Ties are strong now BUT could be spoiled by the US
Katharine Nasielski ’17, is an experienced foreign policy professional with a strong track record in building strategic relationships that strengthen and diversify the reach of organizations. She has expertise in strengthening civil society, public-private partnerships, project management, coalition-building, policy analysis, and public diplomacy, “Disrupting the Russian-Iranian Rapprochement”, American Security Project, 4/17/17, https://www.americansecurityproject.org/disrupting-the-russian-iranian-rapprochement/
The relationship between Iran and Russia has never been built on trust. Since 1979, Iran has held a “No East, No West” policy. No country has seized more territory from Iran in recent centuries than Russia, and Iran has not fully forgiven Russia for its support of Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War. Tehran has consistently been used as a bargaining chip between Russia and the U.S., most notably in backroom negotiations in 1995 when Vice President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin agreed to end arms sales to Iran without their knowledge or consent. But now, U.S. policymakers are faced with the challenge of a fundamentally changed relationship between Iran and Russia derived from military coordination to prop up the Assad regime. Russia and Iran have been working in tandem to ensure that the Syrian government survives. Without their support, President Assad could not have remained in power. Iran’s ambitions for regional hegemony and to counter Saudi Arabia’s strength in the Middle East require Assad’s survival. Russia seeks a larger role in the Middle East and to limit America’s influence. While Russia may not necessarily be committed to President Assad’s personal maintenance of power, it views a continued Russian-Syrian alliance as critical for its access to this region and to the Mediterranean. Because of these shared priorities with Russia, Iran appears to have diverted from “No East, No West.” In August 2016, Iran allowed Russia to use its Hamadan Air Base to take off and refuel in support of its joint military operations; no foreign power has been permitted to base forces in Iran since 1979. Russia has been training and providing weapons to Hezbollah, Iran’s proxy militia in Lebanon. Since the beginning of the war, Hezbollah has adapted from a small terrorist organization to a small-sized army, posing a direct threat to U.S. allies in Israel and Saudi. In the aftermath of the JCPOA, Iran and Russia signed a $10 billion arms deal, and Russia delivered S-300 missile systems that had been delayed due to international sanctions regimes. But the U.S. has the power to drive a wedge between Iran and Russia’s blossoming relationship. Even though Iran and Russia might have similar visions of the Syrian conflict in the immediate term, their long-term regional goals differ significantly.