EU dependence makes Russia/China war unwinnable---wargame simulations prove.
De Maio 21, Giovanna De Maio was a nonresident fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings. She is currently a visiting fellow with George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. With a background on Russia and international security, as well as on Italy’s relations with Russia, EU and United States, De Maio’s research analyzes transatlantic relations vis-à-vis the challenges posed by the rise of China and Russia, with a particular focus on NATO and EU. At Brookings, she has extensively worked on Italian foreign policy and on the European Union. She holds a doctorate in international studies from the University of Naples and prior to joining Brookings, she was a Transatlantic Postdoctoral Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington, D.C. and at the French Institute of International Affairs in Paris., (Giovanna, “OPPORTUNITIES TO DEEPEN NATO-EU COOPERATION”, December, Brookings Institute, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/FP_20211203_nato_eu_cooperation_demaio.pdf) //CHC-DS 🐱👤
A stronger European defense to strengthen NATO’s posture While the EU has made significant progress in countering hybrid warfare since Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the same cannot be said with regard to developing more effective traditional deterrence capabilities. Such capabilities are increasingly necessary, not just because of Russia’s aggressive posture — expanding its area of operations beyond the post-Soviet space to Syria and Africa — but also because of the growing geopolitical and security alignment between Beijing and Moscow.
Since 2014, cooperation between China and Russia has expanded beyond the domain of arm sales. The two countries have supported each other’s development of strategic weapons (such as for missile defense) and artificial intelligence, as well as each other’s political positions in the United Nations Security Council.41 Beijing and Moscow have deepened their interactions in Africa, where Russian Wagner Group mercenaries patrol Chinese facilities,42 and conducted military exercises including a shared air patrol in the Asia-Pacific region.43 They also have been seeking common ground on Afghanistan since the departure of U.S. troops.44 Such alignment is increasingly resembling a partnership that is reflected at the military level too. After the past year’s military drills in the Mediterranean, the Baltic Sea, and the Indo-Pacific, China and Russia recently conducted a joint military exercise called Zapad/Interaction-2021 in China’s northwestern region of Ningxia, where for the first time they used a joint command and control system and shared equipment — mimicking the way NATO forces work with each other.45 Meanwhile, the United States has begun to shift its security focus toward the IndoPacific region and South China Sea where Beijing is threatening Taiwan. Consequently, should a direct confrontation with China occur in the medium to long term, Russia could take advantage of the situation and potentially target Europe while U.S. forces and attentions are directed elsewhere. For this reason, it is crucial for European allies to have the military capabilities to push back against Russia with little support from the United States, at least in the initial phases. With more defense capabilities, European allies would also have the resources to respond to crises that arise in the Mediterranean region. After four years of strained trans-Atlantic relations — where the defense spending issue has intoxicated the broader debate on trans-Atlantic security — a stronger European defense would help Washington recognize the increased geopolitical cohesion and security concerns of the bloc. Unfortunately, as described earlier, such capability has yet to be achieved. A RAND Corporation wargaming simulation exercise assessed that in the case of a conventional attack by the Russian Federation, Moscow’s forces would be able to reach the outskirts of either the Estonian or Latvian capital in around 60 hours, and the NATO allies would not be able to defend these territories because of a (totally fillable) shortage of military capabilities.46 Similarly, a scenario analysis by the International Institute for Strategic Studies argued that without the help of the United States, conventional forces from European NATO countries would not be able to push back against the hypothetical conquest of Lithuania and part of Poland by the Russian Federation.47 To ensure that they can successfully respond to a land attack from Russia, or a coordinated Russia-China operation, Europeans need to increase the quality and readiness of their defense apparatus. A policy brief by the NATO Defense College calls for multinational battlegroups in Poland and in the Baltics to increase their readiness in terms of support capabilities, such as artillery and air defense, and for European allies to fulfill their NATO 2018 Readiness commitment of providing several land combat brigades and maritime task groups.48 The authors also point out that to increase deterrence, European allies need sufficient and effective air and missile defense capabilities to protect critical infrastructure, as well as long-range conventional precision-strike weapons to limit Russia’s options for regional conventional attacks.
All these analyses indicate that expanded capabilities on the European side are crucial for a stronger NATO posture. Political tensions around the branding of European strategic autonomy have unfortunately poisoned this debate and complicated a very simple issue: European forces must be able to take effective action with or without the United States in the theaters that are crucial for European security.