Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Opening Word document…

Turkey-Russia relations allow peace in Syria–Turkey just needs to stop working with the US

Goff Taylor 17 (Moira Goff-Taylor, Moira Goff-Taylor has worked as a foreign policy analyst in the US Government since 2000. Her research focuses on crosscutting political and socioeconomic trends in Europe and the Middle East, including European nations’ relations with the Middle East, September 17, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/why-turkey-needs-russia//RM)

Turkish security concerns also played a major role in Ankara’s rapprochement with Moscow. The Turkish Government had grown increasingly frustrated with the United States and the West’s Syria policy. The United States’ unwillingness to directly confront Syrian regime forces, its focus on countering ISIS, and western collaboration with the People’s Protection Units (YPG) through the Syrian Defense Forces aggravated Erdogan. Ankara views the YPG and the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) as off-shoots of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). In 2016, as the PYD expanded control along the Turkish-Syrian border and the United States considered arming the YPG, the Turkish government grew alarmed, as it did not want to see the creation of an autonomous Syrian Kurdish region on its border nor a strengthened YPG or PKK.[vi] Erdogan knew that if he wanted to take action to counter PYD expansion in Syria he would need to work with Moscow. Turkey’s openness to working with Russia on the Syria crisis revealed a shift in Turkish priori-ties. Since the fall of 2011, Turkey and Russia had been on opposites sides of the Syria crisis; Ankara was focused on Syrian President Bashar al-Asad’s ouster while Moscow supported the regime. Turkey’s fear over the growing strength of the PYD began to outweigh its aversion to the Asad regime and necessitated better cooperation between Ankara and Moscow. In August 2016, Turkey launched the Euphrates Shield offensive, supporting Turkish-backed Syrian opposition forces against ISIS, and succeeded in both taking back the town of Jarabulus and preventing Kurdish forces from gaining additional territory. Turkish plans for this offensive probably encouraged the restoration of Turkey’s bilateral ties with Russia. Ankara likely sought out Moscow’s acceptance of the military operation to avoid a confrontation with Russian and Syrian regime forces. Turkey also began to work closely with Russia to negotiate a diplomatic solution to the crisis. Ankara worked with Moscow to facilitate a ceasefire in Aleppo and participated in Russian led peace talks in Astana. Russia likely welcomed Turkey’s new focus as it forced Ankara to be more flexible on Asad’s status in future Syrian governments and offered an opportunity for greater Russian influence over Turkey. Ankara’s security concerns over the potential for an autonomous Syrian Kurdish controlled region along the Turkish border and the strengthening of PKK forces motivates Turkey to work with Moscow, as well as Washington, on the Syria crisis. While unable to convince either Russia or the United States to adopt Turkey’s perspective on the YPG and PYD, the Turkish government will maintain dialogue with both in an attempt to protect its agenda. Erdogan sees Russia as a dominate force in the crisis and will continue to work with Moscow in the hope of influencing the future of Syria. Ankara will push to preserve the territorial integrity of Syria and limit the power and influence of Syrian Kurds. Erdogan has repeatedly stated that Turkey will never allow the establishment of a Syrian Kurdish state in northern Syria.[vii] Turkey is possibly working on a deal with Russia and Iran on Kurdish-controlled Afrin and the city of Idlib, with Ankara working to get groups it backs to retreat from Idlib in exchange for Turkey having more leeway to take action against YPG forces in the Afrin region.[viii]

Sign in to recut, update, or save this card.