Positivism is good and compatible with a feminist framework– the assumptions of science aren’t intrinsically androcentric – if we win the product is good, the process is justified.
Neilson 5, [Joyce, Sociology Prof @ University of Colorado at Boulder, “Vital Variables and Gender Equity in Academe: Confessions from a Feminist Empiricist Project,” Signs 31(1), pp. 1-28] Mr.Mr.
The now substantial literature on the topic describes feminist research as “passionate, scrappy, energizing” (Garko 1999, 167) and also as contradictory, controversial, revolutionary, dynamic, problematic, oxymoronic, explosive, and filled with creative tension. Deborah L. Tolman and Laura A. Szalacha refer to “epistemological unrest” (1999, 10). Michelle Fine and Susan Gordon describe feminist psychology as an inherent contradiction, pointing out that psychological laboratory studies, with their isolation, sterility, and lack of relationships, are designed to “drive women mad” (1992, 11). Elizabeth Merrick (1999) describes her complex feminist reanalysis of data on teen pregnancy as “like chewing gravel.” There is agreement in the literature that traditional methods need feminist-inspired interruption (Harding 1987). Indeed, Ellen Scott and Bindi Shah (1993, 99) cite Beatriz Pesquera as wondering if “we can develop empowering methodologies without examining the whole process of academic production within the university.” Certainly we have accomplished one goal of this article, that is, to capture the contradictory, emergent, and potentially revolutionary nature of feminist research as it is practiced. Backstage, inside-story accounts of research in progress have been contributing to improving methodologies at least since Julius A. Roth’s “Hired Hands Research” (1966). Feminist research is especially known for its reflectivity. It is not surprising, then, that there is a substantial literature of case studies of feminist research projects.16 Indeed, there is so much that Jane Ussher (1999) asks if feminist researchers are obsessed with methods. A second purpose of this article is to contribute to this literature. Our focus is specifically on feminist empiricism, something described in the literature as in transition and controversial even (or primarily) among feminists. See, for example, Sandra Harding’s (1993) detailed comparison between the feminist standpoint, on the one hand, and prefeminist and spontaneous feminist empiricist epistemologies, on the other; Richmond Campbell’s (1994) model of internal feminist empiricism; Helen Longino’s (1993) philosophical model of contextual empiricism; and Lynn Hankinson Nelson’s (1990, 1993) naturalized empiricism. Thus, juxtaposing our reflective thoughts on feminist empirical work with writings by theorists and philosophers on the topic should be informative. Not surprisingly, we do not exactly fit any one description of feminist empiricism—not completely and not yet anyway. Certainly we recognize what Harding (1993) calls spontaneous feminist empiricism in the earliest stages of this project. But our thinking quickly became unstable, transitioning across different feminist approaches.17 To contribute to current discussion and debate around feminist empiricism, how it is practiced, and how it is transitioning, we present a few close-to-the-ground conclusions based on this particular research experience. As stated earlier, we recognized, perhaps agonizingly, that our feminist thinking had outpaced available methods and strategies. This was most obvious in efforts to measure feminist consciousness when we realized that it was impossible to capture conceptual complexities and refinements in a few or even a series of survey questions. We also realized that to generate useful data and capture the thinking of our respondents, we had to abandon our own constructs and temporarily adopt our respondents’ points of view. We saw the same pattern—that our feminist thinking had outpaced our empiricist approach—with respect to understanding salary differences between male and female faculty. We began with an effort to explain (away) via regression analyses the gendered gap in salaries at this university. We ended with critical questions about the larger social structure and culture—questions that are unanswerable within regression-mode thinking. The questions that emerge when one attempts a deeper—behind the numbers—understanding of this pattern relate to the division of labor by sex. That is, answers to questions about salary differences are found in patterns of sex segregation by academic discipline and likely by associated patterns of work distribution (research, teaching, and service) across and within disciplines. These in turn are patterns that reflect the larger societal division of labor by sex. It is interesting that these kinds of substantive questions begin to approach those that constitute starting points for feminist standpoint theory. We cite, for example, Harding’s description of Dorothy Smith’s questions about women’s work that are generated by a strategy of grounding knowledge in women’s everyday experience: “She [Smith] points out that if we start thinking from women’s lives, we (anyone) can see that women are assigned the work that men do not want to do for themselves” (Harding 1993, 53). We come to a similar conclusion—that our feminist work developed similarities to standpoint and postmodern approaches—from our experience of dual vision. That is, as we shifted between views of the university from central and from marginal social locations, from both the inside and the underside, we experienced firsthand the multivocal and complex nature of the realities we were studying. In other words, this process erased, eroded, and undermined any semblance of the monologic voice that usually underlies and characterizes prefeminist empiricism and much of feminist empiricism. Does it matter what we call our practice of feminist research? Does it matter whether what we have described is contextual (Longino 1993), spontaneous (Harding 1993), positivist, internal (Campbell 1994), or naturalized feminist empiricism (Nelson 1990, 1993)? It does insofar as feminist empiricism is still emerging and this work can be seen as part of the transition toward delineating an effective, successful, and transforming version of feminist research. As a feminist project whose researchers are cognizant of the variety of feminist alternatives, it has descriptive and thus epistemological value. As an actual project against which primarily theoretical work can be compared, its value is in its very doing. Why confessions? This account feels confessional in the sense that alternatives to feminist empiricism—standpoint and postmodern feminism—seem more cutting edge because they are more deliberately critical of traditional ways of producing knowledge. We felt apologetic for continually falling back on known empiricist strategies when we were thinking more radically and aware of being constrained methodologically. This is an odd stance to take, though, since feminist empiricism has been revolutionary in its contribution to women’s liberation, and, as Francesca Cancian (1996) and Longino (1993) point out, despite much writing about creating innovative methods, most feminist work revises mainstream methodologies. (An oft-repeated theme in the literature is that feminism is not in the methods per se but in their use.) Postmodern thinking in particular is often more exhilarating and challenging theoretically, yet insofar as it rejects grand theory, large-scale models, and indeed any kind of generalization, it poses almost irresolvable empirical challenges. Our theme that feminist empiricism is outgrowing its traditional methods is worth pursuing through further analysis of specific research projects such as the one we describe. For now, we continue to stretch and expand the research paradigm with which we began.