Empirics prove that divergences in relations only happen when the US disregards Central and Eastern European security alliances
Vít Střítecký and Nik Hynek ‘09, *is an international security research fellow at the Institute of International Relations in Prague., **works as a research fellow at the Institute of International Relations in Prague., “Divided We Stand: Limits of Central European Atlanticism in the New Era”, International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs, Vol. XVIII, No. 4, 2009, https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/journals/iisfpa/v18i4/f_0019340_16550.pdf
It is a market dream to publish a book that would define several months of frequent discussions in the transatlantic area. One of the authors with a great sense for timing is apparently Robert Kagan, whose fairly simplistic metaphors became widely discussed during the first major post-Cold War transatlantic dispute surrounding the beginning of the war in Iraq.10 Kagan’s ideas did not only influence scholars and analysts but determined a context in which Donald Rumsfeld could express his idea about the new/old Europe division. Although these discussions have been fortunately deeply buried11, it should be understood that the idea of the new Europe is the American geopolitical mirror image to the Central European Alanticist conception. Ironically, this perspective has appeared to be reflected by the current American administration that tends to view the Baltic and Central European states as accomplices of the former Bush’s administration. This became quite apparent from the US treatment of the former Polish foreign minister Radek Sikorski’s candidacy for the post of NATO Secretary-General. One of the senior Obama administration officials reportedly commented on his endeavor expressing a belief that “Radek Sikorski now wishes that he had chosen Brookings over AEI.”12 The signs of symbolic diplomacy could be also recognized in other Obama’s moves. For the official commemoration of the outbreak of World War II organized in Gdansk on September 1st the administration selected William Perry, a former secretary of defense, who became known in Central Europe as the staunch opponent of the Polish NATO membership. Finally, president Obama’s long awaited and perhaps postponed announcement about the future of the third pillar of the American missile defense came on September 17th, which is the date of the Soviet invasion to Poland in 1939.13 No matter how suspicious one wants to be, these events reveal a substantial lack of interest at best. It has been already mentioned that from a broader perspective all Central European countries have a tendency to emphasize the importance of the transatlantic link. Indeed, for a substantial part of political elites as well as intelligentsia the interests of the US have served as a sufficient legitimization for their own countries’ foreign political attitudes and decisions. Nevertheless, the Alanticist positions differ in various countries. The following lines will analyze the Czech and Polish reactions on the two recently important themes of the transatlantic cooperation. The first will be the Iraqi issue that has already been mentioned in a context of the new/old Europe split. Then, the other topic will concern the American plan to build the components of the third pillar of the ballistic missile defense in the Czech Republic and Poland.