the, if you will, Anglo-American source of hegemony for 400 years. How do we think about these peripheral risks and which ones worry you, like Taiwan?

Mike Green: Riffing off what I just said, to me, it sort of says, "Worry more about the maritime periphery than the continental." But how do we think about these peripheral challenges? We're not looking at a direct US-China fight. It's about the periphery. It's about third states. It's about spheres of influence and all that. How do you think about it? What are the ones that worry you, and what does it mean that it's now increasingly maritime and, therefore, in our face?

Hal Brands: So I think there's maybe at least three ways of thinking about this issue, and so one area that I worry about is the one that you flagged, which is basically the maritime periphery of East Asia, right? You think a lot about East China Sea, South China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait as potential US-China flash points. In fact, those areas are so central to the competition that I don't know that we would even describe them as peripheral. I mean, that might be the core of this competition.

Hal Brands: East Asia might be the core in another way as well in that it's probably the most economically dynamic region of the world, or at least it has been for a while, and so it's not like fighting in Southeast Asia during the 1960s when that was the Third World, it was economically underdeveloped, and so on and so forth. It's a bit of a different situation. But, nonetheless, I think that's where the potential for direct conflict between the US and China is most severe because that's where our security commitments, or our ambiguous security commitments in the case of Taiwan, overlap most directly with things that China is increasingly defining as its own vital interests and indicating that it is very serious about pursuing.

Hal Brands: The second one would be, I think, kind of the Eurasian hinterland of China, and so one thing that we sometimes forget when we think about China is that it's a really big country that reaches really far into Eurasia, in fact, and Xi Jinping doesn't forget this. Remember he debuted the Belt and Road Initiative in Central Asia, and so there's certainly a realization, I think, in Chinese policy that China needs to be thinking about its territorial hinterland as potentially an area to expand influence in the context of a US-China competition, maybe just because you want better access to and sort of overland access to resources coming from the Middle East, for instance, so that they're not subject to interdiction if they have to pass through the Strait of Malacca or something like that, but also because the Chinese have been talking more and more about trying to create, sort of, a Eurasian space that is oriented toward China economically and otherwise. So that might actually be a pretty good parallel for kind of the Cold War periphery.

Hal Brands: Then the third area is maybe the developing world or the developing regions writ large. So when we think particularly about technological competition, it seems fairly unlikely... I mean, it seemed more likely about three years ago that China is going to get some sort of technological hammer lock on key American allies in East Asia and Europe. Most of those countries have started throwing up firewalls against Chinese technological influence in one way or another. It's more plausible when you think about developing countries in Africa, in Central Asia, in Latin America, Southeast Asia, places where Chinese technology will be more attractive for price reasons above all else and where some of the security concerns are perhaps less keenly felt. So maybe that's a third area where you see peripheral conflict playing out in a US-China context.

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