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China is threatening, but the US is an early stage of competition. Sustainability indicts assume the squo, not the longer-term trends of US strength. No safe alternative to US hegemony.

Green and Brands 22 – *senior vice president for Asia and Japan Chair at CSIS and chair in modern and contemporary Japanese politics and foreign policy at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University,**Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at Johns Hopkins SAIS, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, and columnist for Bloomberg (Mike* interviewing Hal**, February 25, 2022, “Twilight Struggle: Lessons from the Cold War for China Strategy Today,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, https://www.csis.org/analysis/twilight-struggle-lessons-cold-war-china-strategy-today)//KH

Mike Green: My favorite quote of the people you quote in the book is the quote you have of Kennan, who argues that... At the very beginning of thinking about containment, he argues there is no real security in this strategic competition we were starting out with vis-a-vis the Soviets, no real security and no alternative to living dangerously. That really stuck with me because we are, it seems to me, at a cathartic moment in American strategic thought, and, as you know well, by the way, Australia and the Japanese and a lot of other allies, about this problem, and that just was kind of chilling. There is no alternative to living dangerously. That, to me, is the strategic point of discontinuity we've hit in the last few years. We now realize there's no responsible stakeholder. There's no new model of great power relations. There is no alternative to living dangerously. That really stuck with me. But that's a little bit of a depressing note to strike, so how would you characterize... What does it mean, in your words, to be preparing for a long struggle?

Hal Brands: So it's a great question, and I think maybe I'll start by starting in the present and then working my way backwards. You mentioned the transition period in US-China relations that probably began about five years ago with the advent of the Trump presidency when we decided that the responsible stakeholder was more or less dead and we were moving into a period of competition. In a way, I think that realization kind of felt liberating for a lot of American policymakers. I mean, there was less concern about not rocking the boat in the US-China relationship, and there was freedom to do things that the United States might have wanted to do but felt constrained to do in economic competition or technological competition for a while.

Hal Brands: But I think we've reached the point now where it's actually more sobering than anything else. I mean, competition is not free of danger. We've learned that very much over the past year, both in the US-Russia and the US-China relationship, where I think when a lot of people were thinking about competition with China even a couple of years ago, it was sort of in this abstract way and now you realize that, very tangibly, there is a danger of military conflict that attends any geopolitical competition. It could happen in the Taiwan Strait. It could happen in Eastern Europe. It could happen in a number of places.

Hal Brands: So it's important going into the study of great power competition not to have a sanitized view of what it means, and this takes us back to the Cold War, where we look back on the Cold War now and we think of it as the “Long Peace.” The exaggerated version of this is almost that, you know, there was a 45-year principled agreement to compete short of war but not go into war, and that really, obviously, wasn't how it worked. There were pervasive fears of global military conflict during the Cold War. The United States had to think very seriously about how to deter such a conflict or to fight it if it occurred, and so competition was really kind of a terrifying experience, especially given the presence of nuclear weapons in that competition and how new and terrifying they were. So I think Kennan's quote is quite appropriate in the sense that when we talk about competition, we're actually talking about something that can be quite perilous.

Mike Green: Looking at the Cold War precedent, again, this is not the Cold War again, but embarking on a long struggle like this is an experience where you got to look back at the last time you did it, as you argue throughout the book. How prepared do you think the American people are? How much consensus is there behind this competition compared with, say, 1948, '49? The Korean War was cathartic, but before the Korean War, before June 1950, you had the America Firsters, you had isolationists, you had people opposing NATO. It was not as if the entire American population read the “Long Telegram” and got it, right? Where are we today, do you think, compared to the beginning of that struggle?

Hal Brands: In some ways, we're better placed than we were back then for the reason that you allude to, which is it's a mistake to think back that there was this rock solid Cold War consensus that came about in 1946 and lasted through the end of the Cold War. That’s not how it happened. There were left-wing critiques of containment in the late '40s. There were right-wing critiques of containment in the late 1940s. There was not an acceptance, really, until the '50s, maybe even the '60s, that the United States was going to maintain this network of global military and diplomatic commitments that it had kind of been left with after World War II and took up in the course of the Cold War.

Hal Brands: So if you looked at where we are today, you know, the United States actually has a lot of the things that it needs to compete with China and Russia, right? We have a network of alliances that's still probably our foremost tool in competition. We don't have to build that from scratch. We don't have to build an intelligence community from scratch, a national security state from scratch in the way that we did during the Cold War. So I think we're better prepared in those ways. Where we're maybe a little bit worse prepared comes from the fact that I think that the consensus on competition, and let's focus on China here, is probably broader than it is deep right now, and so there is a bipartisan consensus that China is a competitor of the United States, whatever that means. It came from the Trump administration. It's come from the Biden administration. It has bipartisan support in Congress, and the polling on this stuff indicates that the American people are more or less on board with that proposition. But when you start getting into specific issue areas, I think the consensus looks a little bit shallower.

Hal Brands: So when you start asking people, "Should the United States restrict outbound investment into China to prevent Chinese companies from using American money to pursue the goals of the People's Liberation Army” and things like that, you start getting less consensus. When it comes to aspects of technological competition, when it comes to, you know, things that might actually pose some difficult choices for the United States economically or politically, I think there's less consensus. So I think we're still at a fairly early stage of the competition in that respect, and part of the reason is that, and I'd maybe put an asterisk next to this statement, there hasn't been something quite like the Korean War to have the galvanizing factor in American public opinion. COVID maybe comes close. I think COVID had a pretty disastrous effect on China's global image, and it certainly had a liberating effect on China hawks within the United States, but I'm not sure that the effect is as profound as some of the early Cold War stuff was. So, for those reasons, I think we're in a little bit better position but also maybe a little bit more tenuous position than we were in, say, 1951.

Mike Green: And maybe the biggest difference... And, again, you're not saying this is a new Cold War. But in terms of using that experience to understand the dynamics of geopolitical competition and what it means for the American way of government and strategy, probably the biggest difference, you'd agree, I think, is you didn't have such a stake in Soviet economic interests. You didn't have, you know, prominent Wall Street financiers, to this day, calling for basically no decoupling and faith in the marketplace with China. You didn't have soybean farmers in most states of the union getting most of their income from exports to China. You didn't have all of these stakeholders within the US system who had so much to gain from the Chinese economy.

Mike Green: You didn't talk a lot about that in the book, but how would you amend the lessons, given that piece of it? We've surveyed this, you know, at CSIS, and both thought leaders and the American public are quite willing to decouple on high tech and do things like that. But when it comes to stopping agricultural exports or things that benefit us or cheap consumer goods, there's not a lot of support, and that's very different from the Soviet Union. We had no economic relationship, really, that affected average Americans. So what do you do with that one when you're trying to look at the parallels and the lessons?

Hal Brands: Yeah. What's different is that there are very powerful interests in American society that have a very strong stake in a stable US-China relationship and an open US-China relationship, and that's not entirely a bad thing. I mean, I think that the key is to think not so much about broad or complete economic decoupling as to try to figure out what are the areas in which we absolutely cannot be dependent on China for critical goods or critical inputs? What are the areas in which we absolutely cannot be enabling China's development? Presumably, we don't want to make it easier for Huawei to wire the world with 5G telecommunications, things like that. And then what are the larger areas of not particularly sensitive or strategic trade where it's fine if there's a particularly extensive US-China relationship? I don't know that China buying a lot of agricultural products from the United States is necessarily a point of strategic vulnerability for us. I think, if anything, it testifies to a strategic vulnerability of China's, which is that they are highly dependent on imports of food and other goods from abroad.

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