Central European sanctions are watered down – ambivalence, opacity, hidden owners, and historical ties to Russia.
Gosling et al. 5-25 [Tim; Prague-based journalist who has covered the Central European region for several years; Claudia Ciobanu; journalist for a decade, starting out at the Romanian national daily, Cotidianul, before moving to cover Central and Eastern Europe as a freelancer for various international outlets, won the first prize in the 2018 Balkan Fellowship for Journalistic excellence, finalist in the Reporting Europe and One World Media awards; Edit Inotai; Hungarian journalist, previously Berlin correspondent for Népszabadság and is now its Foreign Affairs editor; Nicholas Watson; award-winning journalist, he has worked for almost 30 years in Asia, the US and Europe, writing for publications such as the Financial Times, Politico Europe, TheStreet.com, Axios, International Herald Tribune TV and Knight-Ridder News, co-founder and managing editor of Business New Europe; 5-25-2022; "Holes Remain in a Tightening Net of Russia Sanctions"; Balkan Insight; https://balkaninsight.com/2022/05/25/central-europe-reveals-holes-in-tightening-net-of-russia-sanctions/; Accessed 7-16-2022; RL 😊] **images and captions omitted
A combination of ambivalence, lack of transparency, legislative barriers and hidden owners are undermining Central Europe’s imposition of sanctions on Russian entities and individuals. In April, Russian activist Alexei Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation published a list of over 6,000 bribe takers and warmongers who, it accuses, have enabled Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine. The EU’s sanctions list falls far short of this, identifying only 80 entities and 1,093 individuals subject to asset freezes and travel bans, though experts cast doubt on whether sanctions are being fully applied even on these fewer targets. Central Europe is illustrative of the difficulties in applying sanctions to Russian companies and individuals. Behind the lurid headlines about the seizure of mega-yachts and opulent mansions belonging to Russia’s elite, who are conservatively estimated to hold assets abroad worth over $1 trillion, there is a much more complicated picture in which a combination of ambivalence, lack of transparency, legislative barriers and hidden owners is conspiring to water down the sanctions’ effectiveness. At the state level, while all EU countries have unanimously approved the five rounds sanctions against these Russian/Belarusian entities and individuals, they have done so with varying degrees of enthusiasm. At one end of the sanctions-support spectrum you have Poland, which has been one of the strongest advocates for tough EU sanctions against Russia. In April, Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki even urged the imposition of sanctions against all members of the Kremlin’s parliamentary party United Russia. Given that at the end of 2021 United Russia had more than 2.3 million registered members, such a move would go far beyond even the Navalny list. At the other end of the spectrum is Hungary, whose Russia-friendly prime minister is holding up the latest, sixth round of EU sanctions, principally over the vexed issue of banning Russian oil imports. The Budapest government’s general attitude towards the EU sanctions can be characterised as ambivalent at best. It expressed reservations when the European Commission included Moshe Kantor, president of the European Jewish Congress, and Herman Gref, CEO of Sberbank, on its sanctions list, but went along with it. But Russian Orthodox Church leader Patriarch Kirill, who is included on the sixth sanctions list for his vocal support for Putin’s war, was a step too far in Orban’s view. “We do not support the inclusion of religious leaders on the sanctions list, as this goes against freedom of religion,” the prime minister said in his weekly radio address on May 6. In between Poland and Hungary are the Czech Republic and Slovakia, both of which are run by Western-oriented, EU-sanction supporting governments, who have to deal with prominent domestic pro-Russian forces ranged against them. In Czechia, this includes President Milos Zeman and his overtly pro-Russian entourage in Prague Castle; in Slovakia, it is the two-time former prime minister Robert Fico and his SMER-SD party, around which various extremist pro-Russian parties coalesce. Present and accounted for Of course, Central European governments can only apply sanctions to that which is actually present in their country. One reason why the British sanctions on Russian companies and individuals make such attention-grabbing headlines around the world is because for so many years the UK was, in the words of Transparency International, a “global hub for money laundering”. Perhaps the most vivid example of Hungary’s contradictory stance over the sanctions is the continued presence of the Russian-based International Investment Bank – a multilateral development institution which has had its headquarters in Budapest since 2019. Considered by many to be little more than a “spy bank” beyond the remit of Hungarian regulators, Orban’s government granted it full diplomatic immunity, which allows staff to enter Hungary freely – and therefore the wider EU – potentially undermining sanctions. Yet despite the overt friendliness shown towards Russia by Orban and his governing Fidesz party, Hungary has not actually been a particularly favourite playground of Russian oligarchs, and the presence of Russian companies is – at least on paper – fairly negligible. Besides the Hungarian subsidiary of nuclear holding Rosatom – responsible for the extension of the Paks 2 nuclear power plant, a project that the Hungarian government is still insisting, somewhat optimistically, will go ahead – only a few Russian companies officially have operations in Hungary. Steelmaker Dunaferr, a renowned industrial company dating back to the communist era, is directly owned by the Cyprus-based Steelhold Ltd. Steelhold belongs to Industrial Union of Donbas, one of the biggest holdings in eastern Ukraine, but is basically controlled by Russian stakeholders. Last year, speculation grew that the company would be taken over by Russia’s Metalloinvest, owned by Alisher Usmanov, the sixth richest Russian, now also on the EU sanctions list, but the deal never materialised. As such, Steelhold is still 50 per cent owned by the Russian state development institution VEB, which is on the EU sanctions list. It is not clear how the sanctions will impact on the company’s operations; officially, it will only say it “faces some supply problems”. Dunaferr has around 3,300 employees, but a long-running feud between its Russian and Ukrainian owners has led to a management vacuum. Another interesting case is that of the rail business and industrial site Dunakeszi Jarmujavito, which is 50 per cent owned by Transmashholding, the largest manufacturer of rolling stock in Russia. The other 50 per cent of Dunakeszi, which has a major contract to modernise and produce carriages for the Hungarian state rail company, is held by the Hungarian entrepreneur Kristof Szalay-Bobrovniczky, who has just been appointed Orban’s next defence minister. Transmashholding is not on the sanctions list, but the president of the company, Andrei Bokarev, had to resign at the end of April after he was put on the British sanctions list, though he’s still absent from the EU list. Even so, the arrangement means that a defence minister of a NATO country is in a close business relationship with a Russian company that builds materiel for Russia’s war machine in Ukraine. When it comes to favourite places for well-to-do Russians in Europe to visit, the spa town of Heviz, some 200 kilometres west of Budapest, is high on the list. Featuring a huge thermal lake, Heviz has been a popular meeting place for the Russian intelligence services. In 2017, Austrian ex-colonel Martin Möller was reported to have handed over classified NATO documents to Russian spies in Heviz – one of several rendezvous points in Central Europe chosen by Möller, which also included Bratislava and Štrbské pleso in the High Tatras. The five-star Lotus Therme Hotel & Spa in Heviz is Russian owned, but by individuals who have been living in Hungary for decades with no obvious connections to the Putin regime. The spa town has also been a favourite destination for Russian tourists, with many owning real estate. There’s even a Russian Orthodox Church being built in Heviz, with hefty Hungarian government support. Image: EC Likewise, Poland has been of limited interest to Russians due to longstanding antipathy in the country to their presence, to the extent that the Warsaw government felt moved to unilaterally modify its national legislation to create room for its own sanction targets. This led to the announcement in April that a further 50 individuals and companies from Russia and Belarus would be subject to measures, which include a ban on entry to Poland and participation in public tenders as well as a freezing of assets. Those found guilty of breaking the sanctions are subject to fines of up to 5 billion euros. “The Polish sanctions list is a supplement to the EU list,” Interior Minister Mariusz Kaminski explained. “It applies to Russian entities and oligarchs with real interests in our country.” The list also includes companies linked to the Belarusian regime of Aleksandr Lukashenko as well as companies previously involved in the import of Russian coal into Poland. The Russian state gas company Gazprom also appears on Poland’s list, which is believed to have been the spark that led to Russia cutting of gas supplies to Poland in late April. A much bigger playground for Russian interests has been the Czech Republic. As one expert who monitors Russian-speaking organised crime once told BIRN, looking at the private school rosters shows it has been the preferred destination for the ‘second’ families of rich Russians – a mix of oligarchs and “criminal entrepreneurs” – for the past two decades. Yet following the mass expulsion of Russian diplomats in 2021 after the revelation that Russian intelligence officers were in all likelihood behind the explosion of a munitions depot in the southeast of Czechia and now the war in Ukraine, a suspiciously large number of luxury properties are finding their way on to the Czech market, priced to sell, say real estate professionals. The Czechs are “dealing with the assets of several persons and dozens of entities on the EU sanctions lists in the aggregate amount of hundreds of millions of Czech koruna,” a spokesperson for the Finance Ministry told BIRN. Asked to specify some of the assets affected, the spokesperson noted that the Finance Ministry acted in mid-April against the West End Hotel in the spa town of Marianske Lazne. The resort is owned by Dmitry Pumpyansky, whose main business is producing pipes for Russia’s oil and gas industries. The action taken against Pumpyansky means that while the hotel can continue to operate, it cannot be sold or distribute profit to Pumpyansky. A hotel of a similar name in nearby Karlovy Vary, owned by Vladimir Yevtushenko of the telecommunications and banking conglomerate Sistema, is also in the crosshairs. Other targets include a member of the Russian State Duma and the wife of another. As well as real estate, frozen assets include bank accounts and company shares. However, dealing with some assets is proving more challenging. Skoda JS, for instance, is owned by Gazprom (which is not yet on the EU sanctions list). Yet Skoda JS’s vital role maintaining and servicing Czechia’s two nuclear power plants means that the Czech state-controlled energy group CEZ has no choice but to continue cooperating with it. The Ministry of Industry and Trade admits that Russian ownership of what is a key strategic partner for Czechia’s energy security is a significant risk. “The fact that Skoda JS has Russian owners can be clearly seen as a mistake,” a spokesman told the local press. In private, officials say that a solution is being sought, which could include either a purchase by CEZ via expropriation or the imposition of an administrator. However, both routes require new legislation, a further stumbling block to the effective imposition of sanctions. The vandalized facade of one of the villas belonging to Russian state TV host Vladimir Soloviev on the shores of Lake Como, Italy, 06 April 2022. EPA-EFE/MATTEO BAZZI Law & order As one of Ukraine’s most proactive supporters, whose relations with Moscow were already in the deep freeze, it’s no surprise that the Czech Republic has enthusiastically leapt to impose sanctions. Yet current Czech legislation only allows the government to act on EU or United Nations sanctions. Prague has no option to enforce sanctions based on the US list, for instance, or even to select its own targets like Poland is doing. “The government would like to extend the current EU sanctions lists to include certain individuals and entities,” said the Finance Ministry spokesman. “This process is also underway, but requires close cooperation with intelligence services and other security services.” “Currently, there exists no real legal tool with which the Czech Republic could sanction a foreign entity on the basis of domestic demand. This is why we are preparing our own Magnitsky Act,” Foreign Minister Jan Lipavsky said in late March, referring to the US legislation of 2016 that authorises its government to sanction foreign officials worldwide who are deemed to be human rights offenders, freeze their assets and ban them from entering the US. The Czech government is also working on legislation that would allow it to cut off companies from public money and tenders. Meanwhile, implementation of the sanctions can be messy and confused. The Polish Interior Ministry appeared loath to provide further details to BIRN as to the manner in which EU or Polish sanctions on Russian entities and individuals since the war have been implemented, restricting itself to stressing the country had imposed supplementary sanctions to the EU ones. However, the local media are beginning to report on a series of issues with the implementation of sanctions on the Polish list. For example, Gazeta Wyborcza reported that one company, Maga Foods, was added to the Polish list because it was owned by Mikhail Fridman, yet it is now actually in the control of a Dutch businessman after the latter purchased Fridman’s shares in March. The company, a food producer, is now struggling to survive. Paradoxically, one unintended consequence of the sanctions is that Ukrainian employees of the firm – about half of the 200-strong workforce – are suffering. “The whole situation is absurd,” Piotr Pawinski, president of the company, told Gazeta Wyborcza. “They wanted to punish Fridman, but ended up depriving our Ukrainian employees of a livelihood – and they had been sending most of their incomes to their families back home.” Experts agree that effective sanctions require greater transparency and enforcement. Yet the region falls short on both. Lack of transparency has been a feature of the region for decades and too little was done to address it. This failure is a significant complicating factor in implementing sanctions, because all too often it’s impossible to identify who owns what.