Otherwise, loss of megacities is an inevitable existential risk---increased technological efficiency is key to solve
William E. Rees 20, Professor Emeritus at the University of British Columbia and former director of the School of Community and Regional Planning at UBC, “Megacities at Risk: The Climate–Energy Conundrum,” Handbook of Megacities and Megacity-Regions, Edward Elgar Publishing, 09/04/2020, https://www.elgaronline.com/view/edcoll/9781788972697/9781788972697.00029.xml//recut by sposten
• The consumptive node cannot survive in isolation. Every modem city depends utterly on being able to maintain continuous intimate contact and exchange with the lands/waters that constitute its eco-footprint. A megacity imports many million kilograms o f low-entropy energy and material daily and exports a nearly equivalent mass of degraded wastes.
• The total human EF is about 20.6 billion hectares (ha) while Earth has only 12.2 billion ha of productive ecosystems, that is. the human enterprise is in ‘overshoot’ by 69 percent (2014 data from GFN, 2018). Since cities account for -7 0 percent o f global consumption and waste production, urban populations alone require the biocapacity equivalent o f -1.2 planet Earths to maintain their present lifestyles.*
• Preventing ecosystemic collapse requires a massive reduction in the human ecological footprint (i.e., in populations and/or consumption).
These facts underscore that cities - megacities in particular are vulnerable to any global change that would isolate them from, or significantly reduce the area or productivity of. their supportive extra-urban ecosystems.
CLIMATE CHANGE: AN EXISTENTIAL THREAT TO URBAN CIVILIZATION
The Birds o f Canada (Earl, 1966) lists Anna’s hummingbird (Calypte anna) as a California breeder, merely ‘hypothetical’ in Canada. Yet, through winter o f 2018-19. three Anna’s jousted daily for position at my backyard feeder in Vancouver, Canada, and by spring were nesting somewhere in the neighbourhood.
The climate change that has shifted birds' ranges northward is real, but its effects not always so benign. In 2017 and 2018. British Columbia experienced two back-to-back ‘worst ever’ wildfire seasons; the deadliest wildfires on record torched California in 2018, destroying thousands of buildings and killing 85 people; droughts are becoming longer and more severe, storms more intensely energetic; and record temperatures arc destroying wildlife and livestock, property and people on every continent. Indeed, extreme weather events o f all kinds are rcllcctcd in the economic costs o f climate-related disasters globally S89S billion (in 2017 dollars) between 1978 and 1997; S2.25 trillion between 1998 and 2017, a 151 percent increase (McCarthy, 2018).
The main anthropogenic driver o f climate change is carbon dioxide, the greatest metabolic waste by weight of industrial economics and an inevitable cntropic by-product of fossil-fuel combustion. Atmospheric CO? readings in April 2018 averaged over 410 parts per million (ppm) for the entire month for the first time on record (US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration |NOAA], 2018). This is a human-induced increase o f 46 percent above prc-industrial levels o f -280 parts per million and elevates atmospheric carbon to Us highest levels in 800 000 years. CO, is still climbing by 2-3 parts per million (ppm) annually and concentrations o f other GHGs are increasing as fast or faster. (Atmospheric CO; averaged 417 ppm during May 2020 [US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration [NOAAJ 2020].)
One result is that mean global temperature has climbed by approximately 1°C, mostly since 1980. A statistically improbable 17 o f the 18 warmest years in the instrumental record have occurred in this young century (National Aeronautics and Space Administration [NASAJ, 2017); 2016 was the warmest year; 2017 was second followed by 2015 and 2018 - ‘the past five years arc, collectively, the warmest years in the modem record’ (NASA. 2019). When the world was last this warm (the Ecmian period 130 000 115 000 years ago) sea levels eventually rose 6-9 metres (20-30 feet), sufficient to inundate most o f today’s coastal towns and mcgacitics. (For an outstanding summary of climate change, likely outcomes, and policy implications, sec Hansen, 2018.)
The Inadequate 2015 Paris Climate Agreement
Our best science tells us that the world is currently on track to experience 3 5°C warming. There is no dispute that 5°C warming would be catastrophic, likely fatal to civilized existence. Even a 'modest’ 3°C implies disaster - enough to destroy economies, destabilize geopolitics and empty megacities. Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change therefore committed in the 2015 COP21 Paris Agreement to hold the rise in global average temperatures to ‘well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels’ (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change |IPCCJ, 2018).
Regrettably, the voluntary commitments (nationally determined contributions or NDCs) made in Paris constitute only one-third o f the reductions needed to limit warming to 2°C; even if fully met. they put us on track for 3+°C. System dynamics confounds the issue. There is a -40-year lag between causc and effect bccause of ocean thermal inertia (the seas absorb 90 percent o f accumulating heat but warm slowly). Present GHG concentrations, if held constant, commit the world to an additional 0.3 0.8°C warming, enough to overshoot the l.5°C limit (Hansen, 2018; Marshall, 2010).* Ominously, CO, and other GHG emissions are still increasing. It is therefore particularly conccming that the parties to the Paris Agreement discussed or endorsed mainly capital-intcnsivc technological solutions from green energy (e.g.. wind and solar), through unproved approaches to carbon capture and storage and even nuclear fission and fusion, that is, any techno-solution that would contribute to investment and growth Reductions in energy/resource use, fair income redistribution and population controls were not on the table. In short, the real commitment of the international community is to technological solutions that will sustain growth and not jeopardize the current social and economic system. This is the status quo by other means. Perversely, climate disaster policy is being designed to serve the capitalist growth economy ‘so the latter becomes the solution to (not the cause of) the [problem]’ (Spash, 2016, p. 931). There is another problem recent analysis suggests that:
biogcophysical fccdback processes (e.g., permafrost melting, methane hydrate releases, tropical and boreal forest die-hack] within ihc Earth System coupled with direct human degradation of the biosphere may play a more important role than normally assumed. . .there is a significant risk that these internal dynamics, especially strong nonlineantio in feedback processes, could become an important or perhaps, even dominant factor (Steffen ct a!., 2018. p. 8253)
Indeed, ‘even if the Paris Accord target o f a 1.5- 2.0°C rise in temperature is met, we cannot exclude the risk that a cascade o f feedbacks could push the Earth System irreversibly onto a ‘Hothouse Earth’ pathway (ibid., p. 8254).7
To neutralize this risk, Rockstrom ct al. (2017) assert that the world community must cut fossil fuel use in half each decade until 2050, as well as extract gigaionncs (Gt) o f carbon out o f the atmosphere, all while shining society to alternative green energy. Similarly, an IPCC Special Report on l.5°C warming and possible emissions pathways found that in ‘model pathways with no or limited overshoot o f 1.5°C, global net anthropogenic CO, emissions decline by about 45 percent from 2010 levels by 2030.. .reaching net zero around 2050* (IPCC, 2018, p. C l). All such pathways require ‘the use o f carbon dioxide removal (Cl)R) on the order of 100 1000 Gt CO, over the 21st century’ (ibid., p. C3).
Significantly for megacities, limiting warming to 1.5°C would require rapid and far-reaching transitions in energy, land, urban and infrastructure (including transport and buildings), and industrial systems’. The scale o f the needed transition is unprecedented and implies ‘deep emissions reductions in all sectors, a wide portfolio of mitigation options and a significant upscaling o f investments in those options’ (IPCC, 2018, p. C2). So far, no city has taken up the IPCC challenge.
ENERGY: THE ACHILLES’ HEEL OF EVERY MEGACITY
The technological outlook for a transition to renewable ‘green’ energy is superficially encouraging. ‘Solar photovoltaic and wind power arc rapidly getting cheaper and more abundant - so much so that they arc on track to entirely supplant fossil fuels worldwide within two decades’ (Blakcrs and Stocks. 2018); and do not worry about solar arrays and wind farms despoiling the countryside: ‘if we cover an area of the fcarth 335 kilometers by 335 kilometers with solar panels...it will provide more than 17.4 TW power... That means 1.2 percent of the Sahara Desert is sufficient to cover all o f the energy needs o f the world in solar energy’ (Moalcm, 2016). Jacobson et al. (2015, p. 2093) propose a set o f ‘roadmaps for converting the energy infrastructures of each o f the 50 United States to 100% wind, water, and sunlight (WWS) for all purposes (electricity, transportation, heating/cooling, and industry) by 2050'. This conversion, allegedly both technologically and economically feasible, would virtually eliminate energy-related pollution and GHG emissions while creating jobs, stabilizing energy priccs and minimizing land requirements.
Such ebullient scenarios generate unwarranted confidence in human techno-prowess and have convinced many that the necessary energy transition is easy and already well underway. This is not so. The transition to renewables is a politically loaded, economically formidable and technologically daunting challenge framed in confusion and contradiction. Opposing narratives on prospects for a 100 percent green energy system by 2030/50 abound (e.g.. Energy Watch Group, 2018; Mills 2019). In a well-known dispute. Clack ct al. (2017, p. 6722) condemn the buoyant Jacobson ct al. (2015) study for significant errors, inappropriate modelling methods and implausible, ill-documcntcd assumptions that ovcrpromise and potentially ‘(impede] the move to a cost-cffcctivc decarbonized energy system’ (see also Bryce, 2017). (icrmany’s much-lauded but faltering energy transition ( ‘Energiewemie') serves as a practical cautionary tale: investment in renewable rcachcd 464 billion euros by the end o f 2015 without significantly reducing German carbon emissions or dependence on fossil fuels (FerToni, Guckos and Hopkirk, 2017; Shcllcnberger, 2019).
The reality is that, in 2019. the world remains hooked on fossil fuels. Renewables (wind, solar, geothermal, biomass and waste) did sec the highest rate o f growth in 2017 but together supplied only onc-quartcr of a 2.1 percent increase and only 3.6 percent of total energy demand; wind and solar just 2.2 percent (British Petroleum [BP], 2018; International Energy Agency [IEA|, 2018). Similarly, energy demand was up by 2.3 percent in 2018, with fossil fuels accounting for 70 percent o f the increase (IEA, 2019). (The corresponding numbers in BP, 2019 are 2.9 percent and 66.5 percent, respectively.) The installed capacity o f wind and solar electricity, particularly solar, is rising rapidly and in 2018 produced 1270 tcrawatt hours (TWh) and 585 TWh, respectively. I lowcvcr, the increase in global demand for electricity was 938 TWh. 70 percent more than the total generated by all existing solar photovoltaic installations. Just two years o f global demand increase would swallow the entire contribution from more than three dccadcs o f wind and solar power development (data from BP, 2019). In 2019, wind and solar generation increased spectacularly by 12.6% and 24.3% respectively, contributing an additional 300 Twh to the world’s electricity grid. Nevertheless, although global electricity demand growth at 352.5 Twh (1.3%) in 2019 was less than half the ten year average growth rate, it was sufficient to outpacc the growth from all non-hydro renewables combined (data from BP, 2020). Moreover, there is concern that green investment has been essentially flat sincc 2011. It actually fell substantially in several major countries in 2017 (36 percent in Europe overall) as subsidies were reduced. Only China’s 26 percent expansion helped bump global investment up by 3 percent in 2017 (Frankfurt School o f Finance & Management, 2018; Gorcham, 2018). Analysts agree that ‘the current level o f investment [S300* billion a ycar| is...too low to support a global transition to renewable electricity’ (Andrews, 2018a). (The SARS-CoV-2 pandcmic has added another layer o f uncertainty to global energy investment of all kinds.)
In any ease, green power generation ‘will not on its own deliver the emissions reductions demanded by the Paris climate agreement’ (Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century, p. 6). Electricity is not yet a viable substitute for fossil fuel in key areas accounting for 80 percent of urban society’s energy consumption including mining, various industrial processes, heavy construction, inter-city transportation (air or highway) and agriculture. Investment in green energy technologies will have to increase multifold if it is to keep up with growing demand and capture a greater share of the total energy market (Club o f Rome. 2018). Securing that investment will become more difficult with reduced government subsidies, particularly if substantial subsidies remain for fossil fuels' and global interest rates keep increasing.
There are also significant systemic problems. Recent simulations show that, even if investment in renewables increased by 2030 to the present total investment in new energy (approximately $1.8 trillion in 2017), fossil fuels would still be providing more than 50 percent o f primary energy and emissions would be increasing again after 2035 - and this assumes an optimistic non-declining ‘energy return on energy invested’ (ERoEI or EROI) for renewables of 15:1. ‘In this case, as renewables still require some fossil fuel energy to construct, it is essentially impossible for the cconomy to meet its energy demands and remain below the emissions ceiling’ (Scrs and Victor, 2018, p. 14). Scrs and Victor call this ‘the cncrgy-cmissions trap’.
More realistically, the ERoEI o f renewables is lower than 15:1 and likely declining, so ‘the long run conscqucncc o f transitioning to renewables.. .at sufficient pace to avoid transgressing cumulative emissions limits is a decline in the net energy available to society’. At 17 percent of GDP and an ERoEI o f 3:1, ‘the redirection of investment from the secondary productive sector to the primary energy sector leads to a constraint on the productive capacity o f the cconomy and a commensurate decline in output' (Scrs and Victor, 2018. p. 17). That is, the economy implodes - hardly the future anticipated by mainstream analysts.
EKoF.I and Megacitics
The F.RoF.I concept is central to energy analysis yet remains mired in controversy. Most ERoEI studies estimate the ratio o f the energy produced by a project divided by the sum of the direct (i.e.. onsite) and indirect (i.e., offsitc energy needed to make the products used onsite) energy used to generate that output. This measure gives a satisfying global average FRoEl for coal of 46:1; for important liquid and gaseous fossil fuels and wind, about 20:1; solar 10:1 (Hall. Lambert and Balogh. 2014).
Controversy blooms when analysts ‘extend’ (ERoEItu) their assessments beyond on-site requirements. Kcrroni and Hopkirk (2016) and Fcrroni ct al. (2017) considered the energy expended on materials, labour, and so forth, for the manufacturing, transportation, installation. operation, decommissioning, integration o f the intermittent photovoltaic (PV) generated electricity into the Swiss and German grids (including the energy demand for auxiliary storage capacity) and for obtaining and servicing the required capital. Result? An ERoEItxi o f only 0.82 (+/- 15 percent). This implies that an electrical supply system based on today's PV technologies in cool northern countries may turn out to be an energy sink, not a source.11 Spain - arguably Europe's best insolatcd country actually is not doing much better. Prieto and Hall (2013) found an ERoEIct( o f only 2.45:1 for that country’s extensive centralized PV system. Most recently De Castro and Capcllin-Pcrcz (2020) demonstrate that the global average ERoEIsetl for onshore wind (2.9:1), offshore wind (2.3:1), solar Photovoltaic (PV) (1.8:1), and solar Concentrated Solar Power (< l: I ) arc well below that of fossil-fuelled electricity generation (and. we might add, insufficient to run modem civilization).
What docs all this mean for mcgacities? First, consider that the standard ERoEI o f major fuels is steadily declining as source quality declines and extraction costs increase - it is only 5:1 to 4:1 for tar sands and less for shale oil, for example. Second, if the more dismal results o f ERoEIrti for solar PV prove correct, today's green energy cannot substitute fo r fossil fuels. Question: at what point will it become impossible to sustain megacitics? (Hall ct al., 2014 suggest that ‘fuel’ requires an ERoEIfi| of 3:1 to be minimally useful to society.) Falling F.RoEIs and rising energy costs are already being implicated in everything from the doubtful promise o f electric vehicles (Gochring and Rozcncwajg. 2018) to Brexit and the so-called yellow-vcst protests in France (Ahmed, 2018).
Can We Make the Transition?
There are additional political and technical barriers to meeting even the 2°C warming limit. We need an unprecedented level of cooperation among major governments but in today's fractious world, with major emitters like the US ‘dropping out’ and others like Canada bent on developing their fossil-fuel reserves, this prerequisite will almost certainly not be met.
Even if world governments were to align in common purpose, the sheer momentum of industrial society is formidable. Driven by exponential growth, half the fossil energy and other key resources ever consumed have been used in ju st the past 30-35 years (see graphs in Steffen ct al., 2015). Thus, most of the infrastructure and equipment involved in electricity generation, manufacturing, transportation, communications, construction, spacc/watcr heating, food systems, and so on, across the modem world arc fuelled by coal, oil or natural gas. And, as noted, the addiction persists. After flattening for three years, carbon emissions increased by almost 1.5 percent in 2017 and 1.7 percent in 2018 (IEA, 2018, 2019; Le Qucrc et al., 2018). In these circumstances, it stretchcs credulity to think the world can organize to reduce fossil fuel use by nearly 50 percent (-7 percent per year) in just 10 years.10
A fu ll transition to green alternative energy - the 100 percent substitution o f fossil fuels by renewable sources (wind, solar, biomass, hydro) while meeting a projected doubling of demand over the next several decades - implies at least a 50-fold increase in net renewable energy generation capacity, particularly of wind and solar electricity. Clearly, this will not happen without global unity, universal commitment to the Paris targets and massive redirection o f investment and subsidies (all o f which might still leave us energy poor and collapse the economy; Sere and Victor, 2018) and cannot happen if the dismal F.RoF.I^ results for solar electricity arc confirmed.
This last point is pivotal. Consider the ultimate extended net energy analysis (ERoEI^). To replace fossil fuels, green energy must be sufficiently intense and abundant to produce all the equipment and machinery used in the mining, refining, transportation, manufacturing, and so forth, of the materials used to produce wind and solar installations, plus all the roads, other supportive infrastructure and labour needed to manufacture, install and operate those facilities. before it can address the bulk of society’s energy needs. So far. fossil fuel stands alone as the only energy source with the intensity both to produce itself, literally from the ground up. and provide the much larger surplus required to supply all the other energy needs o f society (and keep in mind the anticipated 35 percent growth in energy demand by mid-century). Tellingly, fossil fuels currently provide most o f the energy used to manufacture the materials, equipment and infrastructure for wind and solar electricity. (And are these alternatives really ‘renewable’ if essential equipment must be replaced every 20 25 years, repeating the original energy investment?)
A major technical barrier to wind and (particularly) solar energy is relatively low ‘density’ and intermittency compared to fossil fuels. Techno-optimists believe that these barriers can be surmounted through improved energy capture and storage technologies, but this is energy intensive and expensive today’s batteries, for example, can increase costs by a factor o f ten or more (Andrews, 2018b; Temple, 2018). Even modest fixes increase ‘integration costs’ and contribute to notably higher consumer prices for renewable electricity (Hirth, Ucckcrdt and Edcnhofcr, 2015). The added capital baggage also reduces the ERoEI o f wind and solar below viable levels in many parts o f the world. Even at low-but-viablc ERoEls, many countries would not have enough land for solar or wind installations sufficient to supply even their electricity needs (which are typically only 20 percent of all primary energy consumption).
THE CLIMATE ENERGY CONUNDRUM: THE FUTURE IS NOT WHAT IT USED TO BE
It has long been recognizcd that the Darwinian struggle for existence is. in effect, a competition for available energy. Building on Lotka (1922), ecologist Howard Odum formulated what is now known as the 'maximum power principle’: successful systems are those that evolve to maximize power - that is, their use o f available energy per unit time - in the performance of useful work (self-maintenance, growth and reproduction) (sec Hall, 1995). ‘Maximum power’ is a fundamental organizing force in living nature.
Certainly, by this measure, //. sapiens is the most successful vertebrate species ever to walk the earth. Modem industrial civilization is an emergent phenomenon birthed at the intersection o f abundant cheap fossil energy and human ingenuity. Fossil fuels enable societies to acquire and transform all the other low-entropy resources they need to grow and complexify. The megacity of 10 or 20 million people is certainly the greatest far-from-(thcrmodynamic)- equi!ibrium dissipative mega-structure ever created by humans and arguably modernity’s most remarkable icon.
The problem is that the enormous metabolic appetites of hundreds of city and megacity super-organisms can be satisfied only through the consumption (i.e., entropic dissipation) of prodigious quantities o f energy, to date mostly fossil fuels." Urban civilization therefore confronts a conundrum o f its own making. If we are unable to replace fossil fuels with equivalent substitutes in the next couple o f dccadcs, our urbanizing world will remain substantially reliant on coal, oil and natural gas (at least while supplies Iasi). Atmospheric CO, and other GHG concentrations will increase and global warming will exceed the 2°C limit. Our current trajectory implies 3 4°C warming.
Three-degree warming spells widespread disaster by late ccntury - more and longer heat waves and droughts, accelerating desertification, melting permafrost, methane releases, water shortages, disrupted agriculture, possible famine, rising sea levels, the flooding (and eventual loss) o f many coastal cities, mass migrations, civil unrest, and so on. Many cities would be cut off from food-lands and other essential resources with the breakdown of local and marine transportation networks (sec Fricdcmann, 2016); urban life would become untenable in the more vulnerable parts o f the world; geopolitical conflict is almost inevitable. And this may be a bcst-casc C 0 7 scenario. If the world warms by even l.5-2.0®C, we risk crossing tipping points (irreversible positive feedbacks) leading to runaway climate changc and the end of anything passing for civilization.
On the other hand, if the world attempts to avoid climate disaster through vastly increased investment in green energy or serious conservation (phasing out of fossil fuels) we could face energy shortages and shrinking economies even as global population and demand for everything increases. Reduced goods production, declining incomes, rising inequality, widespread unemployment, falling agricultural output, broken international supply lines, failing inter-city transportation, local famines, and so forth, are again a recipe for geopolitical chaos.