The CP solves interoperability, cooperation, and Euro defense autonomy---zero funding or overlap deficits. **an IL to Euro autonomy INB
De Maio 21, Giovanna De Maio was a nonresident fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings. She is currently a visiting fellow with George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. With a background on Russia and international security, as well as on Italy’s relations with Russia, EU and United States, De Maio’s research analyzes transatlantic relations vis-à-vis the challenges posed by the rise of China and Russia, with a particular focus on NATO and EU. At Brookings, she has extensively worked on Italian foreign policy and on the European Union. She holds a doctorate in international studies from the University of Naples and prior to joining Brookings, she was a Transatlantic Postdoctoral Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington, D.C. and at the French Institute of International Affairs in Paris., (Giovanna, “OPPORTUNITIES TO DEEPEN NATO-EU COOPERATION”, December, Brookings Institute, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/FP_20211203_nato_eu_cooperation_demaio.pdf) //CHC-DS 🐱👤
Synergies in procurement and capability development As with the cyber domain, NATO and the EU could respond to outside pressure by increasing and improving procurement and technological cooperation. The COVID-19 pandemic has triggered shortages and vulnerabilities in the supply chain, and the competition for rare earth material and high-technology products (such as microchips) has increased. Meanwhile, breakthrough technological achievements are opening new frontiers for competition in the security domain. First, European allies could better coordinate their defense spending within the framework of the European Union; the absence of an integrated defense structure inevitably leads to duplications and wasted resources. Moreover, the armed forces of different European countries may encounter difficulties in operating with one another, given that there are 138 defense systems in Europe (compared to only 30 in the United States).70 As stated in a European Commission report, the lack of cooperation in the European defense industry produces a loss of 25 billion to 100 billion euros per year, while 30% of the costs could be saved if a joint procurement was in place.71 In the United States, several commentators point out that a more integrated procurement system at the European level will negatively impact U.S.-EU trade relations in the defense industry.72 Although some economic losses for the United States are indeed possible, there are ways to contain them and of course an EU with a stronger defense would make a more reliable partner for the United States. In fact, the U.S. and EU are currently discussing administrative agreements with the EDA to allow the United States to participate in PESCO projects. Through a franker dialogue, the two sides of the Atlantic could strengthen the defense market without resorting to protectionist stances on either side. This is particularly relevant considering the strong ties between the U.S. and EU defense industries; they both could benefit from deeper cooperation and exchanges on the technological level, and from free and fair competition in the trans-Atlantic defense market based on common rules and standards. On this point, the EU could leverage resources from the European Defense Fund and the European Commission’s Horizon 2020 program to develop new technologies and fill security gaps. Both the fund and program are relatively young and would benefit from a deeper exchange with NATO — whose experience in military procurement is unrivalled — to help define standards as well as characteristics of the technology. NATO and the EU address capability development in markedly different ways. NATO focuses more on procuring a given item from a given state to meet a specific need of the alliance, whereas the EU focuses more on filling capability gaps and encouraging member states to cooperate to develop new assets. In this regard, the EU appears to have a comparative advantage given the role of the European Defense Agency to go beyond specific operational requirements and its ability to consider long-term trends and ways member states can cooperate on the development of new capabilities. In particular, the EU defense procurement benefits from strong support from EU-led research and development programs, as well as from considerable financial resources from the European Defense Fund. As European defense capabilities advance, there will be overlap between the EU Capability Development Priorities and the NATO Defense Planning Process; this gives the EU and NATO an opportunity to foster greater cooperation and build up a more efficient and competitive trans-atlantic defense.73 A recent study from the French Institute of International Relations identifies areas where defense requirements could be harmonized and where the EU and NATO could work on joint research projects: from cyberdefense, air superiority, logistics, and medical support capabilities to science and technology, arms control, and intelligence.74 A more synchronized approach in these areas — that would also entail a joint assessment of member state performances — will undoubtedly reinforce both NATO- and EU-led operations as well as deterrence.