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A weak EU turns NATO capabilities---tanks burden sharing and hurts US public support---EU autonomy solves.

Retter et al 21, 1) Lucia Retter is a research leader at RAND Europe and co-directs RAND Europe's Centre for Defence Economics and Acquisition, M.A. in international relations and international economics, The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS); B.A. in modern and medieval languages, University of Cambridge, 2) Stephanie Pezard is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, Ph.D. in political science, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva; M.A. in history, French Institute of Political Science, Paris (Sciences Po); M.A. in political science, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva; B.A. in history, French Institute of Political Science, Paris (Sciences Po) 3) Stephen J. Flanagan is an adjunct senior fellow at the RAND Corporation. Ph.D. in international relations, Fletcher School, Tufts University; A.B. in political science, Columbia University 4) Gene Germanovich is an international defense researcher and currently serves as the acting international portfolio lead for the RAND National Security Research Division. B.S. in international affairs, Georgia Tech; M.A. in security studies, Georgetown University 5) Sarah Grand-Clement; publisher, 6) Pauline Paillé is an analyst at RAND Europe working in the area of defence and security. M.A. in international relations, Sciences Po Bordeaux (“European Strategic Autonomy in Defence: Transatlantic visions and implications for NATO, US and EU relations”, RAND Europe, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1319-1.html) //CHC-DS ‍

European and US interviewees came up with several arguments pointing to the benefits of a strong European pillar not only for NATO and the EU, but also outweighing the challenges that may emerge in the process. Whether these efforts come under the umbrella of European strategic autonomy and EU-level defence integration or via bi- and multi-lateral programmes, or some combination of both, did not make a substantive difference to the well-shared perception that a more capable Europe is good for NATO and good for the transatlantic partnership. A less engaged, less capable, less coherent and less reliable European pillar of NATO is unlikely to be capable of meaningful burden sharing. And from a US national perspective, justifying investment in European defence matters to the U.S. public would be very difficult if European nations choose not to invest in strengthening their contribution to NATO. While a weak Europe (our Scenario 2) would require least policy effort and resources, it would also be the one with least benefits for NATO and the U.S., particularly as it looks for allies in an emerging systemic competition with China. Naturally, the question arises as to whether the pursuit of European strategic autonomy is the ‘right way of going about it’, and whether the lack of clarity in relation to the concept creates more problems than it solves when it comes to the transatlantic relations. All in all, despite the risks of misunderstanding and miscommunication, the concept of European strategic autonomy, if underpinned by continuing defence consolidation, does seem to offer a unifying principle for a much needed defence integration to enable the EU to take up greater responsibilities for its defence and security matters.

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