Multiple factors tie Russia and Germany together
Paul Maurice ’22, is a researcher at the Committee for the Study of Franco-German Relations (Cerfa) at Ifri, where he works in particular on questions of German domestic policy, Franco-German relations in the context of European construction and the political foreign and security interests of the Federal Republic of Germany., “A ''change of era''? Towards a Reorientation of German Foreign Policy after the Russian Invasion of Ukraine”, Ifri Briefings, Ifri, March 7, 2022., translated by Google Translate, https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/briefings-de-lifri/new-era-toward-realignment-german-foreign-policy-after-russian
The escalation of tensions between Russia and Ukraine at the beginning of 2022 raises the question of Germany's reliability with its partners - within the Atlantic Alliance or the European Union (EU) . In this crisis, Germany first appears as the "weakest link" of Europe, even the "Trojan horse" of Russia within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This Russian-Ukrainian crisis has had the effect of "testing both the cohesion of the new ''traffic light'' coalition, the authority of Chancellor Scholz and the adaptability of German foreign policy postMerkel1 ". Within the Chancellor's party, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), there are a large number of “ Rußland-Verstehers ”, who have a measured, even complacent attitude towards Vladimir Putin. The case of former Social Democrat Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (1998-2005) is the most symptomatic. The "personal friend" of Vladimir Putin sits on the boards of Russian energy companies such as Nord Stream AG and Rosneft, and is due to join that of Gazprom in June 2022. After his controversial remarks on the "threatening attitude" of Ukraine, Chancellor Olaf Scholz had to clarify his position on Gerhard Schröder2. The former Chancellor has today, despite the pressure, still not resigned from his post, but he is increasingly isolated. Green MEP Reinhard Bütikofer spoke of personal sanctions against him, and most of his close aides resigned in early March. Gerhard Schröder is certainly an extreme case within the SPD in terms of his position on Russia, but opposing camps have existed for a long time on this subject. This is why the party's new co-president, Lars Klingbeil, wanted to put an end to the dissonance. This position within the SPD has, however, marked German foreign policy in recent years – especially since the Social Democrats have occupied the Foreign Ministry for twelve years out of the sixteen that have passed. This ambiguity vis-à-vis Russia is shared by other political parties, such as Angela Merkel's Christian Democratic Party (CDU). Admittedly, the former Chancellor was known for her cordial – reciprocal – intimacy with Vladimir Putin, but it had always refused to characterize the Nord Stream 2 project as anything other than a “purely economic” project. She had also refused to put this project in the balance during the balance of power with Russia in August 2020 – when she welcomed the opponent Alexeï Navalny in Berlin. Finally, within the army, certain officials also adopted an ambiguous attitude, which may have sown doubt as to German intentions. The head of the German Navy, Admiral Kay-Achim Schönbach, had made controversial remarks on January 22, 2022 regarding the "respect" that Vladimir Putin deserved and the "ineptitude" of the intentions lent by the allies NATO to Russia to invade Ukraine. If the admiral resigned the same evening and was disavowed by the Ministry of Defense, the remarks questioned the reliability of Germany. –,