Renewed focus on European cohesion for NATO undermines Russian influence in Central Europe – continued attempts to exclude Russia leads to violent probing to re-establish influence
Anatol Lieven ’22, is a senior fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, “Russia Belongs at the Center of Europe”, Foreign Policy, 2/10/22, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/10/russia-europe-ukraine-west-security-council/
The Western attempt to expel Russia from Europe has failed. That there was such an attempt was always implicit in the strategy of seeking to admit every European country but Russia into NATO and the European Union. In this context, the NATO slogan “A Europe Whole and Free” is an explicit statement that Russia is not part of Europe.
But as French President Emmanuel Macron has reminded us, Russia is part of Europe and is simply too big, too powerful, and too invested in its immediate neighborhood to be excluded from the European security order. A continued strategy along these lines will lead to repeated Russian attempts to force its way back in. At best, this will lead to repeated and very damaging crises; at worst, to war.
A structure needs to be created that can defend the interests of NATO and the EU while at the same time accommodating vital Russian interests and preserving peace. The solution lies in a modernized version of what was once called the “Concert of Europe.”
The current security order has reached its limit. Until 2007-2008, the expansion of the EU and NATO appeared to have proceeded flawlessly, with the admission of all the former Soviet satellites in Central Europe and the Balkans, as well as the Baltic states. Russia was unhappy with NATO expansion but did not actively oppose it. Then, however, both NATO and the EU received decisive checks, through their own overreach.
At the NATO summit in Bucharest, Romania, in 2008, the United States and its allies, though denied an immediate Membership Action Plan for Ukraine and Georgia because of the opposition of France and Germany, procured a promise of those countries’ eventual membership. Seen from Moscow, this created the prospect that NATO would include countries with territorial disputes (and in the case of Georgia, frozen conflicts) with Russia; that (as in the Baltic states) NATO would give cover to moves to harm the position of local Russian minorities; and that NATO would expel Russia from its naval base at Sevastopol and from the southern Caucasus.
Later that year, the Russo-Georgian War should have sounded the death knell of further NATO expansion, for it demonstrated beyond doubt both the acute dangers of territorial disputes in the former USSR and that in the last resort Russia would fight to defend its vital interests in the region, and the West would not fight. This is being demonstrated again today by the repeated and categorical statements from Washington and Brussels that there is no question of sending troops to defend Ukraine; and if NATO will not fight for Ukraine, then it cannot admit Ukraine as an ally. It is as simple as that.
The rise of China is the other factor that makes the exclusion of Russia unviable. For this project was developed at a time when Russia was at its weakest in almost 400 years and when China’s colossal growth had only just begun. This allowed the West possibilities that today have diminished enormously, if as seems likely China is prepared to strengthen Russia against Western economic sanctions.
The EU too has reached the limit of its expansion eastward. On the one hand, there is Ukraine’s size (44 million people), corruption, political dysfunction, and poverty (GDP per capita that’s one-third of Russia’s). Perhaps more importantly, EU expansion to eastern Europe no longer looks like the unconditional success story that it did a decade ago.
Romania, Bulgaria, and other states remain deeply corrupt and in many ways still ex-communist. Poland and Hungary have developed dominant strains of chauvinist and quasi-authoritarian populism that place them at odds with what were supposed to be the core values of the EU—and that in some respects bring them closer ideologically to the regime of Russian President Vladimir Putin. After this experience, there is no chance that the EU will admit a country like Ukraine in any foreseeable future.
An acknowledgment of these obvious truths (which are acknowledged in private by the overwhelming majority of Western officials and experts) should open the way to thinking about a new European security architecture that would incorporate NATO and the EU while reducing the hostility between these organizations and Russia. We should aim at the creation of this new system as part of the solution to the present crisis, and in order to avoid new ones.