The EU can shape multilateral norms, especially in emerging tech---JCPOA proves.
Puglierin 21, Dr Jana Puglierin is Head of the Alfred von Oppenheim Center for European Policy Studies. From September 2013 to December 2015 she was a program officer at the DGAP’s Future Forum Berlin (Berliner Forum Zukunft). Prior to this she was an advisor on disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation at the German Bundestag, where she also worked on matters relating to German and European foreign and security policy., (Jana, “Strategic Partnerships and EU Security and Defence” in “Achieving Strategic Sovereignty for the EU”, European Parliament, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/653634/EXPO_STU(2021)653634_EN.pdf) //CHC-DS
4.2 EU Strategic Sovereignty, Partnerships and Multilateralism The case of the JCPOA provides evidence of how multilateralism is functional to European strategic sovereignty, but it is also illustrative of how the EU can effectively use its strategic partnerships, especially the one with the US, and multilateralism to mutually reinforce one another. If the E3/EU have done so on an issue of high politics over which they only have limited influence, there surely is much potential for the EU to shape multilateral norms, institutions and regimes in policy areas in which it wields more power, such as trade and regulations.53 The fact that great power competition increased as the crisis with Iran unfolded creates structural incentives for the EU, the US, the UK and other like-minded countries to seek convergence. By closing ranks with its allies, the EU increases its ability not just to resist pressure from systemic rivals such as Russia or China but also to engage them from a position of strength. Containment of Russia’s geopolitical sway in Europe, countering information warfare and protection from the political use of China’s investment policy and technology exports are structural interests around which the EU can build a renewed partnership with the US and others.