EU-NATO security cooperation solves interoperability---PESCO and the EDA prove past successes.
De Maio 21, Giovanna De Maio was a nonresident fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings. She is currently a visiting fellow with George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. With a background on Russia and international security, as well as on Italy’s relations with Russia, EU and United States, De Maio’s research analyzes transatlantic relations vis-à-vis the challenges posed by the rise of China and Russia, with a particular focus on NATO and EU. At Brookings, she has extensively worked on Italian foreign policy and on the European Union. She holds a doctorate in international studies from the University of Naples and prior to joining Brookings, she was a Transatlantic Postdoctoral Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington, D.C. and at the French Institute of International Affairs in Paris., (Giovanna, “OPPORTUNITIES TO DEEPEN NATO-EU COOPERATION”, December, Brookings Institute, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/FP_20211203_nato_eu_cooperation_demaio.pdf) //CHC-DS 🐱👤
Improved military mobility and interoperability While an increased European military posture is important per se, quick deployment and interoperability across the trans-Atlantic space is equally important. For this reason, NATO-EU cooperation appears even more relevant when it comes to military mobility, interoperability and procurement. Military mobility — defined as the ability to deploy and move thousands of troops across the European territory — is crucial to project an effective deterrence and is a key area where NATO-EU cooperation has been the most successful. Many factors slow mobility and therefore negatively impact the readiness of European defense, such as infrastructure incompatibility, as well as complex regulations on the transportation of weapons or military equipment. In 2019, NATO countries identified concrete steps to increase their military mobility, with the goal of being able to deploy 30 ground battalions, 30 air squadrons, and 30 combatant ships in the span of 30 days.49 The steps focus on four main areas: (1) developing and strengthening infrastructure, (2) improving strategic airlift and sealift capabilities, (3) strengthening the command and control line as well as planning for better coordination on a large scale, and (4) easing legal and diplomatic procedures across the military and civilian sectors to facilitate clearance processes. However, an Atlantic Council report has noted some significant gaps within each of the above listed sectors, which include a lack of resources and institutional weakness in tackling military mobility. As military mobility has important repercussions for strategic projection and procurement,50 it should be an area where NATO and the EU could have a more constructive dialogue. Strategic location is not currently a prime criterion for the evaluation of new defense projects in the EU, as the union is not a military power and is not used to strategic thinking in the military field. For this reason, the EU could benefit from NATO geostrategic experience to identify areas where more resources are needed and how they could be put to better use when considering geographical factors. For safer military mobility, such infrastructure should also be made more resilient to cyberattacks. Given its regulatory power, the European Union could play a valuable role in easing military mobility by establishing simpler processes to attain custom and border permissions for the transportation of, for example, dangerous goods or military equipment. The EU is also well placed to strengthen roads and infrastructure that are crucial for military mobility. In fact, the EU has launched the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) projects, a series of studies and activities designed to eliminate bottlenecks to mobility across the continent by, for example, completing missing sections of transit corridors and developing new dual-use (civilian and military) infrastructure projects.51 EU countries have also started featuring military mobility in their defense projects under PESCO and have set parameters for non-EU members to join; for example, Canada, Norway, and the United States are expected to participate in a PESCO project led by the Netherlands to test the state of military mobility in Europe.52 Improving military mobility across the trans-Atlantic space would positively impact the interoperability of allied armed forces — specifically their ability to be deployed and to operate with one another across the territory of the alliance. NATO and the EU can already count on deep interoperability because they share the forces of 21 countries that are member states of both organizations. Yet, as there are important asymmetries in military capabilities across the EU and more broadly across the alliance space, interoperability is in constant need of improvement. So far, one success story of NATO-EU interoperability has been the technological cooperation between the European Defense Agency (EDA) and the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) on air-to-air refueling operations (transferring fuel from one military aircraft to another in mid-air). This cooperation helped address one of the biggest EU defense shortfalls.53 In the aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and the AUKUS deal that marks the United States’ pivot toward the Indo-Pacific region, the debate over European defense has sharpened and more funds are being allocated to the European Defense Fund to strengthen the union’s military posture. In fact, the third EU “Joint Report to the European Parliament and the Council on the Implementation of the Action Plan on Military Mobility” has noted significant progress since October 2020, including on custom formalities and work with the EDA on two Cross-Border Movement Permission Technical Arrangements.54 Most importantly, from next year onward, EU member states can use funding from the European Recovery and Resilience Facility to invest in transport, including dual-use infrastructure.55 The EU also has a budget of 330 million euros (roughly $375 million) for co-funding projects (subjects to call for proposals) on dual-use infrastructure.56 While this level of ambition is certainly welcome because of its positive impact on EU defense capabilities, the EDA and NSPA should closely coordinate their efforts in order to increase interoperability and ultimately NATO and EU resilience and readiness toward international security threats.