Improving on Central Europe’s security and defense realignments with NATO exacerbates holes in trust between the West and Russia.
Freire ’12 [Maria Raquel; researcher at the Centre for Social Studies and professor of International Relations at the Faculty of Economics of the University of Coimbra, Ph.D. at the University of Kent; 2012; "Russia at the Borders of Central Europe: Changing Dynamics in Foreign Policy Relations"; SpringerLink; https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137283450_7; Accessed 7-19-2022; RL]
7.3.2 Security and defence realignments: building fences or fostering cooperative approaches?
The Russian Federation’s relations with NATO have been difficult, particularly in the light of the Alliance’s open door policy (Karabeshkin and Spechler 2007; Kramer 2009; Romaniuk 2010; Shea 2010). For the Russian Federation this policy is understood as an establishment of a virtual wall that reproduces the dynamics of exclusion that characterized the Cold War, but now further to the East. Despite statements about shared values, transparency and confidence-building measures, along with the establishment of institutional mechanisms for cooperation, such as the NATO–Russia Council (2002), trust between NATO and Russia has been hard to achieve.
In fact, the Russian Federation Military Doctrine of 201015 is harsh in its wording, as it identifies the Atlantic Alliance’s enlargement policy as the main external threat to Russian interests. But the Russian Federation’s presence at the Lisbon Summit of the Alliance (November 2010) marked a new stage in the relations after a period of much difficulty, with the war in Georgia in the summer of 2008 representing the height of the tension. The summit included discussions on missile defence and energy issues and, correspondingly, the US proposal for a missile defence shield involving two Central European countries – Poland and the Czech Republic. This project raised serious concerns in the Russian Federation about the enactment of an encirclement policy that, despite some statements to the contrary, was understood in Russia as being driven against it. The announcement of the project was not without consequences for the EU–Russian Federation relations either (Seaboyer and Thränert 2006).
In his annual address to the Federal Assembly in 2007, Vladimir Putin stated that the issue of missile defence was not just Russian–American, but that it involved ‘the interests of all European countries, including those in NATO’ (Putin 2007). Despite the assurance from the United States that the project was not directed against the Russian Federation, the Russian position was one of antagonism. According to President Barack Obama,
[W]e’ve also repeatedly made clear to Russia that its concerns about our previous missile defense programs were entirely unfounded. Our clear and consistent focus has been the threat posed by Iran’s ballistic missile program, and that continues to be our focus and the basis of the program that we’re announcing today. (Obama 2009)
President Obama’s revision of the project with the announcement in September 2009 of the withdrawal from the original plan that envisaged stationing radar and missile sites in the Czech Republic and Poland generated various reactions. The Russian Federation understood it as a victory for itself. Poland and the Czech Republic, however, understood the move as signalling a US disinvestment from European security. In Fawn’s view, ‘[t]he danger is that Russia’s creeping intimidation and influence-peddling in the region could over time lead to a de facto neutralization of the region’ (Fawn 2010: 90). This means that the Central European states considered that the reset policy in the US–Russia relations (Krastev 2011; Lucas 2011; Kupchan 2011) might lead to a policy of ‘benign neglect’ (Larrabee 2010: 45), which would leave them more vulnerable to the Russian Federation’s influence independently of their integration into the EU and NATO.