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Greek-Russian relations are driven by perception of Greece being an active member of NATO – only the action of the plan results in a decrease in Russia’s willingness to pursue the relationship – empirics prove that only security cooperation, not harsh words impact the relationship

Constantinos Filis ’18, is Research Director of the Institute of international Relations in Athens, Greece. He is a specialist in Russian and former-Soviet affairs and a strategic planning expert on Greek foreign policy., “Orthodox myths: Greece’s pragmatic approach towards Russia”, European Council on Foreign Relations, 10/29/18, https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_orthodox_myths_greeces_pragmatic_approach_towards_russia/

The Greek government has dialled down its rhetoric since the expulsions, releasing official statements in favour of rapprochement. But the Russian leadership now appears to see Athens as a long arm of Washington: at the height of the dispute in July, Russia blamed the United States for the deterioration in Greek-Russian relations. Still, it does not want to break ties completely. With its relations with Turkey becoming more strategic in nature (energy, trade, and revisionism are common denominators), Russia needs to maintain a balance – with both Greece and Cyprus – in securing its enhanced position in the eastern Mediterranean. The mood in Greek-Russian relations has therefore shifted from neutral-positive to neutral-negative, but prime minister, Alexis Tsipras’s visit to Moscow in December is already creating a more positive atmosphere. The recent resignation of the foreign minister, Nikos Kotzias, should also alter things; the July crisis had begun to take on the nature of a campaign between Kotzias and Russia. After the expulsions, Kotzias publicly accused Russia of being Turkey’s ‘comrade-in-arms’ and of betraying the level of Greek-Russian friendship attained over the past 190 years, insinuating that Moscow and Ankara were joining forces against Athens. Despite the obvious limitations in Greek-Russia relations, a further deterioration would serve no purpose, particularly at a time of general fluidity and in the midst of Greece’s attempt to return to normality and attract investment. Athens needs to be careful to avoid finding itself part of opportunistic joint ventures that Russian might perceive as aggressive in nature, be it against Russia itself, or Iran. That said, even in Kotzias’s harshest words he alluded to a supposed closeness between Greece and Russia. Under certain circumstances Athens may still find it difficult to take a firm stance against Moscow, given the latter’s assertiveness and the confrontational trend in Western-Russian relations.

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