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Western abandonment is key to Russia-North Africa relations

Isabelle Falcon ’17, Deputy director of the Fondation pour la Recherche Stategique, “Russia’s quest for influence in North Africa and the Middle East”, Fondation pour la Recherche Stategique, 4/11/17, https://www.frstrategie.org/en/programs/observatoire-du-monde-arabo-musulman-et-du-sahel/russias-quest-influence-north-africa-and-middle-east-2017

Beyond the military operations in Syria starting from September 2015, Russia surprised the international community through its capacity to talk with several major players about the Syrian issue, including non-state actors, such as the Kurds. This significantly contributed to the fact that it managed to impose itself as a vital mediator. This approach reflects the strategy pursued more generally in the Northern Africa/Middle East region. No relation is excluded, including those with Fatah or the Iraqi Kurds. Such an approach aims at widening Russian room for manoeuvre. If the legacy of the Soviet era favours the development of certain relations, it does not render them exclusive. Thus, from 2001, President Putin signed a strategic partnership agreement with his Algerian counterpart. However, this did not stop Moscow from engaging with Morocco with whom the Kremlin had always maintained relations, and conversely with Tunisia. In the Middle East, the partnership with Iran has reached an unprecedented level. In four years (2013 – 2017), Presidents Putin and Rouhani have met on eight separate occasions. The last meeting being the first bilateral meeting between the two men. Tehran has authorised Russia to temporarily use the base of Nojeh for its air strikes in Syria. This increased Russo-Iranian proximity has not stopped the links between Russia and Israel from becoming an important paradigm of the Kremlin’s regional policy. The demographic weight of Israeli citizens of Soviet origin undoubtedly contributed to this development. Communication between the two countries became particularly during the Russian military intervention in Syria. The Russian government is showing itself to be particularly attentive to Israel’s concerns regarding the presence of Hezbollah and the military influence of Iran in Syria. Considering that dialogue is preferable to tension and recriminations, Russia has actively sought to establish workable relations with Saudi Arabia. The two countries show themselves inclined to compartmentalise the issues that characterise their bilateral relations. Thus Russia has shown itself to be faithful to a new foreign policy that seeks to diversify its relations in all regions. In the region concerned, this effort must take into consideration the fact that the inherited networks of the Soviet era have been significantly eroded since the 1990s. Moreover, the growing instability in the zone, especially since the Arab Spring, has forced the Kremlin to demonstrate its flexibility so as to not remove any options in the event that political relations were to evolve. In this context, Moscow has also managed to appreciate the opportunity that was presented by the perception spread at the regional level of a “confusion” of Western powers (caused by such factors as the “abandonment” of Mubarak, red lines not followed in Syria and the United States’ regional disengagement). Thus, Moscow did not hesitate to manipulate the disappointments left by Western political leaders to its advantage. This partly explains the development of relations with Egypt, which, after the military coup d’état of 2013, is looking to establish a more independent foreign policy. Despite the strong ambiguities that will lastingly encumber the Russo-Turkish relationship (starting with the Kurdish question), Turkey and Russia continue to share a strong disdain for the West. After the coup attempt in Turkey, the immediate support offered by Moscow to the “legitimate authorities” help to repair the damage left by the crisis of the Su-24 shot down by Turkish forces. This marked a stark contrast with Western capitals which voiced their concerns about the repression carried out by the Turkish regime. Russia also knows that its link with Tehran indirectly benefits from the suspicion Iran harbours for the Western powers. The pragmatism observed in the Saudi Arabia/Russia relationship is tied to Riyadh’s desire to diversify its foreign policy in a context where its relationship with Washington has undergone a restructuring in recent years. The arms deals made with Iraq underline Baghdad’s desire to strengthen its political independence from Washington. In the Maghreb, even the situation is less “severe” for the West, “the Russian project finds a favourable environment due to these countries’ belief in the necessity for a better balanced, bipolar world” (against a highly fluid backdrop, a rapprochement with Moscow can now be used to put pressure on EU countries and the US ). These circumstances have notably favoured the recent development of Russo-Moroccan relations and, to a lesser extent, Russo-Tunisian relations. In general, Russia plays a sensitive game in the entirety of the region. This is demonstrated when Moscow states that its policy in the Middle East and North Africa will always be led on a basis of “respecting their [states’] sovereignty and territorial integrity and the right to self-determination without outside interference” (Foreign Policy Concept).

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