2AC – Russia revisionist
Russian revisionism is the greatest threat to the international order by constant escalation and expansionism through aggressive military force – empirics
Pisciotta 20 (Pisciotta, Barbara, Associate professor in the Department of Political Science at Roma Tre University, 2020, "Russian Revisionism in the Putin era: an overview of post-communist military interventions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria." Italian Political Science Review 50.1, pp. 87-106, doi:10.1017/ipo.2019.18) nihara
Most scholars of international relations today believe that the international order is in crisis. Haas (Haas, 2015) suggests a gradual transformation of the international system into a post-hegemonic global governance, Acharya (Acharya, 2014) the formation of a less centralized system based on regional level interactions, and Kahler (Kahler, 2013) the emergence of new rising powers as moderate reformers influencing the change of international rules through the existing forums.
In the sphere of challenges to the liberal world order, Allison (Allison, 2014) sees Vladimir Putin's annexation of the Crimea as the most visible threat to the stability and preservation of the present international order. In his view, Russia's blatant violation of international norms, backed up by military force in the absence of any conditions legitimizing its use, is indicative of an aggressive strategy designed to oppose western rules politically, culturally, and militarily (Allison, 2017). As effectively pointed out by Krastev (Krastev, 2014: 3), Putin's vision of the new world is one of constant escalation aimed at altering the status quo: ‘He has refused to play by Western rules. He seems not to fear political isolation; he invites it. He seems not worry about the closing of borders; he hopes for it. His foreign policy amounts to deep rejection of modern Western values and an attempt to draw a clear line between Russia's world and Europe's. For Putin, Crimea is likely just the beginning’.
What is the nature of the threats that Russia poses to the present international order? Can Russia be described as an authentic revisionist power? Is the military intervention in Crimea really just the beginning? How are we to interpret Moscow's decision to intervene in Syria?
If we assume that the rise of Putin, strengthened by his fourth presidential mandate, constitutes a factor essential to any understanding of Russian foreign politics over the last decade and its inclusion, at least at first sight, among these so-called ones rising powers, it follows that an in-depth analysis of the nature of the challenges that Moscow is making to the world liberal order will entail first of all a reconstruction of the political and strategic context in which these challenges have begun to take shape. Russia's current refusal to accept the rules of the post-bipolar system passively and therefore to comply with a redistribution of power that denies the country its previously acquired centrality is the result of a series of closely connected events that have developed since the end of the Cold War (Pisciotta, Reference Pisciotta, Clementi, Dian and Pisciotta2018).
On the basis of the above premises, this paper seeks to develop a new typology of revisionism based on the nature of the aims (territorial/normative/hierarchy of prestige), the means employed (peaceful/violent), and the level of action (regional/global). This will then be used to explain the escalation of Russia's foreign policy from regional to global claims with reference to its military interventions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria and to identify the type of revisionism involved in each of the three Russian military interventions undertaken both inside (Georgia and Ukraine) and outside (Syria) the post-soviet space.
To this end, the paper is divided into three parts. The first examines the concept of revisionism and suggests a classification of six kinds in relation to the means, nature, and level of the claims put forward by revisionist powers. The second discusses the interventions carried out by Russia within its regional area (in Georgia and Ukraine) and highlights their similarities in light of the predominant model of revisionism. The third analyses the military intervention in Syria and notes both the escalation in the projection of Russian claims from the regional level to the global and the type of revisionism involved.
Our methodological approach to determine Russian revisionism is an effective heuristic, delimiting it’s application which solves the links – BUT, confining it to a set of realistic threats – AND, analyzing individual actions to accurately depict and compare foreign policy
Pisciotta 20 (Pisciotta, Barbara, Associate professor in the Department of Political Science at Roma Tre University, 2020, "Russian Revisionism in the Putin era: an overview of post-communist military interventions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria." Italian Political Science Review 50.1, pp. 87-106, doi:10.1017/ipo.2019.18) nihara
A new typology of revisionism
In addition to the nature of the revisionist objectives (territory, international norms, or prestige) and the means employed (violent or peaceful), there is another crucial aspect that the literature has not taken into account: the level of action, which can be regional or global. As we'll see, this aspect is crucial for the development of a new typology of revisionism.
At the regional level, the intent to control or annex a territory, reformulate the norms, modify the regional structure, or alter the hierarchy of prestige is confined exclusively to the regional area in which the revisionist power is located. More specifically, the regional area delimits the actions that a state can decide to undertake with respect to the countries dependent on it and/or geographically, economically, and culturally involved in relations with it. The degree of danger of the threat of possible changes to the status quo is a reflection of regional balances of power and directly affects the neighbouring states and those located in the area. The Chinese policy of investments in South-East Asia and Russia's economic, energy, and military policy towards the former Soviet republics provide two excellent examples of action confined to the regional level.
When the demands of the revisionist power extend beyond its regional area, the challenge can instead involve the dominant global power (or powers) directly with the risk of limiting or compromising its (their) strategic interests and spheres of influence at the global level. In this case, unlike the previous one, the action undertaken by the revisionist state, be it peaceful or violent, tends to go beyond the boundaries of its regional area and extend to the international order, thus affecting the international norms, the hierarchy of prestige, the distribution of power and the control or conquest of territories, neighbouring, and otherwise. It is known that the regional and the global levels are both ‘external’ with respect to national boundaries (Pisciotta, 2016). In order to avoid misunderstandings, here we prefer to use the term ‘global’ rather than ‘international’ to stress the difference between a geographically delimited space (regional) and a potentially open space (global), by definition exposed to any external factor (regional, international, transnational).
The three dimensions of revisionism, namely the level of the aims (regional or global), their nature (territory/norms/power/prestige), and the means employed (violent or peaceful), can thus be used to develop six different kinds of revisionism as shown in Table 1.
[TABLE 1 OMITTED]
This typology contains two new elements with respect to those formulated in the past. The first regards the introduction of the level of action (regional/global) undertaken by the revisionist state. As we shall see below, this dimension is of crucial importance to highlight the gradual escalation of aims and the means employed, especially when there is recourse to military force, in transition from the regional to the global level. The degree of danger of the threat to the status quo is directly proportional to the level at which action is undertaken. In the present international system, where various actors would find it in their interest to counterbalance US hegemony but lack the means to do so, it is of crucial importance to note the presence of an actor that has no hesitation in resorting to military force in the pursuit of its own interest outside its regional area and without the consent of the hegemonic power.
The second regards the relation between means employed, level of action, and objectives. If all three dimensions work simultaneously to determine the type of revisionism, it is possible to compare the different empirical cases and highlight similarities and differences between the different forms of foreign policy, which would collapse if there were no connections between their objectives, means, and level of action. For example, two countries can both pursue the aim of changing the hierarchy of international prestige, and therefore act at the global level, but may choose to use force or diplomacy. It is true that the degree of threat to the status quo can be equally high, especially when the action undertaken proves more underhand and less visible, but the use of military force, being more explicit and devastating, can require equally explicit and devastating means in order to restore the status quo. Moreover, the use of military force outside a country's regional area can be associated both with objectives of territorial conquest, the pursuit of hegemony and a complete change in the status quo, and with objectives of mere control over zones of strategic importance together with the security of national borders and increase in power and prestige. There is evidently a substantial difference between these two kinds of revisionism and hence a drastic difference in the level of the threat to the status quo. Equally different are two forms of foreign policy that both opt for the use of peaceful means but pursue markedly different objectives at the global level, such as changing international norms or regimes on the one hand or the hierarchy of power on the other. While both can produce substantial change at the global level, it is clearly only the second type of revisionism that can potentially affect the distribution of power.
In this framework, nationalist revisionism, radical revisionism, and revolutionary revisionism represent three forms of change in terms both of expansion and of control over territory on the part of the revisionist power. All three presuppose the use of military force and objectives of power and territory with a gradual escalation in the degree of change pursued. The first (nationalist) involves forms of territorial expansionism or annexation with respect to neighbouring countries for the improvement of power and prestige at the regional level. The second (radical) is an intermediate modality of change in prestige and/or power at the global level, with or without any intention to alter the international norms, through the acquisition of the part of the revisionist state of territorial control over areas that are geographically distant but regarded as strategically vital to its national interests. The third and most extreme (revolutionary) is based on military conquest and the overall redistribution of power, rules and territory at the global level. The (nationalist) Russian military interventions in Georgia and Ukraine, the (radical) Russian military intervention in Syria, and the (revolutionary) foreign policy of Nazi Germany are three examples of each of the type put forward. It should be pointed out that in the typology presented here, only revolutionary revisionism – which should hopefully constitute no more than a text-book hypothesis in the current situation – corresponds to the kind identified by Buzan, while our radical revisionism is very different in meaning from his. Anyway, here we prefer to use the same term because it is the most appropriate to express our type of revisionism.
Moderate revisionism, normative revisionism, and reformist revisionism indicate three kinds of foreign policy pursued with non-military means of diplomatic and/or economic nature and again involve a gradual escalation of objectives and radius of action. A state may decide to strengthen its position at the regional level through a whole gamut of policies ranging from diplomatic or commercial relations with bordering and/or culturally similar states to the imposition of agreements highly advantageous to its national interests (moderate revisionism). It may decide to undertake large-scale diplomatic action at the global level to modify certain norms and rules of the international system in order to reduce the economic, social, and political costs they involve for the country (normative revisionism). It may use diplomatic and financial means to improve its power and/or prestige at the global level and even pursue a change in international norms (reformist revisionism). The policy of investments adopted by China in the less developed countries of South-East Asia (moderate), the aspirations of the Group of 77 for the NIEO (normative), and the Chinese policy of peaceful/rise/development at the global level (reformist) are examples of the three kinds of revisionism listed above.
Since every kind of revisionism always seeks a change in the status quo, differing in intensity but in any case always substantial, it follows that even when economic means are employed to attain the set objectives, the effects produced are anything but mild. On the basis of this assumption, the typology put forward here can provide an effective heuristic tool for two reasons. First of all, the close relationship between means and objectives makes it possible to delimit the sphere of application of the concept of revisionism and confine it in most cases solely to states possessing sufficient military and economic resources to be able to aspire realistically to a change in the regional status quo and hope to strengthen their position with respect to the hegemonic power at the global level. The weaker states will therefore hardly be able to pursue any form of revisionism other than the normative with any reasonable probability of success.
Secondly, the distinction between the regional and global levels makes it possible not only to reconstruct an escalation of objectives as regards change in the status quo but it is also possible to identify a predominant level of revisionism that characterizes an entire phase of foreign policy and is the result of a series of more or less interconnected individual actions when the fundamental objective of the state tends to remain comparatively stable over time. If this does not happen, it may prove more useful to determine the different facets that emerge from the discontinuity of a specific phase of foreign policy through analysis of the individual decisions taken.
Undue importance should not be attached to any discrepancy between reformist and radical actions, as the use of military force, once adopted at the global level, drives the desire for change in a direction from which it is not always possible to turn back and that tends to characterize a foreign policy far more strongly than simple reformism. In this case, the connection between means and objectives emerges from the notion of ‘uncertainty’ introduced by Schweller with reference to the decision of a revisionist state to resort to force. According to the author, this uncertainty arises from the effective military capacity of the revisionist state with respect to that of its potential allies and the adversary, the importance of what is at stake for both sides in the conflict, and the possible involvement of other actors. Schweller argues that this is a crucial criterion for the identification of actors as risk-acceptant and risk-averse: ‘Risk-acceptant actors are gamblers, while risk-averse actors are cautious under conditions of uncertainty. Risk-acceptant leaders, because they attach some added utility to the act of taking a gamble, are less constrained in making war decisions than are risk-averse actors; they are the actors most likely to saber-rattle, to ruthlessly engage in greedy expansion, and to anticipate bandwagon effects’ (Schweller, 2015: 10). If risk acceptance thus constitutes a key determining factor within the sphere of revisionism, it follows – as Schweller argues – that risk-acceptant and revolutionary powers are the most virulent expanders.
Although theoretically the military option however represents a risk, in the analysis of Russian foreign policy the reference to this concept simplifies the understanding of the nature of the revisionist aims, especially in terms of nationalist claims, as we will see in the Ukrainian case. The following empirical analysis seeks to explain the nature of the Russian military interventions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria with reference to two central aspects: (1) the gradual escalation of Russia's objectives from the regional level to the global and (2) the classification of the three military interventions in terms of the typology of revisionism put forward here.
Russia is decisively revisionist – our typology of revisionism and predictive, empirical analysis are BOTH valuable and accurate
Pisciotta 20 (Pisciotta, Barbara, Associate professor in the Department of Political Science at Roma Tre University, 2020, "Russian Revisionism in the Putin era: an overview of post-communist military interventions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria." Italian Political Science Review 50.1, pp. 87-106, doi:10.1017/ipo.2019.18) nihara
On the assumptions that changing the status quo is the basic aim of a revisionist strategy (Buzan, 2008) and that acceptance of the risks involved in the use of force is a key factor in distinguishing the different forms of revisionism (Schweller, 2015), this study puts forward a new typology of revisionism. The six types identified are based on three dimensions: the means employed (peaceful/violent), the nature of the objectives (territory/norms/power), and the level of action (regional/global). The introduction of a new typology of revisionism can also stimulate further research on the possible change of goals, means, and level of action of the potential claims of the revisionist powers that have economic and military capabilities to act both regionally and globally to change the status quo (see the case of Russia, China and, according to some scholars, the United States). Further research insights can be derived from the application of normative revisionism to the various empirical cases (see the Arab countries and the developing).
Our empirical analysis, in particular, confirms the importance of the level of action as a new element with respect to previous typologies and makes it possible not only to demonstrate the central part played by the military option in Russian strategy inside and outside the post-Soviet space but also and above all to confirm the escalation of the revisionist objectives pursued both at the regional level with the interventions in Georgia and Ukraine, and at the global level with the intervention in Syria. The respectively nationalist (Georgia and Ukraine) and radical (Syria) nature of the interventions emerges in relation both to the means and the level of action of these interventions, and to the objectives. In Georgia and Ukraine, Russia obtained the control and/or annexation of territories like South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Crimea, strengthened its position with respect to neighbouring countries, and impeded the expansion of NATO and the EU. In Syria it obtained control of the port of Tartus, ended the American monopoly in the war on terrorism by asserting itself as a strong party to the peace negotiations, challenged American interests in the Middle East by strengthening the Assad regime, and clearly manifested its determination to halt the decline that set in after 1989. The dual nature of Russia's objectives – both territorial (annexation and/or control over certain areas) and political (improvement of power and prestige at the regional and global levels) – characterized the country's revisionist strategy as a whole from August 2008 to March 2016, confirming the importance of the gradual increase in military expenditure and the reforms of the SAP in pursuit of the same.
If the spectre of the ‘end of history' that hovered over the ashes of communism was swept away by Putin at the end of the 1990s and the impact that his long period in power has had on domestic and regional balances is unquestionable, what is instead still in need of discussion is the effect that his plan of radical revisionism has had on the configuration of the international system as a whole. As matters now stand, any talk of American decline at the military level is misleading and empirically incorrect. It is, however, necessary to take the readiness to use military force as our starting point if we are to understand the nature and the consequences of Russian revisionism at the global level. A power in a position of hegemony cannot in fact hesitate to use all of the diplomatic, economic, and military means at its disposal in order to preserve its status and prevent any destabilizing threats from calling it into question. The USA has made systematic use of force since 1989 to preserve its spheres of influence all over the world and eliminate threats (from figures like Milosevic, Saddam Hussein, and Qaddafi) to the stability of the liberal world order on which its indisputable supremacy rested. Where it intervened militarily, with or without a resolution of the UN Security Council, it told the rest of the world that it was the only actor authorized – or rather self-authorized – to intervene in defence, at least formally, of human rights at the expense of national sovereignty.
Russia's revisionism is the child of this strategy. In order to alter the status quo in its favour, Putin has operated on at both the regional and the global levels to oppose American expansion in the post-Soviet space and its version of humanitarian intervention all over the world, not hesitating to use force in order to challenge the United States openly and bend the international rules to Russia's advantage. At the regional level, Georgia and Ukraine have been blocked. Their entry into the EU and NATO will not be possible without Russian consent or the risk of a frontal clash with Moscow.
At the global level, the effects of Russia's strategy will have to be assessed in the medium and long terms. Russia has now revealed its intentions and explicitly threatened the US monopoly in Syria both in words and in deeds. It is clearly not enough for Russia to alter the hierarchy of power. It wants to obtain acknowledgement of its prestige as a great power in both diplomatic and military terms. In other words, Russia wants to play a decision-making part once again in the management of world affairs. It also wants a less centralized system offering the opportunity to regain important margins of power.
Appeasement triggers Russian adventurism which turns their impacts, withdraws support from Baltic defense, AND upends the international order – causing prolif and disrupting trade
Goncharenko 20 (Oleksiy Goncharenko, Oleksiy Goncharenko is a Ukrainian lawmaker with the European Solidarity party, 2-27-2020, "The lesson of Crimea: Appeasement never works," Atlantic Council, ) nihara
Six years ago this week, a war began in Eastern Europe that has challenged our basic understanding of international aggression. Vladimir Putin’s attack on Ukraine has often been called a hybrid war due to Moscow’s reliance on a confusing cocktail of unmarked troops, local proxies, and blanket disinformation. The Kremlin has been careful to stop short of the conventional threshold for international aggression, but this has not diminished the global security implications of the conflict. Quite the opposite, in fact.
The Russian takeover of Crimea in February 2014 was not just a tragedy for Ukraine; it was a watershed moment for the entire post-WWII international order. Since annexing Crimea, Putin has launched an invasion of eastern Ukraine that has cost over 13,000 lives and displaced millions. He has dramatically escalated the carnage in Syria, deployed non-state forces everywhere from Venezuela and Libya to Sudan and the Central African Republic, and sanctioned a wave of political assassinations across Europe. Meanwhile, Russian disinformation campaigns, cyber attacks, and election meddling have become everyday facts of life.
Despite the obvious and mounting costs of failing to confront Putin in Crimea, some world leaders remain in denial. They talk of the need to improve relations with Russia and advocate compromise over confrontation, even if this means treating Putin’s imperial ambitions as legitimate grievances. This approach has produced little of value. After six years of escalating international insecurity, it is now time to abandon attractive illusions and acknowledge that appeasement only encourages further Russian aggression.
We have been here before. Europe’s previous attempts to appease a revisionist power with expansionist ambitions were similarly well-meaning, but they nevertheless resulted in WWII. Like Putin, Hitler also rejected the international order of the day and sought to create new realities on the ground through an audacious foreign policy linked to support for ethnic comrades left stranded abroad by post-war borders. When the Anschluss with Austria went ahead unopposed in March 1938, Hitler laid claim to the Sudetenland in neighboring Czechoslovakia. This led to the Munich Agreement, which has come to be recognized as the ultimate symbol of appeasement. Within a matter of months, Czechoslovakia had ceased to exist and a new world war was underway.
Comparisons with the 1930s are not entirely accurate. Unlike the abandoned Czechoslovakians, Ukraine refused to surrender in 2014 and has been opposing Russian aggression militarily for the past six years. Nor has there been any international attempt to legitimize the Russian annexation of Crimea as happened with the Sudetenland in Munich. On the contrary, the international community has imposed sanctions on Russia that have inflicted genuine economic damage, and has also introduced a number of symbolic measures to demonstrate its disapproval. However, there are growing indications that the resolve to maintain even these modest measures is now weakening.
Since taking office in early 2017, US President Donald Trump has been famously reluctant to criticize Putin. Recently, he has reiterated his that Ukraine can “make a deal” with Moscow. Meanwhile, French President Emmanuel Macron continues to champion a comprehensive with Russia while seemingly expecting little in return. Macron is not alone in this regard. He was only one of many leading European politicians to support Russia’s unconditional return to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) in summer 2019, despite Moscow’s refusal to address any of the issues that first led to Russia’s exclusion in 2014.
The trend continued at the Munich Security Conference in February 2020. Dubbed the “Davos for diplomats” and seen as the biggest event on the global security calendar, this year’s Conference was marked by the high-profile appearance of a Kremlin-friendly 12-point towards peace in Ukraine that more closely resembled a roadmap for the country’s surrender. The twelfth and final point of this plan, which called for Russian involvement in the search for a new Ukrainian national identity, underlined the dangerous absurdity of the document. To many in Ukraine, it was also a further sign of the mounting appetite for a return to business as usual with Russia, even if this means sacrificing Ukrainian sovereignty and ignoring some of the most basic principles of international law.
There is much more at stake here than Ukraine’s continued existence as an independent nation. Efforts to appease Russia are undermining the entire basis of the modern world order. Instead of equal justice for all nations regardless of size, we risk returning to a world where might is right and powerful nations are able to dominate smaller countries at will. If left unchecked, the rise of lawlessness in international affairs will have all manner of disastrous consequences in areas ranging from global trade to nuclear non-proliferation.
To prevent this scenario from unfolding further, the international order must be defended in Ukraine, where the breach first occurred. This defense should include a significant tightening of sanctions against Russia until the Kremlin begins to demonstrate changes in its behavior. At the same time, the international community should strengthen its support for the Ukrainian military. This combination of rising costs and growing deterrence would send a signal of strength to Moscow while stopping short of provoking a wider conflict. As things stand, the mixed messages currently reaching Russia are all but guaranteed to encourage further adventurism.
There is no excuse for today’s politicians to repeat the mistakes of the past, regardless of their good intentions. History has already taught us that appeasement of an aggressor simply does not work. If the lesson of the 1930s was insufficient, we now have the additional example of the past six years to refresh memories. Vladimir Putin has demonstrated again and again that he believes power is more important than principles. It is up to the international community to prove him wrong. Failure to do so will have dire consequences for global security in the decade