Insufficient institutional COVID response destroyed the US-led LIO
Nolke 22 – Professor of Political Science at Goethe University (Frankfurt) and Senior Researcher at the Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE. (Andreas Nolke, May 10, 2022, Post-Corona Capitalism, “Chapter 27: China– US Struggle for Global Economic Hegemony: Contender or Incumbent?” pp. 169-173, Bristol University Press, Project Muse via UMich Libraries, https://muse.jhu.edu/book/100967)//KH
The coronavirus crisis as a challenge to the liberal global order
Very early in the pandemic, the crisis was seen as a problem for the liberal economic order (Norrlöf, 2020a). Next to the challenges of democratic and liberal capitalism on the domestic level (see Chapters 30 and 31), it also affected some of the core pillars of the LIO in the international economic realm; for example, the freedom of individual movement (see Chapter 6), the transnational openness for the movement of goods (see Chapters 17 and 20) and the transnational openness of financial markets (see Chapter 18). Importantly, these are challenges to the specific LIO, not to intergovernmental cooperation or international organizations per se; the latter often were even able to expand their scope and policy instruments during the crisis (Debre and Dijkstra, 2020), although they were unable to ensure comprehensive international cooperation on core issues such as the prevention of ‘vaccine nationalism’ (Abbas, 2020).
Similarly, the core Western institutions of the liberal global order – in particular, the G7 and the OECD – did not play a leading role during the crisis. In general, the latter was fought individually on the domestic level, with very little multilateral coordination (Levy, 2021: 562– 3). Obligations to international institutions, from the WTO to the Paris Agreement on climate change targets, took a back seat. As far as multilateral economic coordination took place, it involved the G20, an international institution much less dominated by the West and quite neutral to the core normative principles of the LIO. Opportunities for the creation of powerful international institutions were also limited by the rise of nationalism triggered by the pandemic. The latter had a ‘rally- around- the- flag’ effect, which also has led to a more confrontational climate in foreign policy between China and Western countries, as for example witnessed in the case of Australia’s China policy (Pan and Korolev, 2021: 127– 33). China- based observers applaud the weakening of the LIO during the pandemic – inter alia, due to the entrenchment of authoritarianism, the increasing nationalism and the return of big power rivalry – and assume that it provides China with many options to increase its options globally. They also argue that China has weathered the storm of the pandemic better than the US (Dunford and Qi, 2020; Huang, 2021).