Turkish economic decline spills over to other European banks
Arbaa & Varon 19 (Ofer Arbaa: Department of Economics and Management, Ruppin Academic Center, Emek Hefer, Israel, Eva Varon: Graduate of Masters in Finance, London Business School, London, UK, December 2019, “Turkish currency crisis – Spillover effects on European banks”, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214845018304010#!//BVN SC)
In this paper, we aim to analyze the impact of the Turkish lira currency shock on the stock returns of 29 major banks in Europe. Literature after the global economic crisis of 2008, deals mostly with the financial spillovers of shocks in the US or Europe to emerging markets rather than vice versa and on a macro level (Stracca, 2014; Kim, Kim, & Lee, 2015; Chen, Filardo and Zhu, 2016; Fadejava, Feldkircher, & Reininger, 2017; Fratzscher, Duca and Straub, 2016). As a result, we look at data on some of the largest banks in Europe from both high and low risk economies. Our results illustrate the investors' sentiment of how resilient banks would be to possible bank defaults with spillover effects. The stocks of the overall banking sample react negatively to the crisis in Turkey and results indicate that banks that recently increased their leverage or experienced a decrease in liquidity or profitability have also been subject to higher abnormal losses on the event day and a day after the event, where the losses in general were the most severe. Nevertheless, leverage, liquidity and performance ratios are by themselves not sufficient to assess the financial soundness of banks, since the risk is more related to the quality than the quantity of the assets they carry. Across countries, we find Greece, Italy and Spain, the three economies of PIIGS analyzed in this paper, to be significantly related to the Turkish currency shock. Banks of Greece show the highest abnormal losses, which indicates that geographical proximity can be a factor in speculative attacks and/or crisis spillovers. Moreover, banks located in countries with lower systematic risk such as Germany, Netherlands and France react strongly to the Turkish lira crisis. Therefore, investors do not appear sensitive to whether a bank is operating in a less or more healthy banking system. In addition, losses of banks are not necessarily proportionate to the size of their exposures, with the exception of Turkish banks, which have been the most vulnerable. Spanish and Italian banks, which carry the largest amount of loans extended to Turkey do not seem to display the highest abnormal losses among the European banks. German banks, on the other hand, have no subsidiaries in Turkey and their claims are small relative to their capital (2.4%) and yet they disclose significant abnormal losses. In fact, the underlying risk resulting from banks' exposures to Turkey is difficult to assess, as there are many indirect factors that might influence the operation of banks such as other country and industry-specific risks. German, Dutch and French banks could be vulnerable to the extent that their economies will support the ailing financial system in other EU areas. UK and Switzerland, which are considered as outsiders of the EU financial system (the former in the process) appear to be immune to these pressures and therefore their banks are found relatively stable. We conclude that foreign banks' lending practices may be a source of instability in their financial markets even when a shock originates in a relatively small economy to which the banks have direct or indirect exposure. The role of banks in transmitting disturbances from emerging markets across borders is of increasing relevance with the presence of international banks and emerging markets with greater openness in their financial sectors. To better understand this phenomenon, further research would be useful that analyzes the response of individual bank balance sheets and lending decisions to such shocks from the emerging economies.