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The kritik’s framing of women as victims steals female power – turns the K.

Stringer 2k, [Rebecca, “’A Nietzschean Breed’: Feminism, Victimology, Ressentiment,” Why Nietzsche Still? Reflections on Drama, Culture, Politics. Pg. 249-251] Mr.Mr.

There is nothing wrong with identifying one’s victimization. The act is critical. There is a lot wrong with moding it into an identity. Naomi Wolf, Fire with Fire. Feminist debate about victimology is not new, but its appearance in the feminist popular press is. That discourse about feminist victimology has attracted substantial contributions from popular press feminists is an indication of this discourse’s significance to feminism’s appeal as a social movement, indeed to feminism’s “marketability” as a cultural formation. For these contributions aim precisely to revitalize feminism’s appeal, to rewire its “marketing strategy,” in order to overcome the “alienation” of “ordinary” women from feminism that, they argue, victimology has brought into effect. Although Denfeld, Wolf, and Roiphe have been vocal about their disagreements with one another, their accounts of “the victim problem in current feminism” have more substantive similarities than differences, with Wolf having produced the most generous and systematic account. The manner in which they deal with victim feminism follows the same line, and both Denfeld and Wolf exhibit the same desire to cure feminism of victimology and charge inexorably toward an alternative. What, then, is feminist victimology, or victim feminism? It can be understood in general terms as an attitude fueled by the belief that women are victims of power, where power is understood exclusively as man’s capacity to dominate – a capacity given a fixed and central place in a social order (patriarchy) that fosters its systematic and repeated expression. In short, and to exemplify, relations between the sexes are understood as “a system of sexism in which men as a group have access to power and privilege that women do not have.” This understanding of the sexed distribution of power is posited as an exhaustive account of the power and, as such, breathes life into an elaborate feminist morality. Feminist victimology is, on all accounts, a morally righteous kind of feminism. The experience of powerlessness (women’s experience, whether they “realize” it or not), as the inverse and opposite of power, is the raw material from which the injurious effects of domination can be tabled. As Wolf writes, victim feminism proffers definitive judgment on good and evil with reference to sexual difference and thereby “casts women themselves as good and men themselves as wrong.” A mantle of virtue is bestowed on women and their distinctive ways of doing things, on account of their radical subjection to power, while men “as a group” take on the suits of evil as they are cast as the source of harm. Under the auspice of victim feminism, resistance to domination begins with the process of articulating and tabling its effects to produce an undistorted view of how domination really works, where the responsibility for it really lies, and who stands outside of it – who can, at the end of the day, be evacuated to a position that is, morally speaking, “above” domination and outside of power. Wolf’s criticism of situating feminism’s constituency outside of power is that it “urges women to identify with powerlessness even at the expense of taking responsibility for the power they do possess.” It follows from this that adherents to a victimological line of thinking would avoid registering the figure of the consciously and deliberately powerful woman – who is not, and does not desire to be, above or outside of power – much less the workings of power within its own auspice. The possibility that women and feminists might themselves practice and participate in domination, that not all men have or use the capacity to dominate, that power expresses itself in forms other than domination, is rendered unthinkable if power is conflated with male domination. This much is noted by Denfeld, who argues that victimology makes some women’s conscious participation in “racism, sexism, and violence” at most invisible and at least excusable. For Denfeld, under the auspice of victim feminism women are cast not only as victims but also as dupes. This casting serves a dual purpose. First, some women’s participation in regimes of domination can be excused as “manipulated by negative male ideas.” Second, anointing patriarchy with great powers of deception is an effective means of defending feminism against negative criticism. Denfeld writes, If you don’t agree with current feminists about the enemy, that’s only another sign that he exists.” Victimology, on Denfeld’s account, embraces a hopeful purity of position and registers anything less as contaminated compromise. We can add to Denfeld’s complaint that a victimological perspective will evade the idea that not all experiences of powerlessness are the same and should not, therefore, be collapsed under a single moral claim and that the experience of powerlessness offers no less distorted a view than does the “power-infused” view with which it competes politically. Wolf argues that victimology is especially impoverished in the respect that it inhibits the registration and representation of women’s capacities to assume positive relationships to power. It dwells exclusively on powerlessness, “molding it into an identity,” ratifying and regenerating, rather than transforming, socially derived stereotypes of female weakness and vulnerability. Moreover, having granted victimhood the status of a grand category into which women as a group can be hereded, feminists effectively eschew the conceptual strategies at their disposal for overcoming victim identity. As Sandra Harding has commented, “Victimology… often hide[s] the ways in which women have struggled against misogyny and exploitation.” Harding’s comment indicates that even as a victimological perspective can have a dramatic reversal of the social order in mind – for men must be made to repent for the injuries they have caused by relinquishing the values, ideals, and sociocultural configurations that secure their power – the very logic through which relations of power are conceived from this perspective works against registration of struggle (successful and otherwise) with these values, ideals, and sociocultural configurations.

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