The only area where NATO can revitalize the relationship with Central Europe is security cooperation
Tamás MAGYARICS ‘19, Professor, Department of American Studies, Eötvös Loránd University; Senior Research Fellow, American Studies Research Institute, National University of Public Service, “How to Revitalise the U.S.– Eastern European Relations”, Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade - Budapest, Foreign Policy Review, 2019, https://kki.hu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/FPR_2019_online_final.pdf
The single most important area where U.S. and Central European interests meet is security cooperation. Ironically, one of the challenges posed to this shared interest is coming from Western Europe, more specifically from the advocates of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), a European security policy without U.S. input. In 2000, a 60,000 strong Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) was announced within the ESDP (McCray, 2014). These attempts met almost universal rejection in the U.S.; both Democratic and Republican politicians warned against any ’duplication’ of the existing structures. Then Secretary of Defence William Cohen went as far as saying that ”if the EU created a defence capability outside of NATO, the alliance would become ’a relic of the past’”. Later U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Nicholas Burns branded the effort as ’one of the greatest t dangers to the transatlantic community’” (Carpenter, 2018). Washington, instead, lobbied for a military response force within NATO, and put pressure primarily on the new members of NATO in Central and Eastern Europe, which were – on the whole - receptive to the U.S. concerns because they strongly believed that the only country that was able to provide hard security guarantees for them was the U.S. The underlying issue is a struggle between Western European leaders, such as Emmanuel Macron, and the U.S. about the future role that America might or should play in Europe. Washington is vary of a federalised Europe with an independent defence and security capability because the present disagreements between the U.S. and the EU might degenerate into open hostilities, which – in turn – would weaken American positions in the world. NATO is the only official institution that makes the U.S. ’a European power,’ and it obviously enhances America’s opportunities to counter the Russian and Chinese influence in Europe, and even elsewhere. Moreover, the U.S. can legitimately press within NATO its allies to assume a larger share of the burdens of the Atlantic Community and thus, at least theoretically, it offers an opportunity for Washington to concentrate larger forces to combat the newly emerging military challenges elsewhere in the world, first and foremost in the Asia-Pacific region - the Obama administration’s ’pivot to Asia’ was intended to address this issue by shifting naval assets from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean - (Thompson, 2012). From a Central European point of view, a relatively strong American military, political and economic presence in Europe can be a sort of counterbalance to the centralising tendencies of the so-called core countries of Europe - which would mean, in essence, further loss of national sovereignty over a number of areas. Therefore, the countries of ’new Europe’ have tended to support the U.S. even if they had misgivings about the latter’s policies, and a similar pattern is likely to remain in place in the foreeseable future too.