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Increasing Central Europe’s cooperation with NATO foments hostility from Russia.

Freire ’12 [Maria Raquel; researcher at the Centre for Social Studies and professor of International Relations at the Faculty of Economics of the University of Coimbra, Ph.D. at the University of Kent; 2012; "Russia at the Borders of Central Europe: Changing Dynamics in Foreign Policy Relations"; SpringerLink; https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137283450_7; Accessed 7-19-2022; RL]

7.1 Introduction Since 1989, Central Europe1 has seen substantial reforms, which included its countries’ membership in the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which signalled a posture on its part in which they distanced themselves from decades of subordination to the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, in the Russian Federation, a strong regime has been consolidating in order to reassert the Russian Federation’s status in a post-Soviet context. This process, of course, includes the redefinition of the official Russian politics towards its (new) neighbourhood, including Central Europe. Looking at the interconnections that resulted from post-Cold War developments, the foreign policy changes that have taken place in Central Europe and the Russian Federation have allowed for the distinct dynamics that this chapter seeks to explore. It starts by setting down the evolving context of Russian foreign policy. It looks at the definition of Russia’s multi-vectoral2 and pragmatic policy and the strengthening of the multipolar international order as two factors that constitute the main axis for understanding the projection of Russia’s goals in its neighbouring areas. The analysis of the Russian Federation’s relations with Central European states is then pursued in the broader framing of the integration processes of these countries in NATO and the EU, and the Russian Federation’s own shaping of relations with these multilateral organizations. The analysis follows the identification of three factors that are central to the understanding of the Russian Federation’s policies towards Central Europe: the course of political reform and institutional capacity building; the redefinition of security and defence alignments after the end of the Warsaw Pact and the Cold War rivalry; and energy security as an essential factor in the redefinition of relations. These factors highlight different approaches to common issues, suggesting the need for a careful management of challenges and opportunities, as will be analysed later in the chapter. The chapter argues that, despite difficulties at both the level of the EU–Russian Federation and NATO–Russia relations and the bilateral level of Russia’s relations with Central European countries, the current state of affairs points to an increased trend in cooperation between the Russian Federation and Central Europe. It should be noted, however, that this cooperative trend does not do away with the Cold War rhetoric, which is still very much present (as will be shown below); traditional ‘issues’ still play a considerable role in the shaping and making of policies and actions both in the Russian Federation and in Central European states. 7.2 Russian Federation foreign policy: multi-vectoral and pragmatic The first post-Cold War decade allowed for a clarification of the Russian Federation’s foreign policy objectives which resulted from various adjustments that the process of transition from Soviet times demanded. In the proWestern context of the period after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, President Boris Yeltsin proclaimed the Russian Federation as a natural ally of Europe and pursued Russia’s integration into European institutions on the basis of the belief, as expressed by the first Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev, that there were ‘neither potential adversaries nor military threats to Russian interests’ in Europe (Thorun 2009: 29). This posture also implied an inward-driven approach towards the domestic transition process in which relations with the former satellites to the West were not prioritized. ‘The story of relations between Russia and the East-Central European countries in the nineties was the story of Russia’s departure from the region’ (Póti 2007: 118). During the second term of Boris Yeltsin’s presidency, in the face of the Central European states’ integration into Euro-Atlantic structures, the Russian Federation’s policy has evolved from one of ‘indifference’ to one of ‘engagement’. Many concerns were voiced in the Russian Federation regarding the impact of expanding NATO towards its borders, including concerns about the status and protection of borders in the face of an alliance that, according to Russian sources, had transformed itself from a defensive into an offensive alliance (Yugoslavia in 1995 and 1999) (Karaganov 2011: 7; Krastev et al. 2009: 57). Also, there was the predicted economic impact that the membership of the Central European countries in the EU was expected to have on the Russian economy, which would consist of a decrease in trade indicators along with new formalities that would have implications for the openness of the Central European markets to Russian products.3 Arguably, though, the NATO enlargement is a much more delicate issue for Russian foreign policymakers.

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