Russia’s influence in Germany is driven by ability to conduct cyber operations – the plan forces Germany to respond and restrict that influence
John Lough and Andrew Monaghan ’21,*is an associate fellow of the Russia & Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, ** is a researcher and analyst in the field of international politics. He is a Russianist in the area studies style, with a preference for old-fashioned Kremlinology. His particular interests are Russian domestic politics, strategy and biography, and he has written extensively on Russian Grand Strategy, UK-Russia Relations, and the Euro-Atlantic community’s relationship with Russia, particularly modern deterrence., “7 Russian influence in Germany”, Germany's Russia problem, Published by Manchester University Press, 2021, accessed via Project Muse on 7.17.22
German discussion of Russian influence in Germany focuses almost exclusively on disinformation, cyber vulnerabilities and the susceptibility of the Russian German community to the AfD message. Clearly, these should all be factors of concern for German policymakers, but they pale in comparison to the significance of Russia’s well-established networks in Germany across the worlds of politics, business, media and NGOs. These make Germany an easy target for Russian influence operations. There has been no in-depth research on the political connections of the CDU/ CSU and SPD in Russia. For example, it is surely significant that the East German head of the CDU’s political foundation office in Moscow has close personal ties with the Kremlin party, United Russia.61 Yet, in an article discussing foreign political influence in Germany, the head of counter-intelligence at the domestic intelligence agency did not even refer to these relationships62 – an indication perhaps of their sensitivity. The registration of the DOC and the lack of restrictions on the professional activities of former officials point to further alarming gaps in Germany’s counterintelligence defences. In addition, Russia’s influence-building activities benefit from another factor in Germany, which is unavailable elsewhere in Europe. Despite tensions in bilateral relations, the combination of trauma about Russia and gratitude for reunification require the political class to think in terms of reconciliation with Moscow and to pursue dialogue and cooperation. This creates multiple opportunities across different fronts to build relationships and project Russian views. Some journalists and businesspeople who have served for long periods in Moscow and have ‘gone native’ provide valuable channels for projecting pro-Russian views. For example, the Spiegel journalist Benjamin Bidder, who spent ten years in Russia, caused controversy in late 2019 after writing a story casting doubt on the veracity of Hermitage Capital’s account of the agonising death of its lawyer Sergey Magnitsky in a Moscow jail in 2009. As noted in Chapter 6, Andrea von Knoop, the official representative of Germany business from 1993 to 2007, is another example of an outspoken critic of western policy towards Russia. In 2016, Putin granted her Russian citizenship in recognition of her contribution to building business ties. She has lived in Russia for over thirty years.63 Germany’s deep respect for Russian culture is another significant advantage that facilitates the process of conditioning Germans to a Russian message. Currently, 158 members of Parliament (Die Linke and the AfD combined out of a total of 709) whose parties have clearly pro-Russian positions on sanctions, for example, provide Moscow with a much larger influence platform than it has in any other major European country. Finally, a further benefit for Russia in Germany is that public opinion has marked pacifist tendencies and does not support significant investment in defence. For now, Russia can remain sure that Germany’s bark will be worse than its bite. At the same time, in the face of pressures aimed at societal disruption, Germany has proved resilient thanks to its strong institutions, including its media, and its relatively low levels of inequality compared to the UK and the USA. However, past performance is not necessarily a guide to the future since Russia has so far deployed some of its ‘harder’ instruments sparingly possibly because it does not want to alienate irreversibly its once strongest advocate in the EU and NATO. For example, Moscow chose not to deploy the data it stole from Parliament and government servers in the run up to the federal 2017 election. This would have risked moving beyond managed disruption and damaging the bilateral relationship beyond repair. In the case of its interference in the US presidential election in 2016, Russia appeared to conclude that it had more to gain than to lose, while in Germany the calculation was possibly the reverse. There is speculation that a high-level German warning beforehand persuaded Putin to refrain from interference in the election. In addition, it is uncomfortable for Germany to discuss the dangers posed by Russian ‘soft’ power without calling into question the guiding principle of seeking maximum contact with Russia to prevent conflict and as redemption for the past. To this extent, Russia does not need to use the ‘harder’ instruments of power as robustly as in many other countries to achieve its desired levels of influence. This situation may change if Germany’s Russia policy hardens further. Some of Russia’s established influence-building advantages are in any case already starting to erode. The Ostpolitik generation is leaving the scene. Their successors, born in the 1980s, have less awareness of the Second World War and the division of Germany. They were still children when the Wall fell and have less instinctive sympathy for Russia. Over time, Moscow will need to find new tools and messages to ensure that Germans remain conditioned to respond to its voice. Yet for now, Russia’s influence in Germany remains strong and of a qualitatively different nature to that in other major European countries.