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Countries follow on --- clearer EU stance on tech regs galvinzes broader support for EU leadership

Franke and Torreblanca ’21 – Ulrike, Senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, Jose Ignacio, Senior policy fellow and head of the Madrid office of the European Council on Foreign Relations, a position he has held since the launch of ECFR across Europe in 2007.,(“GEO-TECH POLITICS: WHY TECHNOLOGY SHAPES EUROPEAN POWER, 7/21, https://ecfr.eu/wp-content/uploads/Geo-tech-politics-Why-technology-shapes-European-power.pdf) – sel

What Europe needs to do ECFR has put forward recommendations on how to address all these sources of vulnerability, from 5G and undersea cables to military AI. The EU needs to improve its data sovereignty by adopting strict regulations on data privacy and ensuring that these are exported to countries and companies that access Europeans’ data. EU member states should create an ecosystem in which smaller 5G players that focus on software and virtualisation can scale up their operations and cooperate effectively with larger European and US companies. The EU should heavily invest in exporting technologies and practices that protect democracy and help achieve technological sovereignty, and in learning from others’ experiences in this realm. But more important than these individual fixes is deeper engagement with the external implications and geopolitical power elements of technology. This engagement has an external element of reaching out to partners and an internal element of ensuring close cooperation between the EU and its member states. Outreach to partners The EU needs a global strategy for improving its partners’ access to reliable and safe technology. Otherwise, the bloc will leave a space that others will fill. Democracies would be further weakened and impoverished. Autocracies would thrive. Europe would be wrong if it thought it could set out its own rules and standards and let the rest of the world adapt. The Brussels effect, by which Europe silently exported its data privacy regulation to the rest of the world, will not easily repeat itself. GDPR happened when technology was still under the geopolitical radar. Now, technology has been (geo)politicised and both governments and industry actors know how closely intertwined power, technology, and regulation are. Both China and the US are reaching out to third countries. The US has programmes such as The Clean Network, which aims to help its allies end their use of Chinese 5G. The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative includes a digital component. And Chinese firms, with governmental support, export facial recognition and surveillance techniques to autocracies around the world. The challenge for the EU is in working with like-minded countries and multilateral bodies – such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), but also regional arrangements such as those in Latin America, Africa, and the Indo-Pacific – to develop fair, open, and values-driven technological standards. The EU should deploy the incentive of access to its digital market to strengthen its alliances. The bloc should use its financial institutions to incentivise EU firms to invest in countries that are seeking to adopt these critical technologies but, at the same time, want to reduce their technological dependence on China. The EU should also consider establishing a comprehensive and compelling tech package that would allow it to become a geopolitical player in the area. This ‘tech compact’ should include: upgrading existing or prospective trade agreements to grant improved access to the EU digital services market to countries that comply with EU standards in areas such as data flows, privacy, and AI; offering technical assistance to governments and parliaments wishing to align with the EU on regulatory issues; offering funding guarantees for connectivity investments; coordinating positions on technical standards in multilateral organisations; and offering cyber security and democracy-protection packages. In contrast to other great powers, whose tech offers are often based on coercion and the exploitation of weakness, the EU should stand for a principled approach based on partnerships, mutual interests, consent, and solidarity. Also, as it is already doing, the EU should continue scanning its internal market for vulnerabilities in critical technological sectors, identifying high-risk vendors, and ensuring reciprocity in market access to these technologies for countries that restrict or curtail digital trade. It will not be sufficient for the EU to merely approve internal regulations in the expectation that others will accept them, such as in the case of the GDPR. For example, the bloc is already operating on bilateral agreements with like-minded countries such as Japan to implement data privacy clauses that ensure the free and safe flow of data. But this is not enough in itself. The EU should aim higher – through multilateral institutions such as the OECD and the International Monetary Fund, or through groupings such as the G20 – to establish a global data privacy regime whose standards are valid for most democracies, if not for all countries (as those ruled by authoritarian regimes may opt out). A key component of this is the transatlantic relationship. A major agreement on data privacy with the US would help break the current dynamic of regulatory fragmentation, helping both the country and the EU jointly take on China and other illiberal regimes. The importance of cooperation between the EU and its member states The European Commission and other Brussels institutions are positioning the EU as a powerful actor in the global debates about tech regulation. But not all member states appear to feel the same sense of urgency. As of today, 21 member states have now published AI policy documents in which they identify areas of focus, develop recommendations, and decide funding priorities. These strategies reveal that most EU member states primarily see AI through an economic lens. Almost all the strategies were written by or under the leadership of economics ministries (or variations thereof) or, less often, ministries of innovation. With very few exceptions – such as France – most EU countries do not engage with the challenges posed by the way that the development and use of AI might affect the international balance of power. Even fewer discuss or even mention the impact of AI on defence. If the EU moves forward on technology issues without the support of its member states, it risks losing credibility and the capability to influence others. Worse, it could leave empty spaces in Europe that external actors fill. But, if the EU and its member states work together closely on technology issues, the bloc will be strengthened – and will lead by showing that its rules and regulations, such as those on privacy or trustworthy AI, work at home. In this, the EU can benefit from member states’ diplomatic reach in various regions. It is crucial for Europe to recognise and consider the international second- and third-order effects of any actions it takes in the technological space. It needs to acknowledge that these actions have an impact on its geopolitical power. They influence the EU’s soft power as a role model, its positioning relative to other major players’ plans, and its geopolitical room for manoeuvre.

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