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Relations between Russia and North Africa are only possible because of US isolation

Isabelle Falcon ’17, Deputy director of the Fondation pour la Recherche Stategique, “Russia’s quest for influence in North Africa and the Middle East”, Fondation pour la Recherche Stategique, 4/11/17, https://www.frstrategie.org/sites/default/files/documents/programmes/observatoire-du-monde-arabo-musulman-et-du-sahel/publications/en/8.pdf

This confirms that Russia’s regional politics remain above all an instrument working towards the realisation of larger ambitions in its foreign policy and security agenda. This is shown perhaps by what is left of its, still modest, economic footprint. The regional powers are aware of this whilst taking into account the calculations of a strengthened Russia. Indeed, said powers are often at the origin of such rapprochements. Thus, the heating up of links with Algeria would not have been possible if the Algerian regime had not needed international legitimisation at the end of the period of violence that it emerged from at the end of the 1990s. In the case of Egypt, the rapprochement can also be explained by Cairo’s will to play Russia and America off against one another so as to draw the greatest profits. This is in a context where it is necessary to find a solution to the very reserved stance of Western countries towards President Sisi’s regime. Indeed, regional actors maintain their independence as, despite Russia’s new found political and military credibility, they are still seen as “strangers in the Middle East.”75 To explain this, several examples are cited by an expert including the constitutional project proposed by Moscow for Syria following the Astana76 format which is unpopular in the region (for example in Turkey). The same specialist also evokes the traces left in the region by Russia and their contribution to the creation of memories of “Russian wars against Islam” (Afghanistan, Chechnya and Aleppo).77 The multi-faceted game which Moscow employs – at times both a strength and a means of safeguarding its influence in a particularly unstable and conflictual area – contributes to the blurring of its image. In Syria, how should Russia develop relations with Tehran when the Gulf monarchies and especially Israel aim to extract concessions from Moscow in order to contain Iranian influence? There are many in Iran who believe, as put by the old spokesperson of the Iranian ex-president Mohamed Khatami, that Russians are untrustworthy and likely “to stab you in the back.”78 Many of these new regional relations, whether with Turkey or Saudi Arabia, lie on shaky foundations and are far from being based on complete trust. Success is not always straightforward or clear, a conclusion demonstrated by the mixed result of the Astana Conference held in March 2017. An important parameter of the Russian growth in regional influence lies in the possibility that the region becomes the object of a “deal” between Moscow and the Trump administration. This would be under the name of the struggle against international terrorism. As of March 2017, too many uncertain variables are in play to proffer a definitive answer to this question. For now, political circumstances in Washington are preventing progress from being made, given Russia’s place at the heart of issues questioning the legitimacy of Donald Trump. In any case, scepticism abounds in Moscow as Trump’s new security advisor, H. R. McMaster is not the zealous proponent of total war against radical Islam that Flynn was” and that “this limits room for détente.”79 The Trump administration’s position on Iran (the president will doubtless be keen to limit Iran’s influence in Syria) could complicate things, especially as Russia is attached to the JCPOA that Trump has criticised at several instances.80

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