Trump used COVID to secure the US’s masculinity by portraying it as the strong, masculine hegemon ready to defend both its own weak, and destroy the weakness around it to prevent “contamination”
Kuteleva and Clifford 2021 (Anna Kuteleva is a postdoctoral research fellow at the School of International Regional Studies at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (Russia). Anna holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Alberta (Canada). Sarah J. Clifford is an MSc student in Political Science at the University of Copenhagen (Denmark). Her Master’s project explores the intersections of American militarised masculinities, identity politics, and education policies. Clifford studied Political Science and worked as a Research Assistant for the China Institute and the Faculty of Education at the University of Alberta. “Gendered securitisation: Trump’s and Putin’s discursive politics of the COVID-19 pandemic,” European Journal of International Security (2021), 6, 301–317 doi:10.1017/eis.2021.5)
In a paralleled vein to feminist discussions of 9/11, COVID-19 produces what Bonnie Mann calls the ‘unmanning’ of America.18 Mann details how sovereignty is a ‘style of national masculinity’ with any violation of a nation’s borders resulting in its figurative demasculinisation.19 Accordingly, the pandemic challenges the American doctrines of absolute sovereignty, invulnerability, and global hegemony. To counter this threat, Trump reframes it not as a public health dilemma but as a threat to the nation’s security and hegemonic masculinity. In this setting, COVID-19 presents a direct threat to the national body that is innately gendered. On 4 February Trump securitises COVID-19.20 However, in January and February, Trump struggles with fully committing to the securitising move and vacillates between securitising and desecuritising the spread of COVID-19. At first, Trump frames the virus only as a ‘potential threat’ contained in China.21 Simultaneously, he assures his audience that ‘[o]ur country is prepared for any circumstances’ and that ‘there’s no reason to panic at all’ as the possibility of exposure and mortality to the American nation ‘remain[s] low’. 22 It is not until 13 March that Trump constructs COVID-19 as an existential crisis and ‘national emergency’, one that not only threatens the nation’s health but also has the power to obstruct its sovereignty and security.23 As specified by Trump, one of the existential challenges of the pandemic is that the United States will face the ‘public health consequences of a mass uncontrolled cross-border movement’. 24 Starting from the presidential campaign in 2015, Trump persistently pushes migration out of the domain of ‘normal politics’. As the pandemic unfolds, he builds upon the image of the othered and villainised migrant to redefine COVID-19 not only as a health hazard but also as a security threat that can compromise the nation’s sovereignty. Trump personifies these fears in undocumented migrants who potentially carry COVID-19. This extra discursive layer highlights how the perceived threat to America’s sovereignty elevates the virus from a public health dilemma to a national security crisis through the processes of Othering. For example, he emphasises that they threaten to create a perfect storm that would spread the infection to our border agents, migrants, and to the public at large. Left unchecked, this would cripple our immigration system, overwhelm our healthcare system, and severely damage our national security.25 As a response, Trump affirmatively declares that ‘we’re not going to let that happen’. 26 Sara Ahmed explains such a discursive reconstruction as an attempt to monopolise and ‘eliminate the source of fear’ – a move by the state to control the uncontrollable through asserting selfdetermination and containment.27 In other words, Trump portrays the United States as no longer fearful but as a nation that is mobilised to repel the dangerous Other. This construction also frames Trump and his administration as the protectors of the nation (‘we’) from the existential threat (‘they’) by concurrently securitising and desecuritising COVID-19. Trump’s narrative does not alleviate the threat of the pandemic but, counterintuitively, dispels notions of fear and security to discursively embolden his masculine command over the nation. COVID-19 is not only embodied by the undocumented migrant but is also personified through a multiplicity of Others. To shift the blame for the harms of the COVID-19 outbreak, Trump fixates on China and racialises the pandemic as a ‘Chinese’ threat. Since 21 January, Trump obsessively emphasises that COVID-19 ‘comes from China’ and should be regarded as the ‘Chinese virus’ or ‘Wuhan virus’. 28 Restricting international travel from China to the United States, Trump labels his executive order the ‘China ban’, stating that ‘China, you can’t come in. I’m sorry.’ 29 While the United States evades an attack from the virus by shutting its borders and taking strong actions, China is presented as weak and incapable. According to Trump, the COVID-19 outbreak ‘could have been stopped in China, before it started, and it wasn’t’ and now ‘the whole world is suffering because of it’. 30 China is portrayed as a soft nation because of its permeable borders, passivity, and ineffective leadership. The feminine softness makes it not only vulnerable but also dangerous. By differentiating and separating the nation from the pandemicstricken Others, Trump does not allow the insecurity of COVID-19 to feminise the United States and, in turn, (re)secures America’s masculinity. By framing COVID-19 as a destabilising force to the United States’ masculinity, Trump mobilises the nation around three gendered narratives to perform and actualise American hegemony: the gendered construction of the national ‘we’, militarisation, and displays of the United States’ economic omnipotence. These three discursive formations function as applicators to deconstruct how the nation is mobilised to repel the threat. Building on this logic, Trump’s performances of certain hegemonic traits demonstrate how gender practices become a securitising tool utilised by national leaders in times of crisis. The performative values that the American state believes its citizens personify are embedded in these gender practices. In Trump’s words, Americans are those who ‘do not despair’. 31 He argues that ‘we do not give in to fear’ and ‘we pull together, we persevere, and we overcome, and we win’. 32 Americans ‘sacrifice together’, 33 but, as Ahmed puts it, the nation is presented as winning by ‘refusing to transform its vulnerability and wounds … into an affective response of fear’. 34 A response that is premised on exemplifying the masculine characteristics of ‘valour’, aggression, and determination in times of combat. These characteristics frame the nation as being militarised and in a perpetual state of conflict that will not dissipate until the threat has been vanquished: As our citizens persevere through this present challenge, we’re renewing American unity and we’re replenishing American will and we are witnessing new American valor each and every day. We see it every day. The daring and determination of our people in this crisis reminds us that no matter how hard it gets, no matter what obstacles we must overcome, Americans will keep on fighting to victory and we will secure the glorious future that our citizens so richly deserve, especially after going through this nightmare, this evil beast.35 Here, Trump constructs the notion of an ‘internal strength’ that the American populace epitomises – one that transforms the emotions of fear and insecurity into the imagery of mobilisation and collective triumph.36 In this framework, the nation escapes potential feminisation by acting as a wilful subject and taking command of the pandemic. To further denote a sense of control and agency, Trump uses active verbs to place the United States not as a passive, feminised observer but as an active, masculine participant. By positioning the United States as one that is ‘renewing’, ‘replenishing’, and ‘witnessing’, Trump construes the nation as actively mobilising and hence, enacting its masculinity against COVID-19. To perform the state’s hegemonic masculinity, Trump also militarises the society. Drawing upon established gendered identities, the Trump administration evokes a series of securitising moves to militarise COVID-19.37 As early as 15 March, Trump argues that the United States ‘deployed over a thousand officers in support of the coronavirus missions’, reframing the pandemic not as an emergency managed by health professionals but one controlled by the military that will ‘defend our homeland during this crisis’. 38 In this framework, the nation’s military capabilities are constructed as a source of security, a physical reassertion of its masculinised control and dominance. Here, Trump touts the desirability of the military, stating that [o]ur great military is operating at 100 per cent during this crisis and thousands of troops are deployed alongside of civilians in the COVID hotspots, as you know. You see them all over. I spoke – when I spoke with Governor Cuomo, and when I spoke to Gavin Newsom, and many of the other governors, they wanted to know if we could have some military help with the medical, and we – we gave it to them.39 This quote presents the military as the masculinist protector of the nation with Governors jockeying for its aid while simultaneously framing it as a pervasive and saturating force who is ‘all over’. The military’s spreading encroachment across all vectors of society assures Trump’s audience of the United States’ ever-growing control over the virus, and in turn, paints the military as the reason for the nation’s success. As a result, Trump hails his response to the pandemic as ‘a tremendous victory’, ‘thanks to our all-out military operation and the extraordinary devotion of our people’ as ‘we believe we will experience far fewer deaths than even the optimistic projection’. 40 In tandem with the physical deployment of the military, Trump’s rhetoric is imbued with militarised references. Trump constructs the pandemic as a figurative battlefield, one that parallels ‘a World War, or a World War One or Two or something’ as it is ‘a war all unto itself’. 41 To align with this imagery, military hospitals are deployed to New York and Los Angeles, ‘frontline workers’ are reconceptualised as heroic, selfless soldiers falling in the line of duty, and even ordinary citizens are viewed as making their patriotic contribution to the nation by ‘fighting this battle from home’. 42 Not only does Trump construct the pandemic as an ‘all-out war’ but he places himself at the centre of society’s militarisation: ‘I’m a wartime president. This is a war. This is a war. A different kind of war that we’ve ever had.’ 43 Here, Trump figuratively takes control of all militarised activities intended to protect the population by using the personal pronoun ‘I’. As an extension of this militarised paternalism, Trump’s reluctance to count the casualties of this ‘war’ creates ambiguity and disillusionment that alters what Christine Sylvester calls the ‘perceptions of American war capabilities’. 44 Following this logic, Trump often refuses to broadcast the statistics of American mortality and case rates. However, when discussing these statistics discreetly, multiple members of Trump’s team utilise dehumanising tactics by referring to those who passed away from COVID-19 as having ‘expired’ – a term that more frequently refers to food past its due date rather than the loss of a citizen.45 Trump also deploys these discursive tactics to create a façade of militarised success that is further bolstered by notions of paternalistic protection as well as hegemonic and charismatic leadership. For instance, when prompted by reporters in multiple press briefings to discuss the number of cases, Trump belligerently dismisses their questions as ‘nasty’, ‘really bad reporting’, and ‘sensationalism’. 46 These discursive tactics expose Trump’s lack of transparency as an effort to give the American people a renewed sense of ‘hope’ and safeguard them from the brutal truth of ‘war’. 47 Once again, such militarised responses to the pandemic place Trump not only within the centrefold of controlling America’s military activities but also in the role of hegemonic protector. While Trump’s role as the nation’s protector rests upon his position as the Commander in Chief, his legitimation strategy also relies heavily on the United States’ economic capacity. Unlike his two predecessors, Trump’s reign has conjured a blatant reframing of previously exemplified American masculine norms. From George W. Bush’s indelible hyper-sexualised bravado48 to Barack Obama’s familial paternalism,49 Trump’s form of physical masculinity leaves much to be desired. As a result, the construction of Trump’s masculinity and, in the consortium, his legitimacy revolves not around his prominent physical characteristics but instead around his success as an entrepreneur.50 On multiple occasions, Trump draws on his economic success over the three years as president to demonstrate his capacity to rule. He states that ‘nobody has ever done anything like what we were able to do’ 51 and forcefully appropriates this achievement: I think you’re going to have a recovery. Look, I built – they were just telling me inside, and it’s fact – I built the greatest economy – with the help of 325 million people, I built the greatest economy in the history of the world. And one day, because of something that should have never been allowed to happen, we had to close our country, we had to close our economy.52 Such assertions portray Trump not only as a legitimate and successful leader of the United States but, more importantly, as the one responsible for maintaining its position as the economic powerhouse and global hegemon. As the latter quote exemplifies, Trump excessively utilises the first personal pronoun (‘I’), which allows him to embody the success of the nation. As the American economy slipped into one of the worst downturns since the Great Depression, Trump claims that ‘I had to turn it off in order to get to a point where we are today.’ 53 While claiming responsibility for the economic safety of the nation, Trump also assures his audience that Americans will ‘help countries around the world as well’ because ‘the whole world is watching’ them.54 The narrative of Trump’s leadership par excellence produces an image of the United States as the supreme leader in the fight against COVID-19, whereas other countries ‘aren’t highly sophisticated’ and represent failures.55 For example, Trump contrasts the United States’ rate of COVID-19 testing with that of other countries: We are way ahead on testing. We are the best in the world on testing. We’ve tested much more than anybody else, times two – or every country combined. We’ve tested more than every country combined. … The quality of our tests is the best and the number is the best.56 These multiple superlatives and assertions that the United States is ‘first’ on one or another measure enable Trump to reinforce a masculine fiction of conquest and triumph. In this framework, the pandemic becomes a platform for the United States to demonstrate and maintain its innovative capacity and supremacy. Similarly, other top-level members of Trump’s administration extend the narrative of American omnipotence. As a case in point, Mike Pompeo reminds the media that ‘a lot of countries are asking us for assistance and a lot of countries have received assistance’, assuring that the United States has ‘of course, done the right thing’. 57 However, he instantly highlights that the United States will be ‘an enormous force for good’ in other countries and regions only after it provides for itself: We’ve made sure we had the resources for our own people, but as the American greatness – as American power and American commercial prosperity continues to grow, we’re building out – we’re getting not only ventilators but all of the equipment that the world will need.58 While Trump and Pompeo make it clear that the United States will take care of itself first, they continue to represent the nation as the world’s saviour and protector of the weak. This notion is explicitly rhetorical. Although both figures elevate COVID-19 to a ‘global threat’, 59 it is clear that the United States is isolated. Rather than binding together as a universal front and leading the world to victory, Trump and his most prominent team members continually denounce the work of both other nations and international organisations, portraying the United States as individually successful in comparison. In turn, the fight against COVID-19 is framed not as a fight for global immunity and humankind but as a competition over who is going to defeat the threat first.