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Russia’s drive to establish global relations is only facilitated by decohesion of US and NATO policy

John Lough and Andrew Monaghan ’21,*is an associate fellow of the Russia & Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, ** is a researcher and analyst in the field of international politics. He is a Russianist in the area studies style, with a preference for old-fashioned Kremlinology. His particular interests are Russian domestic politics, strategy and biography, and he has written extensively on Russian Grand Strategy, UK-Russia Relations, and the Euro-Atlantic community’s relationship with Russia, particularly modern deterrence., “Introduction”, Germany's Russia problem, Published by Manchester University Press, 2021, accessed via Project Muse on 7.17.22

The premise of this book is that Russia in its current condition and configuration poses a serious threat to the stability of Europe. Russia’s authoritarian system is weak at home and yet strong enough to be a revanchist power, one able to fill power vacuums created by the USA and its allies in Africa, the Middle East and parts of Central America. Turning its back on Europe, Russia has moved closer to China, apparently ready to accept being its junior partner in the absence of allies to counter-balance Chinese influence. The focus of Russia’s leadership is on survival. It sees the restoration and upholding of Russia’s international status as essential to the process of securing its rule, prioritising it over the need to equip Russia for a new economic and political age dominated by climate change, digitalisation and other disruptive forces. The rise of Asia, the disorientation of the USA and its allies as well as the tarnishing of western values and the fractures in western societies all offer short-term gains for a Russian leadership fearful of reform at home but confident of its strength abroad. This has encouraged an ill-conceived policy of aggression towards Ukraine that could easily have triggered a wider European conflict in 2014 when it annexed Crimea and deliberately destabilised south-eastern Ukraine. In the process, Russia has needlessly made an enemy of a people with which it shares a strong cultural affinity, consolidating Ukraine as a political nation that no longer sees its future in close alliance with Russia. The ‘return’ of Crimea to Russia is meagre compensation for forcing Ukraine on to a pro-western path of development and seriously aggravating relations with the EU and NATO. Moscow’s flat-footed reaction to revolution in Belarus in the summer of 2020 pointed again to poor decision-making and limited crisis management capabilities. The Lukashenka regime had been living on borrowed time for years beforehand and danger was looming. Further misjudgements of this kind are likely to increase rather than decrease as the Russian system closes further in on itself in pursuit of greater resilience to outside threats.

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