Prolif causes nuke war in the Middle East – draws in all Great Powers
Saab 18 - senior fellow and director of the Defense and Security Program at the Middle East Institute, and an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program (Bilal Y, “The coming Middle East missile arms race,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Sep 25 2018, https://thebulletin.org/2018/09/the-coming-middle-east-missile-arms-race/, jwg)
The main reason Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have yet to pursue ballistic missiles is that Washington has managed for years to convince them not to. The last thing the United States needs in the Middle East is an offensive missile race, which could quickly lead the antagonists into a deadly military confrontation that drags Washington and Moscow into war. Missiles are inherently destabilizing weapons because of their potential to quickly escalate conflicts. Their flight times can be very short, and new technologies are dramatically improving their accuracy and lethality.
As if that were not scary enough, the nuclear future of the Middle East is also increasingly uncertain, now that the United States has withdrawn from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the deal that limited Iran’s nuclear development in exchange for sanctions relief. At the same time, at least half a dozen regional powers including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, and Qatar see peaceful nuclear energy as a long-term solution to their fossil-fuel dependence. The growth of nuclear power generation in the region could exacerbate the risk of nuclear proliferation, as the same technologies and materials are required to develop both nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. Should Middle East civilian nuclear development become militarized, possession of fleets of offensive missiles—arguably the most effective delivery vehicle for nuclear warheads—could magnify the potential danger.
Like Israel, some Gulf countries are heading toward a stronger deterrent posture—through a broader mix of offensive technologies, including missiles—because missile defense on its own does not seem to be the answer to the Iranian missile problem. Furthermore, missile defense is expensive and comes with its own set of challenges. While the best missile defense system would be one that is regionally integrated, any hope of establishing such a system in the Gulf is now gone because of the ongoing feud Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, and Bahrain are having with Qatar.
With US influence in the Gulf seemingly declining, it is unlikely that Washington’s preferences will register as strongly in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi as they did in the past. To be sure, the drive for autonomy in national-security decision making has its limits, given the Gulf countries’ military dependence on Washington, but US weapons are not the only game in town, with both Russia and China making inroads into the region lately.